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SUMMARY
This dissertation describes the development of a game-based methodology that fa-
cilitates the exploration and selection of research and development (R&D) projects under
uncertain competitive scenarios. The proposed method provides an approach that analyzes
competitor positioning and formulates response strategies to forecast the impact of technical
design choices on a project’s market performance.
A critical decision in the conceptual design phase of propulsion systems is the selection
of the best architecture, centerline, core size, and technology portfolio. This selection can be
challenging when considering evolving requirements from both the airframe manufacturing
company and the airlines in the market. Furthermore, the exceedingly high cost of core
architecture development and its associated risk makes this strategic architecture decision
the most important one for an engine company. Traditional conceptual design processes em-
phasize performance and affordability as their main objectives. These areas alone however,
do not provide decision-makers with enough information as to how successful their engine
will be in a competitive market.
A key objective of this research is to examine how firm characteristics such as their
relative differences in completing R&D projects, differences in the degree of substitutabil-
ity between different project types, and first/second-mover advantages affect their product
development strategies. Several quantitative methods are investigated that analyze busi-
ness and engineering strategies concurrently. In particular, formulations based on the well-
established mathematical field of game theory are introduced to obtain insights into the
project selection problem. The use of game theory is explored in this research as a method
to assist the selection process of R&D projects in the presence of imperfect market informa-
tion. The proposed methodology focuses on two influential factors: the schedule uncertainty
of project completion times and the uncertainty associated with competitive reactions.
A normal-form matrix is created to enumerate players, their moves and payoffs, and to
xvii
formulate a process by which an optimal decision can be achieved. The non-cooperative
model is tested using the concept of a Nash equilibrium to identify potential strategies that
are robust to uncertain market fluctuations (e.g: uncertainty in airline demand, airframe
requirements and competitor positioning). A first/second-mover advantage parameter is
used as a scenario dial to adjust market rewards and firms’ payoffs.
The methodology is applied to a commercial aircraft engine selection study where engine
firms must select an optimal engine project for development. An engine modeling and
simulation framework is developed to generate a broad engine project portfolio. The creation
of a customer value model enables designers to incorporate airline operation characteristics
into the engine modeling and simulation process to improve the accuracy of engine/customer
matching.
Several key findings are made that provide recommendations on project selection strate-
gies for firms uncertain as to when they will enter the market. The proposed study demon-
strates that within a technical design environment, a rational and analytical means of mod-
eling project development strategies is beneficial in high market risk situations.
xviii
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
“It is this triple convergence-of new players, on a new playing field, developing
new processes and habits for horizontal collaboration-that I believe is the most
important force shaping global economics and politics in the early twenty-first
century.”
-Thomas L. Friedman
1.1 Research Motivation
The practice of engineering in society has evolved over the past half century because of a
changing global arena. Although engineering remains the art and science of creating practical
solutions, the engineering process of achieving these solutions has been redefined. In the
aerospace community, many companies now design, manufacture, and sell their products by
decentralizing their operations according to the U.S. International Trade Commission (2001).
The Boeing 787 program for example, represents a network of the very best suppliers and
has revolutionized the way in which aircraft are designed and built (Elmer Doty, 2007).
The significant amount of resources required to produce large scale systems combined with
potential market risks have engineers focusing on getting the design right early on.
The commercial aviation industry is an example of an evolving market where margins
on regulations, environmental awareness, and life-cycle cost are having more leverage on the
success of a program than at any other time in the past. One particular trend has emerged
where large-scale airframe manufacturers offset design and production responsibilities to key
global suppliers for the purpose of gaining market access to ultimately gain a competitive ad-
vantage when airlines in those markets consider purchasing new aircraft (National Research
Council, 1999; U.S. International Trade Commission, 2001). Brandenburger and Nalebuff
(1996) conclude that there is an important interdependence between manufacturers, sup-
pliers and customers that should be considered when addressing market requirements. The
investigation of these relationships and how they impact the aircraft engine design process
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is a motivating problem in this research.
The primary example application in this research is aircraft engine design. The com-
mercial aircraft engine is an example of a complex system that is a key determinant in
satisfying customer requirements. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001),
as the market becomes more uncertain, matching customer needs with available resources
is a priority early in the design process. Engine companies make important strategic de-
cisions in designing their engine core architectures because the risks in development costs
and evolving customer requirements can likely collapse the entire business. Authors like
Newhouse (1982) state that commercial aircraft and engine business sets itself apart from
other industries because of the size of the risks and the costs that must be accepted. Green-
wald (1981) recounts how the development and subsequent market failure of the Rolls Royce
RB211-22 program for the Lockheed TriStar in the late 1960’s was evidence of an attempt
to guarantee performance requirements that ultimately could not be met.
There is a trend in the systems engineering community that involves synthesizing all parts
relating to the system, from the performance (technical) to the customer (business). From
this perspective, an engineer approaches a complex systems design problem “in its entirety,
taking into account all the facets and all the variables and relating the social to the technical
aspect” (Fossnes and Forsberg, 2006). The research conducted in this dissertation is focused
primarily on investigating new techniques that link the technical aspects of engineering
with the business aspects of the market. According to Newhouse (1982), a driving force
in the market is that of competition where companies must constantly “estimate market
size over a period of ten to fifteen years, partly on the basis of how they see the economy
and world politics evolving, and partly on the basis of the activities of their competitors”.
The fierce competition between Boeing and Airbus for global market share reinforces the
importance of getting the design right early on because, as Kretschmer (1998) recounts,
“committing large chunks of a company’s resources to a single investment project is always
a risky undertaking. It becomes even riskier when a competitor is set to do the same thing
and the market is unlikely to sustain two rival products”.
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Many authors agree that decisions made early in the design process have a lasting im-
pact on the success of a program (Ettlie, 1997; Kirby, 2001; Mavris, Macsotai and Roth,
1998). The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) also mentions the
consequences on life-cycle cost of making decisions early without the “benefit of good in-
formation and analysis” (Fossnes and Forsberg, 2006). In order to introduce these goals
into the conceptual design process, technical and non-technical design factors have to be
co-addressed early in design. In the aircraft engine industry, this will enable engineers to
address questions like: How much design margin is sufficient in order to be competitive?
How much growth potential is necessary to guarantee future sales? When is it better to take
a “wait and see” approach to benefit from market uncertainty?
Although it may be difficult to answer these questions analytically, this challenge can
be overcome with a framework that provides engineers with means to use decision-critical
knowledge to model, structure, and interface multi-attribute decisions within the context of
risk and uncertainty. With an increasingly uncertain and dynamic global marketplace and
a rapid change of pace in consumer demand this framework must be anchored in strategic
thinking.
This research proposes a systematic approach to competitive analysis that supports
decision-making in the concept selection phase of large-scale systems. This enables decision-
makers to explore design strategies and select the most optimum designs under the realms of
competitive uncertainty and customer requirements evolution. Various concepts and tech-
niques are borrowed from the mathematical discipline of game theory as means to facilitate
the systematic exploration of strategic solutions.
The goal of this chapter is to establish the foundation for the motivation behind this
research. The approach taken to narrow the scope of the problem is reflected in the struc-
ture of the chapter. The following sections begin with broad concerns in the conceptual
design field and end with issues surrounding competitive analysis in engineering design. Ob-
servations are made at each stage and research objectives are presented at the end of the
chapter.
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1.2 A Strategic Approach to Aerospace Design
Engineering can be described as a way of manipulating nature to create something physical
that has value to at least some segment of mankind. According to Hazelrigg (1996), “The
process of creating something physical requires allocation of nature’s resources; therefore,
engineering design is, essentially, the effective allocation of resources. The allocation of
resources is, by definition, decision making”. If the act of designing is a decision-making
process then the process by which decisions are made is instrumental in understanding a
design process. There are two key domains where decision-making is prevolent in systems
engineering and is the core of this research. The first one is called project planning and control
which describes how the creation of products and services is managed within a system’s life-
cycle. The second domain is the field of systems engineering. Since the creation of products
arises from systems engineering it is important to understand how these two areas interact.
A motivating interest in this research is the overlap that exists between systems engineering
and project planning.
According to Fossnes and Forsberg (2006) from INCOSE, this overlap is referred to
the management of risks and opportunities. Figure 1.1 provides a scope of the research
areas in this dissertation. The focus of this research is in the conceptual design stage of a
product’s life-cycle. There are two key contributors to the design decision-making process:
programmatic and strategic factors. Programmatic factors are typically associated with
technical, cost or schedule changes that arise internally throughout the development process
and strategic factors are external effects that impact the design decisions. These two areas
will be explored further throughout this chapter.
Most managerial activities in engineering design that deal with problem-solving, strategic
planning, and resource allocation, contain one or more components of the decision-making
process. Simon (1960) categorizes this process into three phases: Intelligence, Design and
Choice. Current decision-making theories seek to understand the real-life context in which
designers make decisions but often cannot make a rational case for the design choices made
by the designers. Few entities know how to perform a synthesis of these analyses. There of-
ten exists a disconnect between decision makers at the engineering design level and managers
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Figure 1.1: Product Life-Cycle Stages (Modified from Fossnes and Forsberg (2006))
at higher levels. This often results in failed promises to customers and the accumulation of
financial penalties. Decision-makers at all levels also have to distinguish between quanti-
tative and qualitative factors such as cost, performance, and customer satisfaction. At the
technical level, designers tend to make more quantitative decisions whereas managerial deci-
sions usually involve more qualitative factors. A framework is needed that enables decision
makers at all levels to understand and explain the implications of choosing one design over
another and improve the transparency of information between conceptual design engineers
and project management.
Conceptual engineers designing a commercial jetliner have to incorporate not only the
various elements and disciplines that comprise the aircraft but must also account for airports
and other supporting infrastructure as well as the larger market picture and global economy.
Each of these factors play an important role in the success of the commercial jet and its
operating airline. However, not all design decisions for example, associated with an engine
(subsystem-level) are made in unison with decisions about entering the aviation market
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(system of system-level). Furthermore, there often exists a disconnect between the those
making decisions at one level and those at another level of the system.
An important aspect of complex systems design is that both technical and management
processes must be closely interlinked (Souder, 1980; Tesar et al., 2003; Mackenzie et al.,
2004). More importantly however, is the fact that the decisions take place over long, in-
termediate, and short-term planning horizons. Long-term decisions will generally address
strategy, by considering such questions as when and which market to invest into, what
risk is involved, how to market the system, who to partner with, where to produce it, etc.
Intermediate-range decisions are tactical in that they address more directly the product with
a more in-depth study of the financial implications at a more detailed level. These tactical
decisions must be made within the boundaries established by the strategic long-term deci-
sions. Finally, short-range decisions involve fewer decision-makers that have local control
over a particular component or an analysis operation. Therefore, integrating these activi-
ties, with scope or time elements usually complicates the design process. In the aerospace
systems design process, these different decisions take place but, like most businesses, are
often made in isolation of each other. Furthermore, engineering design teams focus on the
lower-level, technical aspects and very little attention is given to the broader strategic de-
cisions. Several managerial decision-making methods exist that cope with some of these
challenges (Souder, 1980). Most of the existing advanced design methods in academia today
are directed towards improving both the quantitative and qualitative decisions in technical
disciplines where results can be obtained in a relatively short time period.
The underlying ideas behind the proposed research focus primarily on the harmoniza-
tion between systems integration in conceptual design and the strategic risks that exist when
introducing a new commercial vehicle at the market level. The risk and opportunity man-
agement domain shown in Figure 1.1 identifies the various factors that contribute to the
uncertainty present throughout the life-cycle of a system. The concept of strategic risk and
its relationship with market competition are the motivating themes in this research and are
expanded further in the subsequent sections.
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1.3 Beyond Systems Engineering
An indicator of success in engineering design is the ability to practice it within a broader
context. This means generating designs with all disciplines in mind and systems engineering
is at the forefront of this process. As defined by Fossnes and Forsberg (2006):
“Systems Engineering is a discipline that concentrates on the design and ap-
plication of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves looking at
a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facets and all the variables
and relating the social to the technical aspect.”
The systems engineering community approaches each problem with a process to interface
with external system elements such as the stakeholders, customers, markets, maintenance,
manufacturing, production management, etc. One author illustrates this perspective in
Figure 1.2 as the business case for any engineering problem.
Figure 1.2: The “Design Onion” (McMasters, 2002)
At the core of any engineering problem is its design and analysis process. This process
consist of three main phases; conceptual, preliminary and detailed design (Anderson, 1999;
Raymer, 1999). The conceptual phase can differ slightly but typically consists of creating
a fuzzy representation of the overall shape, size, weight and performance of the product.
The activities at this stage involve evaluating the overall performance and feasibility of the
design via numerous iterations between customer requirements and system configuration
parameters. The decision-maker then determines whether a satisfactory performance is met
by all parameters and initial requirements are met. The design(s) is then considered feasible
enough for further analysis at which point it enters the preliminary design phase.
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Preliminary design or embodiment design may include more thorough performance anal-
yses and component configurations. At this stage, comprehensive aerodynamics and struc-
tural performance calculations are made with appropriate drawings indicating specific com-
ponent placement (Raymer, 1999). A preliminary selection of materials and manufacturing
processes are established and tolerances and dimensions are provided. The final stage is the
detailed design phase where detailed drawings and specifications are made for the product.
The traditional approach to design was driven primarily through performance measures.
Without the advantages of modern computer capabilities to facilitate decision-making other
key objectives like cost, maintainability and so on were dealt with in the latter stages of
the design process. Limited information about the impact of the surrounding environment
such as the market and competing firms meant that decision-makers relied on intuition and
heuristics to make design decisions.
In the aerospace industry, studies by Monteleone (2001) confirm that the impact of
factors like customers or politics has a significant impact on the design decision-making in
the conceptual phases. Decisions within the non-technical areas are often deciding factors
in determining the success of a program. The competition between Boeing and Airbus is
a good example of where strategic decision-making plays a key role in developing design
concepts.
Boeing initiated the Sonic Cruiser concept in the late 1990’s as a response to Airbus’
A380, claiming rapid point to point connections was the key to future travel. However, in
part because of the political and financial impacts on the airline industry from the September
11, 2001 events, customers then favored lower operating costs over a marginal increase in
speed. This forced Boeing to end the Sonic Cruiser program and leverage its technologies to
develop the new B787. This new program presented a serious threat to Airbus’ existing A330
with its lower operating cost. Although Airbus initially rejected these claims, increasing
customer pressure forced Airbus to propose a simple derivative of the A330 dubbed the A330-
200lite with improved aerodynamics and engines. However, with continuing dissatisfaction
from the airlines, Airbus was forced to formally launch a four billion dollar investment into
the development of a new replacement, the A350. It became the B777-200ER and B787-9’s
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biggest competitor. But airlines noticed that the A350’s design was not fully developed
and did not provide significant improvements over its competitors. The wing design was
somewhat outdated and the fuselage remained the same as the A330 and A340. Airlines
shifted towards the B787 and those that remained on-board pressured Airbus to completely
revamp the design and create an all new wide-body. In response, Airbus unveiled the
A350XWB family with a new fuselage, wider than the 787 in addition to other improvements
but with a delay in entry into service (Flight International, 2006). Both companies have
invested billions of dollars into various programs in order to satisfy airlines and gain market
share. This example illustrates how technical design decisions in conceptual design are only
as successful as those that deal with the larger strategic problem.
The challenge is to understand why some research and development (R&D) projects fail
while also predicting how others succeed in the market. According to Balachandra and Friar
(1997), in the early 1990’s almost 90% of approximately 16000 new products introduced did
not meet their business objectives. The key to a successful system in the market is to achieve
a balance between the business aspect, the budget aspect and the technical aspect. The
mindset of systems engineers is develop a technical solution that follows the business case
and meets funding constraints. Systems engineering plays a role in the business development
as much as in the design itself. INCOSE highlights the main components of a business life
cycle in Figure 1.3. The INCOSE handbook defines the concept stage of systems engineering
(Fossnes and Forsberg, 2006):
“The concept stage of systems engineering is executed to assess new business op-
portunities and to develop preliminary system requirements and a feasible design
solution.”
In many current design approaches, like propulsion design, decision drivers are primarily
based on performance (technical) metrics. Preliminary design engineers in engine manu-
facturing companies are turning towards academia to help develop methods or techniques
that will help them drive decisions with customer value and business return early in prod-
uct development. The challenge is to find ways to incorporate the business case into the
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Figure 1.3: Generic Business Life Cycle (Fossnes and Forsberg, 2006)
different technical processes that take place in conceptual design and is an underlying focus
of this research. An understanding of the technical design process is necessary in order to
determine where to incorporate business-centric variables. This can be formally written as:
Observation 1: Financially successful research and development programs
in aerospace engineering are a product of a comprehensive understanding of
the business case and its relationship with the technical design environment.
The engineering design process could benefit from methods that analyze mar-
ket uncertainties and their impact on design decisions.
Designing aerospace systems with useful market knowledge and information is vital to mak-
ing accurate decisions throughout the R&D phase. Decision-making in project selection is
therefore an important element early in design. Fortunately, progress in the decision-making
fields has enabled engineers to become better equipped at making complex choices.
Expanding the engineering design space to include the analysis of market uncertainties
in systems engineering has been a primary objective throughout the investigations in this
research. As the technological and competitive landscape are evolving, the firm’s strategic
decisions are precisely what will determine its competitive success and market survival.
The problem lies in the fact that managers have had to make decisions in the absence of
structured, quantitative analysis, relying primarily on intuition and experience. A need has
emerged in conceptual design to study the importance of the market on engine selection and
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in order to limit the scope of this research one of the areas of interest for further review
is the study of market uncertainties in systems engineering. At the end of this chapter, a
compilation of observations, objectives and research areas will be presented.
1.4 Decision-Making in Design
The importance of decision-making in systems design cannot be emphasized enough. Sys-
tems design problems generally deal with both physical and organizational parameters in
a multi-dimensional setting. Product selection is made from a large set of alternatives and
must be made by considering many diverse factors. However, as expressed earlier, both
managers and engineers traditionally use one-dimensional tools to make design decisions.
Engineering choices are often made in a disciplinary fashion, which are driven by specific
areas of expertise, like aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, etc. Managerial decision are
likewise independent of the engineering capabilities, and focus primarily on the business
aspect of the problem. As a result, product design is mismanaged and subsequent failures
occur. The bottom line is that decision-making at any level in the design process hierar-
chy must be well structured so choices can be made as accurately as possible. Suh (1990)
recognizes the role of decision-making in design by stating:
“In order to obtain better performance, both engineering and management struc-
tures require fundamental, correct principles and methodologies to guide decision
making in design...”
There is extensive literature that addresses the field of decision-making. Chen and Lewis
(1998); Lewis et al. (2001) acknowledge that poor decision-making cannot be solely as a result
of poor information that the designer held at the time of the decision. Instead, Hazelrigg
(2003) contends that “faulty decision methods are also likely causes of bad engineering design
decisions”. He claims that although many engineers have developed numerous decision tools
for selection in design, these tools do not necessarily contain the formalisms of decision
theory. The science of decision theory is based on a mathematical framework that has been
employed in applied economics, operations research and a wide variety of other fields(Pratt
et al., 2008; Clemen, 1997).
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There does exist a decision-making hierarchy in systems design problems that involves
the overall business objective of the organization. Strategic management is the approach
taken to link the vision, resources, environmental circumstances and core objectives together
to outline an overall corporate strategy. This topic will be reviewed further in the strategic
risk section in this chapter. What is important about business decision-making here is that
organizations are generally not highly centralized structures where important decisions are
made at the center. Instead, organizations decentralize decisions.
“Matters of fact can be determined wherever the most skill and information is
located to determine them, and they can then be communicated to ’collecting
points’ where all the facts relevant to an issue can be put together and a decision
reached” (Simon, 1996).
Most systems design organizations follow a similar decentralized decision-making structure.
The organization is generally subdivided into specialized groups that perform specific func-
tions such as: investment and funding decisions, administrative decisions, strategic planning,
marketing decisions, engineering design decisions, etc. The fact that the decision-making
is decentralized does not mean that the decisions for each group are one-dimensional. For
this reason it is important to search for selection techniques that allow for the inclusion of
both physical (technical) and business (non-technical) parameters. The organization of a
engineering enterprise can be defined in a functional manner to facilitate the understanding
of design and product development. Dieter (2000) shows how the Department of Defense
(DOD), a major sponsor of R&D projects, classifies engineering functions in Figure 1.4.
As stated in the previous section, there are many disciplines beyond the technical that
need to be brought back into the decision-making problem early in the process. Decisions
become hierarchical such that some decisions may have a short term impact vs some that
may have be long-term with potentially more significant consequences. Decision-making in
systems design is a process, not an event. This evolutionary process almost always involves
iteration. In many organizations, there exists top level managers, mid level managers, super-
visory managers, technicians and other experts, each making an independent contribution
to the analysis of a complex systems decision problem.
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Figure 1.4: Spectrum of engineering functions (Dieter, 2000).
An example of hierarchical decision-making that currently exists in system design prob-
lems is illustrated in Figure 1.5. The horizontal axis describes the number of decision-makers
Figure 1.5: Systems Decision-Making Hierarchy
and the vertical axis represents the level of detail that a specific decision corresponds to.
The third axis is the arrow which describes the time element associated with the decisions.
This time third axis can also represent the degree of freedom associated with decisions. At
high levels in the hierarchy, the decisions will generally affect the system as a whole thereby
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having greater freedom for change.
This section has introduced the significance of good decision-making early in the design
process and thus the need for more adequate information about the problem. Skinner (1999)
reminds designers in his “ten principles of good-decision-making” that they must “understand
the business situation and the external factors influencing the problem”, which is a primary
objective embedded in this dissertation.
1.5 An Aerospace Market Overview
With the emergence of new markets around the world in recent years the aerospace industry
is rapidly adapting to the accompanying increase in travel demand. Large-scale aircraft
manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus have taken advantage of growing economies in
China and India to expand their production facilities and establish business roots. Boeing
Commercial Market Outlook (2008) forecasts air travel demand to grow to 29,400 airplanes in
all size categories by 2027. The Asia-Pacific region will be at the forefront of this growth with
a predicted demand of 9,160 aircraft. These are impressive figures that indicate significant
aviation growth in the future and which will require more efficient aircraft to cover expanse
regions of the Earth.
Alongside the airframe manufacturers engine companies are also expecting an increased
demand over the next 20 years. Both General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce (RR) are
competing in the B787 and A350-XWB markets, with the GEnx and Trent1000/1700 re-
spectively. As Pratt and Whitney (PW) begins development of its new Geared TurboFan
(GTF), both GE and RR are actively pursuing next-generation engines of their own. Airbus
recently announced that it would be willing to enter the GTF competition against Bom-
bardier’s CSeries but saying that “it would probably take the best part of two to two-and-a-half
years to develop a GTF-powered A320” (Flight International, 2008). Although engine man-
ufacturers have similar looking engines their internal architectural designs and capabilities
differ so they can differentiate themselves in the market. Airlines have several engine op-
tions available to chose from for a particular aircraft model. Figure 1.6 illustrates the two
top airframe and three top engine manufacturers in the commercial aviation industry. The
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figure shows each aircraft model with two or three engine options and the six engine man-
ufacturers are listed at the bottom. Deciding to produce an engine for a particular aircraft
model requires extensive conceptual analysis.
Figure 1.6: Competitive Propulsion Applications in Commercial Aviation (Airbus Indus-
trie, 2008; Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2008)
The competition in the engine markets is not as clear-cut as it may seem. The trend in
the past decade or so has been for manufacturers to form joint ventures and partnerships
for risk-sharing purposes. Companies are having to “listen more to customers, work with
suppliers, and establish strategic partnerships- even with competitors” (Brandenburger and
Nalebuff, 1996). In order to formulate better business strategies companies must understand
the inter-dependencies that exist between players, as well as the multiple roles they may play.
Understanding the aircraft requirements is only a small part of the conceptual design
problem. Many more non-technical variables affect the decision-making in conceptual design.
These are influenced by the many participants in the market. From the perspective of an
engine manufacturer, the aviation industry’s participants are categorized as competitors,
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complementors, customers and/or suppliers. This industry can be envisioned through the
Value Net created by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) and illustrated in Figure 1.7.
AN 
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The Airlines, 
Maintenance Customers,
The General Population
COMPETITORS
Other Engine Companies,
Other aircraft
SUPPLIERS
Component and Parts Manufacturers, 
Company Employees,
Company Facilities
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Aircraft Company,
Airports, 
FAA
Figure 1.7: The Value Net for an Engine Company (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996)
Competition in the engine industry has significant leverage on the future sales for engine
manufacturers. Monteleone (2001) represents a well-established aviation consulting firm that
points out that “engine manufacturers want market share and will do pretty much anything
to get on the wing and make up their costs on the back end”.
Every company has an incentive to maximize the return on investment for their stake-
holders. This objective translates to making sure that the product does well in the market.
A conceptual design author makes the case for analyzing competition (Mattingly et al.,
2002):
“The designer will also experience a natural curiosity to find out what the other
engine companies are proposing. This curiosity can be satisfied by a number of
legitimate means, notably the free press, but each revelation will only make the
designer wonder why the competition is doing it differently and cause his or her
management to ask the same question.”
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Since the core engine design is locked in early in the design process, the ability to pre-
dict how your product will do against the competition once it enters the market is vital
so that the design can be optimized for potential market consequences. Especially since
choosing the right engine from the airline’s perspective is not straightforward. There are
many financial incentives and intangible criteria involved in the negotiation process with
engine manufacturers. However, a significant part of the negotiation relies on performance
objectives instead of financial or economic criteria. Therefore, integrating the customer and
performance metrics collectively into a process provides a better understanding of how the
engine will perform in a market.
1.6 Competitive Designs
Engineering systems design is described as a process where the key to successful decision-
making is good information and the knowledge to use it. There are various formal methods
within the realms of decision theory and multi-disciplinary design that are used to obtain
such information and use it to examine decision-making problems. This type of engineering
design can be viewed as a “game against nature” where designers seek to maximize the
utility of a system. Nature represents a limitation or constraint on the design and generates
uncertainties on the outcomes. In the design of defense systems such as military aircraft
this type of decision-making philosophy is applicable. However, in other design problems,
systems design is not only limited by ’nature’ but also by competing designs. The commercial
aviation industry is a prime example where the element of competition plays a crucial role.
Airframe manufacturers are continuously competing over price, speed, range, comfort, etc.
in a market full of exigent customers. The decision-making environment under conditions
of competition is the underlying theme of this research.
A common design objective can be expressed in the form of a utility function that allows
designers to rank alternatives. There is however, no utility function that represents nature.
Nature presents uncertainties in many forms (storms, earthquakes, etc) that may influence
the operation, reliability, safety, and lifetime of engineering systems. The one thing nature
does not do is produce competitive designs. Competition occurs with people or entities
17
that have preferences or utilities that are often in conflict with one another. A company
that designs a product to compete against other companies is consciously making design
decisions that affect its competition. This type of competitive situation is defined as a game
by Hazelrigg (1996):
”A game is any activity that involves more than one individual, where the actions
of each individual in the game affects others who are also in the game.”
The research proposed in this dissertation creates a structured process for conceptual de-
signers in complex systems engineering problems that analyzes (uncertain) competitor in-
formation for the purpose of generating actionable design strategies. This requires a more
rigorous definition of the meaning of competition in systems engineering. Merriam-Webster
(2003) defines competition as:
”The effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of
a third party by offering the most favorable terms.”
This notion of competition can be defined similarly in the context of propulsion systems
design as:
The effort of two or more design alternatives acting independently to secure the
business of a market by offering the most favorable terms.
Where:
• Design alternatives: Engine architecture designs (note: these designs may represent
two or more companies)
• The business: Commercial aviation
• Market: Airlines (Customers)
• Terms: Robust aircraft/engine package for airline’s intended purpose
Hernandez et al. (2000) and Marston (2001) show how a competitive game can be described
as an optimization problem where there exists two or more objectives or utility functions,
and corresponding to each utility function, a separate set of control variables. Systems
design problems can be decomposed into complex games (Fernandez et al., 2005). Multi-
disciplinary problems are modeled as games where the players represent different disciplines
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like aerodynamics, weights, propulsion, etc (Vincent, 1983; Chen and Lewis, 1998; Ferguson
and Lewis, 2004; Lewis and Mistree, 1996). But multi-disciplinary design problems ulti-
mately have one common goal and that is to produce a design that minimizes or maximizes
a global objective function. The competition is now external to the company and the players
are the companies themselves. The environment in which they compete is the market. One
of the underlying interests in this research is to examine how the competition in the market
impacts the design choices in the technical disciplines of design problems.
In propulsion systems design, there exists many disciplines that may have conflicting
objectives. Design areas like customer value, manufacturing cost, and business financial re-
turn directly influence how an engine should be designed. Engines may contain technologies
that make it have the best thrust and lowest weight but how successful is that engine if its
manufacturing and maintenance costs are too high which means the return on investment
and customer value are too low. What if a competing engine placed more emphasis on cus-
tomer value and strategized appropriately for the market? More than likely that company
would fare better in market share. So how is the strategic game won for propulsion sys-
tems? There is extensive research in academia that analyzes the impact of technologies and
improves the technical potential of engines. This is a game against ’nature’ that produces
incremental gains in design performance. There is very little impact on the success of a de-
sign in improving component efficiency by one point or less. With only a few revolutionary
technological game-changers on the horizon the strategic game can no longer rely solely on
technology investment. Early in the design process, there are key design decisions that fix
the the design. These decision are in fact strategic because they impact every discipline at
some point in the future. Examples of strategic design options are consist of, but are not
exclusive to:
• The selection of a ’correct’ propulsion architecture:
– 1-stage high pressure turbine vs. 2-stage high pressure turbine
– 2-spool vs. 3-spool vs. geared fan
• Setting the design point for maximum flexibility:
– Airframe family evolution: extended range, increased take-off gross weight, etc.
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– New family designs
These strategic options in conceptual design are considered product development decisions.
As noted earlier, an evolving marketplace has meant that conceptual designers are going
beyond their engineering capabilities to address non-technical characteristics of innovative
product development design decisions. Studies by Ali (1994); Ali et al. (1993); Ettlie (1997);
Loury (1979); Mansfield and Wagner (1975); Rosenberg (1990) in the operations manage-
ment and product development fields have shown that competition is a key factor to the
innovation process. These observations culminate into the following:
Observation 2: Customer requirements and the intensity of rivalry between
firms influence the engine architecture selection process. Selection mecha-
nisms capable of evaluating both of these factors simultaneously are needed
for increased selection confidence at the conceptual design level.
We are essentially attempting to improve the efficiency in designing new innovative products
by addressing competition from an engineering perspective and managerial mindset. This
leads to a second area of research that further bounds the scope of this dissertation and that
is to investigate how competitive analysis facilitates decision-making in conceptual design.
1.7 Strategic Risk in Aerospace Design
An article from the The Wall Street Journal (1988) describes the competition between Pratt
& Whitney (PW) and General Electric (GE) in the early and mid 1980s and their strategic
choices in jet engine design. After losing a decade long market lead to GE in the mid 1980s,
PW invested $1 billion in manufacturing a new, mid-size engine to power the new Boeing
757. GE instead chose to focus on improving its engines for the successful 747. PW’s decision
to build a brand new engine was a much riskier yet potentially more lucrative approach to
GE’s decision to upgrade their existing engine line. These are two distinct product selection
strategies that had a major impact on the each firm’s return on investment and ultimately
their survival in the business. There is a strategic risk associated with pursuing different
types of product development projects and competitive positioning is a key factor. Ali
(1994) reaffirms the importance of the competitive effect on product development strategy.
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In particular, he studies how anticipated competitive behavior may affect other firm’s choice
in product selection.
The focus of this dissertation is competition and how to analyze and interpret it within
the realms of engineering design. Design choices made based on these analyses are going to
have an associated level of risk. The risk involved in developing and pioneering new innova-
tive engines may inhibit firms from committing resources to their research and development.
Identifying, mapping and mitigating this risk is part of the risk management process that
is of interest in this research. There are many well established risk management procedures
that are noteworthy. Fossnes and Forsberg (2006) provides a risk and opportunity manage-
ment process that studies the risk and opportunities present in the life cycle of systems. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2004) (NASA) branch of the United States
government also has a well-documented risk management plan that details procedures to
identify, analyze, track and mitigate risks.
The risk management framework drawn from the Institute of Risk Management (IRM),
the Association of Insurance and Risk Managers (AIRMIC), and the National Forum for Risk
Management in the United Kingdom provides an appropriate start to identifying strategic
risks. The framework is presented in Figure 1.8.
The framework identifies four main contributors to strategic risk. This research seeks
to evaluate primarily competition and customer changes as the main risk factors associated
with new product development. The choice between an new or modified product is one
of great strategic importance to conceptual designers. In addition, studies by Ali et al.
(1993) show that the impact of entering the market with either product before or after the
competition can be a highly rewarding investment or a very risky strategy. There are certain
firm characteristics, like the choice of new or modified product choices as well as market entry
timing that influence the strategy for product development early in design. These aspects
of product development exist in the development of aircraft engines are are central to the
investigation in this research. A third and final observation can be summarized as:
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Figure 1.8: A Risk Management Framework (The Institute of Risk Management, 2002)
Observation 3: In aerospace design, the probability of economic success
of engine development strategies is dependent on market entry timing and
development duration in addition to the performance of the engine design.
In order for a company to better mitigate risk in a dynamic global market and to be eco-
nomically successful there is a need for innovative methods to assist propulsion system
decision-makers as they account for these larger strategic impacts.
Two main deficiencies have been identified in most systems engineering conceptual de-
sign problems. The first is that conceptual design decision-making at the engineering level
is typically based on performance and affordability metrics alone. This results in designs
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that do not have sufficient competitive or strategic leverage. Secondly, the current sys-
tem architecture down-selection process in conceptual design is conducted with a reduced
amount of knowledge and information about competitive and market uncertainty and their
relationship with the technical parameters. This problem can be summed up as an ongoing
disconnect of information between the design engineers at the technical level and the upper-
level management. A primary goal in this research is to adequately introduce the notion of
strategic decision-making early in the design process. Throughout this dissertation, strategic
design is defined as an approach to efficiently develop new designs by forecasting changes or
fluctuations in technical capabilities, customer requirements and market competition. This
involves a systematic execution of methods and procedures for performance and affordability
implementation, technology infusion, and competitive hedging.
Design decision-making must therefore include some element of competitive analysis of
the manner in which conceptual designs are influenced by market forces. This may involve
a broader perspective of design for growth within a product family and ways to strategically
position the family for maximal investment return in the competitive markets of today and
tomorrow.
The third and final research area of interest is the selection of project development
strategies in competitive environments. The review of literature in this field will limit the
scope of the investigations to the study of selection strategies based on competitive effects.
1.8 Dissertation Organization
The previous sections introduced the main areas of study that are covered in this research.
They also highlighted possible analyses that were lacking in current systems design pro-
cesses. The deficiencies of current engineering design methods, coupled with the promise of
strategic design, is the impetus for this work. The observations made provide guidance for
the development of formal objectives that this research aims to accomplish.
Objective 1: Expand the engineering technical design space to evaluate the
market performance of large-scale aerospace systems.
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Objective 2: Introduce mechanisms that quantitatively model competitive sce-
narios and their impact on the resource allocation for a portfolio of engine ar-
chitectures.
Objective 3: Establish a framework for down-selecting engine strategies that
accounts for uncertain development periods and that benchmarks potential de-
sign performance against the competition.
The purpose of the first objective is to create a foundation within the conceptual design
process that enables engineers to introduce economic models and their attributes into the
parametric design space of aerospace systems. Particularly in the design of commercial
systems, revenue and cost models are essential to evaluating economic success. A unified
framework that allows engineers to map performance and economic requirements concur-
rently within a single design space is also beneficial from a managerial perspective. The
concept of market performance is meant to focus on the economic success of a particular
design within a particular market segment. Throughout this research, this performance will
be evaluated in terms of market share and its subsequent value to the manufacturer. The
task of expanding the existing technical design space to one that incorporates market at-
tributes is no easy task. The first focus area for this research will be to investigate which
elements are needed to create an environment that is capable of modeling both technical
and economic metrics concurrently.
The second objective builds on the first by taking the environment one step further to
analyze the dynamics of competition between two or more entities. The goal here is to inves-
tigate methods and techniques that can quantitatively measure competitive scenarios. Of
particular interest are techniques that provide competitive response strategies to facilitate
the selection of engine architectures. For this reason, the second focus area of this research
is dedicated to investigating competitive methods and techniques. Finally, the third objec-
tive is meant to guide the selection process of engine architectures. When making engine
architecture choices the number of decision criteria is often overwhelming. The importance
of each criteria can also has a significant impact on the choice of design architecture. This is
a foreseeable challenge and thus a third focus area is to investigate which criteria are most
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important to a manufacturer when selecting an engine architecture design.
These objectives provide the direction that is necessary to answer the global research
question of this research:
How can aerospace architecture solutions be generated in the context of uncertain
competitive scenarios and be strategically explored for optimal selection?
The traditional design process as applied to aircraft engine design does not have the means
to address the issue of strategic decision making early in the conceptual phases. It is now
possible to look into answering questions such as what path(s) overall will maximize return
on investment based on market changes or customer makeup? This dissertation provides
an introduction to and examination of the strategic decision making aspects of commercial
engine selection and design. Additionally, since the engine design/selection problem involves
making key economic decisions in a competitive environment, it is reasonable to introduce
some aspects of game theory within the decision analysis.
The development of a methodology for analyzing market competition in the conceptual
design phases of design is presented in this dissertation. The motivation and problem def-
inition sections served to provide a frame of reference and to delineate the scope of the
research. Chapter 2 provides a background of the relevant methods and techniques that
characterize the state-of-art. Innovative competitive analysis techniques are the subject of
Chapter 3. The research questions and hypotheses are then formulated in Chapter 4 based
on the literature review and competitive techniques. These questions and hypotheses guide
the development of the methodology. Chapter 5 implements the methodology on a commer-
cial engine selection problem as a proof-of-concept. The dissertation concludes in Chapter
6 with a revisitation of research objectives and recommendations for future work.
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Figure 1.9: Dissertation Structure
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of reviewing the literature is to survey existing methods, processes or techniques
that address and help achieve some or all of the research objectives. Throughout this process
it is possible to determine if and where there are gaps in the literature that are consistent
with the top-level research objectives established in the previous chapter. Based on the
information gathered in this review, existing gaps will be explored and bench-marked to
determine where more advanced methods may be needed to enable the development of the
proposed competitive analysis method.
There are five main sections to this chapter that are loosely organized to fit within the
scheme set up by the three research focus areas described in the previous chapter. The first
two sections introduce the field of aircraft engine design and provide a historical overview
of commercial engine selection studies as well as recent challenges in the design process.
A review of modern systems design methods is conducted and together with the strategic
analysis and planning section addresses the first research area. The fourth section reviews
the literature associated with project selection and primarily addresses the third research
area. Finally, the fifth section reviews competitive methods and analytical approaches in
both the business and engineering domains and bounds the scope of the second research area.
The sixth section provides a summary and a set of criteria to help identify the strengths
and weaknesses of the competitive techniques.
2.1 Aircraft Engine Design
The degree of complexity in engineering is driven by many diverse disciplines. There is an
intricate process by which these disciplines interact to bring a product to fruition. Although
Dieter (2000) claims “there is no single universally acclaimed sequence of steps that leads to
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a workable design”, most designers agree that there are three definable phases of design: con-
ceptual, embodiment (preliminary) and detailed design. Each is a decision making process
that begins with a creative idea or concept, and ends with a realized product. A principal
engineer in the propulsion industry, Halliwell (1998) states:
“The design and manufacture of a modern gas turbine engine is a manifestation
of an intense and lengthy cooperative effort of communication, sharing, under-
standing, and ultimately of compromise between practitioners of all of the tech-
nical skills, and in today’s world, of economics and marketing.”
After establishing the need for a new or modified engine, conceptual design usually begins
with an account of the engine requirements. The general size, configuration, and performance
of the engine are determined based on requirements set forth by an RFP or specified by
market demand (Raymer, 1999). It is at this stage that designers determine if a potential
engine will meet the customer requirements and if not, the customer may choose to relax
or revisit the requirements. At the end of this phase, the engineer should have a workable
design that has met key requirements, incorporated desired technologies, has gone through
extensive design point studies and finally is both feasible and affordable to produce.The
conceptual and embodiment design phases may often overlap depending on the definitions
of each. Halliwell provides a straightforward view of the design process from concept to
manufacture in Figure 2.1.
One of the first questions the engineer will ask himself is if the engine design will meet
the the required specifications given by the requirements of the aircraft mission which,
can be both technical and economic in nature. Following the mission profile requirement
and aircraft characteristics that specify mission segment thrust requirements several engine
configurations are proposed and the engineer will determine which best design meets the
specifications. This will depend on how each candidate design performs in the cycle analysis
where weight and performance calculations are made over the complete mission. Information
from the thermodynamic design point studies and critical off-design performance is used to
help choose a cycle as well as a preliminary layout of the turbomachinery. Another well
established gas turbine engine design fra mework is proposed by (Mattingly et al., 2002)
and is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: The Design Spectrum (Halliwell, 1998)
The cycle design point studies and configurations are usually determined by conduct-
ing parametric trade studies using preliminary estimates of the aerodynamics and weights
of compressors, turbines, etc. An engine configuration is described as the layout of tur-
bomachinery, specifying the number of spools or compressor/turbine stages. A number of
design alternatives are evaluated to determine which concept is preferred. With the advent
of computer power, analysis sophistication and fidelity has steadily increased to allow faster
evaluation of alternative design concepts. The settings of the top-level design specifications
define the conceptual baseline which becomes the configuration input for embodiment design,
where the system is decomposed for more sophisticated analysis by discipline, subsystem,
or component. At the detailed design phase, the subsystem components are fully designed
and the system is manufactured for testing and development.
In the early stages of propulsion design, the engine architecture is synthesized at the
system level based on performance and customer requirements and market opportunities.
The primary objective of embodiment design is then to determine which of a number of
alternative engine configurations to pursue further. Decision-making at this stage is critical
since there is an irrevocable commitment of valuable resources and serious consequences of
failure.
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Figure 2.2: Gas Turbine Engine Design System (Mattingly et al., 2002)
Although the market research and customer requirements steps from Figure 2.2 are ex-
tensively researched in industry and academia, they are not addressed concurrently with
the technical specialties. Instead, the engineering technical analyses (the core of the design
process), have largely become the focus of the design process. Many project managers are
reluctant to carry out strategic impact evaluations because they are deemed to be expen-
sive, time consuming and technically complex, and because the findings can be politically
complex, particularly if they are negative. Yet with improved computational power and
advances in the multi-disciplinary design and optimization fields and other modeling tech-
niques, engineers have been able to generate more sizable design spaces to perform more
complex trade-offs and thus more rigorous architecture selection (Smith, 2003; Baker and
Mavris, 2001; Mavris, Macsotai and Roth, 1998). A feedback link from the technical aspects
of conceptual design to the market research and customer requirements in Figure 2.2 is
therefore necessary to better match the technical potential of the company with its broader
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strategic goals. However, these techniques are only as good as the model fidelity of each
analysis module. Therefore, in conjunction to improving the decision-making process in
design, it is necessary that the quality of solutions be continuously upheld.
2.1.1 Architecture Selection Studies
In the conceptual design of commercial aircraft engines there is a constant pressure to
continuously develop systems that meet the customer’s requirements in the shortest time,
with the lowest cost and with a high reliability. This is a challenging feat for systems
engineers that have to also address the broader game problem that involves competitors, a
political arena and economics. The difficulty in understanding how these factors influence
each other is compounded by the fact that the rules of game keep changing. The airframe
manufacturer will change the engine requirements, the customer will alter their requests,
there is a reallocation of resources over time, etc. A necessary understanding of how factors
evolve over time and more specifically how engineers can forecast this evolution is central
to understanding and predicting competitive behavior. There is an increasing need for
enabling processes or techniques that examines uncertain phenomena in conceptual design.
Since most of the design is established early in the design process it is evident that having
a means to understand how it will perform in the latter stages of the design process is of
great importance to engineers.
There are several probabilistic methods that deal with design uncertainty, requirements
uncertainty, economic uncertainty, etc (Mavris, Macsotai and Roth, 1998; Mavris and Roth,
2001; Rothwell and Gardiner, 1988; Kirby and Mavris, 1999). Whether it is aircraft mission
changes or changes in emissions and noise regulations, there are emerging design methods
that allow decision makers to select the most robust or flexible design to all these uncontrol-
lable effects of the future (Baker, 2002; Mavris and Briceno, 2003, 2005; Kirby, 2001; Mavris
and Roth, 2001). Probabilistic methods are commonly employed to understand uncertain
effects in design. Figure 2.3 illustrates some uncertain characteristics associated with engine
design.
The points illustrated in this Figure represent specific engines and their associated thrust
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Figure 2.3: Impact of Internal and External Uncertainties on Core Engine Sizing and
Architecture Selection
ranges. The two notional architectures represent two engine "cores" to which changes can
be made to create derivative engines. Although the engine design space occupies many
dimensions, for visualization purposes two dimensions have been selected and shown here.
Two types of engine sizing trends are shown. The first growth trend is physics-driven, by
which an engine can be made to produce more thrust at the expense of increased weight. The
other growth trend is technology-driven. The exact position of an engine in the space can
be described as a probability distribution depicted as solid density contours centered around
the nominal engine design point. It is possible to see that one engine from both architectures
shown may or may not satisfy the requirements. If it does not a newly developed engine
design will be required. The design process might involve the modification of an existing
engine in architecture A, or if this is not possible, the creation of a new engine. The question
of which path is best now arises and represents the engineering view of the engine market
problem.
The likelihood of a particular engine meeting the airframe design requirements can be
determined by the intersection of two joint probability distributions. One that describes
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the airframe requirements uncertainty and the other that represents the engine design un-
certainty. Mavris and Briceno (2003) demonstrate a measure of design success that can be
obtained by these probability intersections. The analysis of uncertainty in engine design,
discussed in the preceding section, does not account for future engine design considerations.
It considers only the impact of uncertainty on a single requirement point without considering
the associated uncertainty of evolving requirements. In order to take maximum advantage
of emerging markets, designers must be prepared to strategically position their core design
relative to their competition and design along the lines of a product family instead of a
single application.
The complexities of modeling the various forms of uncertainty associated with require-
ments within a competitive business environment has been quite challenging for the propul-
sion community. However, new emerging techniques within the fields of complexity sci-
ence, probabilistic analysis and game theory has enabled engineers to help solve these prob-
lems.Mavris and Roth (2001) developed a vision that brings together new ideas and theories
to help advance the development of new methods within these fields. This vision is illustrated
in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Research Vision Linking Design Uncertainty, Requirements Uncertainty, and
Engine Design (Mavris and Roth, 2001).
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One of the most challenging and interesting engine selection studies from both an en-
gineering and managerial standpoint is the Boeing 777 program. After the U.S. Congress
passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 intense competition followed in both the airline
and airplane markets (Kahn, 1988). In 1986 Airbus and McDonnell Douglas, two of the
big three aircraft manufacturers, were nearing the end of the development of the A330/340
and the MD-11 respectively. Boeing was continuously profitable with the B747 but could
not compete in the same market. Engineers initially wanted to develop a derivative for the
B767 but could not agree with customers on the number of seats and range. They opted
for a fresh start and a new design that promised to have the latest in navigation and flight
control technologies, newer materials and more fuel-efficient engines. Furthermore, the B777
was planned to fill a new niche in the marketplace. Figure 2.5 shows how the B777 and its
derivatives have managed to secure a broad range of seat capacity and range combinations
in the market.
Figure 2.5: Seat and mile chart (2-aisle wide body aircraft) (Horibe et al., 2004).
United Airlines was the launch customer for the B777 and had a choice of three engine
manufacturers: Rolls-Royce, General Electric and Pratt & Whitney. The available options
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were to either offer variants of existing engines or weigh the options in favor of designing
and building a new engine type. General Electric decided to pursue a completely new
engine and invested $1.5 billion into the development of a new fuel efficient design. Their
strategy was to infuse new low emissions and noise technologies with Snecma’s partnership
and provide airlines with thrust growth options for commonality within the B777 family of
future derivatives. United Airlines however, chose the engine Pratt & Whitney was offering
purely on commercial grounds to power their airplanes (Sabbagh, 1996).
The choice of engine type is made for a whole host of reasons. Most experts, like
Monteleone (2001) and Sabbagh (1996) agree that one of the most important metrics is the
return on investment of the engine to the airline. Engine companies will compete for the best
price and financial incentives as well as negotiate maintenance and support contracts. But
fuel economy and efficiency are also important as they contribute directly to the operating
costs of the aircraft. The potential for thrust growth is a significant advantage too. Moreover,
the ability for engines to be standardized across the fleet by derating an engine for entry to
service while providing growth capability for future thrust requirements is also attractive to
customers (Ramsay, 2003).
It was up to the B777 engine manufacturers to take the best strategy in choosing the
engine architecture as this would ultimately determine their economic success for the next
20 years to come. The GE90, General Electric’s engine, was virtually all new technology.
It had a wide chord composite fan blade, new combuster design and a very high pressure
compressor that had not been implemented before. Although Pratt and Whitney’s PW4084
was chosen to launch the B777-200 it did not have the same growth potential as the GE90.
It’s engine core had a proven track record with the Boeing 747-400 and later with the A330.
One of its biggest advantages was its parts commonality with other PW4000 cores powering
aircraft such as the B767 and MD-11. This commonality was popular among customers
and was a deciding factor for those airlines whose savings in costs from service and parts
resulted in offsetting the lower thrust growth potential and higher fuel consumption. As the
B777 orders grew over the years and as airframe derivatives entered the market there was
a need for more thrust and it was ultimately the GE90 whose core was best positioned to
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take advantage of more thrust growth. Figure 2.6 shows the fluctuating sales for all three
engine providers of the B777 family for the past 10 years. For further sales data, the reader
is referred to section D.2 of the appendix.
Figure 2.6: Boeing 777 Engine Sales (Based on deliveries made) (Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, 2008).
Although Pratt and Whitney may have secured the launch of the B777-200, together
with Rolls-Royce they were unable to provide an option for the last two variants of the B777
family. The core architecture selection of the GE90 was a unique strategy that helped them
maximize their return on investment in the latter years of the B777 program.
2.2 Modern Systems Design Methods
The way in which engineers design systems today has evolved from the once limited methods
that were primarily employing qualitative measures to a more quantitative-based approach
that includes analysis of economic factors, safety, certification, etc. A major advancement
in the design process has been the study of life-cycle cost. Foerstemann and Staudacher
(2004), Fossnes and Forsberg (2006), and Halliwell (1998) have shown that by the end of the
research, development, testing, and evaluation phase (RDTE) approximately 60-70% of the
life-cycle cost has been committed. Since life-cycle cost is an important contributing factor
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to economic success, designers have put a great deal of effort in designing for cost.
One of the goals of modern design methods and tools is to generate a better understand-
ing of costs factors as well as provide a foundation for integrating life-cycle processes such as
manufacture and support into the early phases of design. Efforts in Concurrent Engineering
(CE) by Kusiak (1992) and Integrated Product Development (IPD) together helped pave
the way for the establishment of Integrated Product/Process Development (Schrage and
Mavris, 1995).
2.2.1 Integrated Product and Process Development
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) is a design discipline that emerged as
an effective way to drive Total Quality Management (TQM) in each stage of a product’s
life cycle. The philosophy behind IPPD is rooted in bringing together experts from the
different phases of both product and manufacturing process development with the goal
of maximizing life-cycle cost. Process and product trades are made with respect to the
conceptual, preliminary and detail design sequence. An example of the modified Georgia
Tech IPPD framework is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Georgia Tech Generic IPPD Methodology (Schrage and Mavris, 1995).
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IPPD techniques have enabled entities managing complex programs to decrease program-
matic risk as well as uncertainties associated with product redesign during the manufacturing
and support stages (Department of Defense, 1996). According to Kirby (2001), by bringing
knowledge and information forward in the design process through the use of IPPD tech-
niques, decision-makers have greater flexibility in choosing affordable designs. There is also
a greater likelihood that systems will perform better because of the cohesiveness of all inte-
grated disciplines that play a part throughout a system’s life cycle. For systems engineering
design problems this process is typically non-trivial. The difficulty lies in determining what
rational choice best meets the objectives or expectations. Hazelrigg (1996) lists:
“Two things that complicate almost all engineering decision-making processes:
first, uncertainty on both outcomes and values and, second, knowing what to
include in the universe of phenomena that needs to be considered in determining
the outcomes of the options.”
2.2.2 Robust Design Simulation
Robust design is a technique that was originally developed by Taguchi (1987) to decrease
product variability and improve quality in manufacturing processes. The goal was to elimi-
nate as much of the variability during the design and manufacturing processes and thus stay
as close to the design specification as possible. The technique is carried out by identifying
the settings of design parameters that best minimize the effects of variation in manufacturing
on the performance of the design (Dieter, 2000).
In the aerospace community the concepts of Robust Design were brought in to address
the need to control interdisciplinary interaction as well as combine both design and manu-
facturing into a systematic framework such as IPPD. A Robust Design Simulation (RDS)
methodology was created that embodied techniques like Design of Experiments (DoE), Re-
sponse Surface Methodology (RSM), and Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) in order to support
the IPPD framework. One the goals of RDS is to identify sources of variability in order to
reduce life-cycle costs. Bandte and Mavris (1995) developed a way of assessing economic
uncertainty by employing RDS techniques within an IPPD framework for the development
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of a High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) vehicle. Furthermore, the use of probabilistic mea-
sures of robustness in multidisciplinary design have been successfully shown to help manage
uncertainty in complex aerospace design problems (DeLaurentis and Mavris, 2000).
2.2.3 Probabilistic Design
The term probabilistic design refers to the approach used in systems engineering to facilitate
decision-making. Probabilistic tools help identify designs that are least sensitive to random
variability in performance of systems. These variability effects are significant when optimiz-
ing for quality and reliability and are found to be most useful in fields like manufacturing and
systems engineering. Probabilistic methods incorporate techniques such as robust design,
parameter design and design for Six Sigma.
The use of probabilistic methods are found to be most beneficial whenever there is
sufficient uncertainty to cause a significant variation in the response. This situation is most
common when the design requirements are not well known or are likely going to change
throughout the design process. The design of revolutionary vehicles is a prime example where
designers would employ probabilistic methods in order to account for changes in mission
requirements and uncertainties associated with the maturation of embedded technologies
(Mavris, Roth and Elliott, 1998; Roth et al., 2004).
Aircraft engine design benefits from probabilistic methods because it helps to estimate
the uncertainties in engine component weights and performance as well as predict the overall
performance of the system. The application of robust and probabilistic methods are becom-
ing more widespread due to increased demand for safety and reliability and better prediction
of technology performance. Studies by Mavris, Macsotai and Roth (1998) have shown how
probabilistic design methods are employed throughout engine preliminary design that show
the impact of changing engine cycle parameters on the performance of a large commercial
aircraft.
Quantifying the uncertainty of customer specifications in engine design is an underlying
goal of the this research. Customer requirements are specified as deterministic values that
translate into constraints on the engine design space. However, these requirements rarely
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stay the same throughout the entire design process. These engine specifications are ulti-
mately a function of aerodynamics, structures and other aircraft characteristics that will
change whenever the aircraft design changes.
Mission uncertainty faced by the customer results in aircraft performance changes, yield-
ing further variation of engine specifications. The vendor observes this variation of engine
requirements as a migration of the engine design point. An illustration of this migration
scenario is shown in Figure 2.8. Once the Modeling and Simulation Environment has been
created, it is possible to challenge the required solution and possible deviations from the
original needs. For instance, the solution point contains assumptions about:
1. Structures: If for any reason the initial design empty weight of the vehicle cannot be
met when performance and takeoff gross weight are fixed, the engine manufacturer
might be asked to lower the engine weight and or fuel consumption to help in reducing
the overall vehicle empty weight or block fuel weight. Since there is usually a competing
engine manufacturer waiting for an opportunity to enter the game, the company that
is willing/capable of providing such a reduction might be the one chosen to power the
vehicle. This is illustrated in Figure 2.8 where the maximum allowed engine weight is
decreased, shifting the engine design point to (1).
2. Aerodynamics: uncertainty associated with the vehicle aerodynamics may lead to a
degradation of the aerodynamic drag coefficients and properties which may increase
the needed thrust to maintain the target cruise speed. This situation results in a
displacement of the design point to location (2) as shown above.
3. Mission Evolution: Initial user needs usually change over time. These changes include
variations in payload and range that regularly occur with time as new versions of this
vehicle will be introduced on the market. This migration, due to growth needs, is
denoted as (3).
4. Combinations: As shown in the Figure 2.8, it is possible to observe that combinations
of these three scenarios can possibly change the design point.
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Figure 2.8: Migration of the Design Point with Uncertainty
Uncertainty in engine specifications is modeled by introducing variations in the assump-
tions made by the customer. For instance, the airframe manufacturer requires that the
performance remain unchanged with a reduction in engine weight. As the aircraft design
matures, the empty weight estimation at the outset is no longer valid. The customer needs
to maintain range, payload, and performance. To balance this increase in weight, the air-
frame manufacturer may pass some of the weight reduction responsibility to the engine
manufacturer, requiring a reduction in engine weight to meet the user performance needs.
At this point, the engine manufacturer may no longer guarantee meeting the initial design
requirements with full confidence.
Over recent years the field of probabilistic analysis has matured significantly with the
emergence of new tools and techniques that have overcome the obstacles of using physics-
based sizing codes that are deterministic in nature. The use of a surrogate model, which
implies approximating a model with another model, is one of the best ways of building
complex models that more accurately represent the physics-based codes. However, these
complex models tend to have a large number of inputs and outputs meaning that a surrogate
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model usually will take a significant amount of time to construct. There is a tradeoff that
is often made between the degree of complexity of the surrogate model to achieve accuracy
and amount of time needed to construct that surrogate model. Oftentimes, designers will
choose to create simplified models that sufficiently represent the more complex model and
accept in return some measure of modeling error.
The biggest advantage of using surrogate models is to alleviate the burden of expending
too much time running design codes that can usually take several minutes to run a single
simulation. This is particularly common in aerospace design where using aerodynamics codes
to perform design optimization and sensitivity analyses would need to be run thousands of
times.
The first step in constructing a surrogate model is to identify which input variables are
uncertain in the analysis. The creation of an accurate surrogate depends on the number of
simulation runs which in turn is a function of the number of input variables used. However,
as the number of variables increases more analysis runs will likely be needed which effectively
increases the total simulation run time. Determining the most efficient number of runs or
experiments needed to create a surrogate model with the minimum amount of effort is
a broad field of its own. Experimental designs range from evaluating every possible input
variable combination, commonly referred to as full factorial designs, to more efficient designs
that leave out specific variable settings, known as composite designs. For a more detailed
description and application of these designs, the reader is referred to more in depth literature
by Montgomery (2001) and Barros et al. (2004).
After running the experimental designs through the analysis codes the data is regressed
to build a linear regression model or a Response Surface Equation (RSE) (Myers and Mont-
gomery, 2002). There are many popular methods besides Response Surface Methodology
(RSM) such as Kriging, Gaussian Processes, and Neural Networks. Kriging models are
advantageous for situations where a non-linear representation is needed (Simpson, 1998).
Neural Networks (NN) are popular non-linear data modeling tools that are based on a
mathematical representation of a biological interconnected group of neurons. They are most
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commonly found in the study of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. A surro-
gate model is constructed through a learning process in which Neural Networks must be
trained during data-fitting. The statistical software JMP, developed by the SAS Institute
Inc. (2007), combined with a surrogate modeling tool- Basic Regression Analysis for Inte-
grated Neural Networks (BRAINN) (Johnson and Schutte, 2006) has greatly facilitated the
creation of surrogate models and simplified the training process. (More information available
in appendix B)
The process for implementing probabilistic analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.9. The
representation of the modeling and simulation environment, via polynomials as expressed
by the surrogate models, greatly facilitates the use of a Monte Carlo Simulation approach
to obtain the probabilistic forecasts. Monte Carlo methods are simulation techniques that
use random samplings to observe the statistical output of a mathematical system. They
originated with famous physics researchers like Metropolis and Ulam (1949) and have been
widely used in many operations research fields. A probability distribution of an appropriate
Figure 2.9: Probabilistic Design Method (Adapted from Bandte (2000))
shape is placed over the ranges set for each input variable. These distribution shapes can be
normal, triangular, beta, or any other shape that best represents the perceived confidence
and represent the probability of change of any given design metric (aerodynamic, structural,
etc.). As the design development matures and the confidence associated with these estimates
increases (i.e. reduction in the variability range) these shape functions will also be modified
to reflect the change. Since the shape functions are time dependent this formulation may
be characterized as a stochastic one.
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The distributions defined are then provided as inputs into the computationally expedient
surrogate model and a Monte Carlo simulation is performed. At the conclusion of this iter-
ative process, probability distribution functions (PDF) or cumulative distribution functions
(CDF) are generated for each of the responses of interest. Once these distributions have
been evaluated for each metric of interest, and their corresponding correlation coefficients,
ρ, have been determined (using the DoE obtained from observed results), joint probability
curves may be introduced by superimposing two or more probability distribution functions
(PDF) into the design space. Joint probability distributions (JPD) are useful in disciplines
that involve the observation of more than one random variable (Li, 2007). Two probability
distribution functions can be analyzed with a bivariate normal distribution in which each
of the two random variables (x,y) are normally distributed. The resulting joint probability
density function (JPDF) of the bivariate normal distribution is presented in equation 2.1
where “f” is the frequency of the JPDF, “x” and “y” are any parametric axes such as thrust
and weight and “a” and “b” are specific values of x and y respectively. Equation 2.1 uses
the normal distribution parameters, with mean µ, standard deviation σ, and correlation
coefficients ρ of pairs of criteria and is illustrated in Figure 2.10.
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Joint probability decision-making is a popular method used to analyze various forms of un-
certainty in multi-dimensional problems. The reader is referred to a more extensive overview
of this field in the work by Bandte (2000) and applications of this method by other authors
in this field (Li, 2007; Mavris and Briceno, 2003; DeLaurentis and Mavris, 2000).
2.3 Strategic Analysis and Planning
A principle goal in this dissertation is to investigate the spectrum of project selection strate-
gies that best position manufacturers in a competitive market. To better understand the
selection process and its purpose in the overall strategic vision of an engine company a
review of the business structure of an organization is warranted.
Corporations have varying levels of strategy. Corporate strategy is developed by the
top-level management to give a broad direction into corporate values, culture, goals and
44
Figure 2.10: Joint Probability Distribution (Ang and Tang, 1984)
missions (Collis et al., 1999). Under this global corporate strategy there are often func-
tional or business unit strategies. Functional strategies are limited to the domain of each
departments’ functional responsibility within the overall corporation. These include new
product development strategies, human resource strategies, financial strategies, marketing
strategies, legal strategies and information technology management strategies. Most com-
panies however, have structured their organization into semi-autonomous strategic business
units (SBU) that are responsible for their own budgeting, new product decisions, etc. The
lowest level of strategy is operational strategy which deals with day-to-day operational ac-
tivities such as scheduling criteria. This hierarchical strategy structure describes the types
of strategies envisioned within a corporation. The aggregation of strategies in either an SBU
or broad corporation is synthesized into the business strategy of the firm.
“At the heart of business-level strategy is the objective of developing a firm-specific
business model that will allow a company to gain a competitive advantage over
its rivals in a market or industry”. (Hill and Jones, 2004)
Strategic planning is a fundamental activity at all levels in an organization. It involves defin-
ing objectives or goals and developing strategies to reach those objectives. The term strategic
implies that the objectives are typically addressing the big picture. It is distinguished from
tactical planning which focuses on local or individual activities. Strategic plans are often
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viewed as road-maps that provide a structured process to guide the decision-making towards
achieving a vision within an organization.
The strategic plan is formulated in the form of a business case which provides direction in
areas like financial strategies, human resources, information technology deployments, mar-
keting strategies, etc. It involves decisions regarding the firm’s target market, product mix
and technology selection as well as its ability to allocate resources and prioritize projects
(Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). At the product strategy and planning level decision-makers
will want to know what market and product strategies maximize the probability of eco-
nomic success. The objective of strategic plans is to match the organizations resources and
core competencies with the external environment. It also allows companies to establish a
sustainable competitive advantage in a market. A major aspect of strategic planning is to
identify potential investment opportunities. The research and development phase of product
development is a prime candidate for strategic planning due in part for the large amounts
of capital spending. “Unfortunately, traditional methods of investment in technology de-
velopment programs or closing the business case are ad hoc and lack rigor” (Kirby et al.,
2006). Technology programs form a significant part of research and development spending.
Knowing if and how the technology will be aligned with the future business strategies is the
motivation for initiating a proper strategic assessment. There are a variety of qualitative
and quantitative decision-making tools that provide a structured approach to developing
strategy (Rouse, 1992).
2.3.1 Strategic Prioritization and Planning Process
One such tool is the Strategic Prioritization and Planning (SP2) process developed by Kirby
et al. (2006). This process focuses on the resource allocation of technology programs in re-
search and development phases. It builds on techniques in the quality engineering domains
and employs characteristics of both Quality Function Deployment (QFD) (Akao, 1990; Di-
eter, 2000) and Six Sigma techniques. A method that integrates the customer requirements
and engineering capabilities in a quantifiable manner is the Quality Function Deployment
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. This is a problem-solving and planning tool that translates the customer needs and en-
gineering characteristics into a strategic plan. It’s a qualitative method that assists design
teams with categorizing customer requirements and systematically matching each require-
ment with an engineering characteristic. In addition, it provides a benchmarking of the
competition and allows for a competitive strategy formulation. The SP2 process was exer-
cised in a recent study for Congress as part of a five year research and technology plan for
U.S. aviation (National Institute of Aerospace, 2005).
Throughout the strategic planning of programs it is often challenging to map the cus-
tomer requirements to technology options. One of the thrusts of the SP2 process is its
ability to reduce the dimensionality by creating a traceable link between technology options
and requirements and thus facilitating their decomposition. The SP2 process is divided into
five steps, namely: Define the customer requirements, Define the system attributes, Gather
technology information, Technology information review and validation, Strategic planning
execution. A parallel approach for strategic planning of technology portfolios is called Strat-
egy Optimization for the Allocation of Resources (SOAR) is described by Raczynski (2008).
2.3.2 Product Development Decisions
An important aspect of strategic planning is the selection of R&D projects within the orga-
nization. A project can be defined as a “finite endeavor-having specific start and completion
dates-undertaken to create a unique product or service which brings about beneficial change
or added value” (Project Management Institute, 2004). In aerospace design an R&D project
entails the collaboration of organizational functions as identified in Figure 1.4 for the purpose
of introducing a product into the marketplace. Of interest in this research are the decisions
associated with the generation of new products within the overall strategic process.
There is no single universal approach to product design and development. However,
within the business and engineering communities it is widely accepted that there are at
least four main organizational perspectives that deal with product development. Krishnan
and Ulrich (2001) compile these perspectives in table 2.1.
A continuing challenge to product development research is to identify means of bridging
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Perspectives of the Academic Communities in Marketing, Orga-
nizations, Engineering Design, and Operations Management (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001).
these perspectives to help promote cross-functional ideas and communication. Efforts have
been made by Ettlie (1997); Balachandra and Friar (1997) to integrate the design of new
products by having the various disciplines and organizational functions that span the life-
cycle of new products and services collaborate together. In particular, Ettlie (1997) shows
that integrated approaches to design assist in providing more knowledge and reduced uncer-
tainty about market needs throughout the development process. Incidentally, the study also
mentions that although integrating marketing, R&D and production teams will promote
new product development success, there is still a need for strategic direction and knowledge
of customers and competitors to further that success.
One the main roles of marketing teams in engineering firms is to help identify customer
needs, product opportunities and market segments and is referred to loosely as the mar-
ket research phase of design. Marketing is “about understanding how people make buying
decisions and using this information in the design, building, and selling of products” (Di-
eter, 2000). They are responsible for helping the firm successfully sell a product or service
in a specified market. The marketing department is the interface between a firm and its
customers. Their goal is to acquire new customers and expand relationships with existing
customers. A driving goal in this research is to understand how to utilize information from
marketing teams in the form of customer needs and market competition to help further
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the selection process of concepts in design. Mansfield and Wagner (1975) suggest market
analysis should be performed earlier in the R&D stages of product development.
A key challenge is evident in the cross-functional flow of information between marketing,
operations, and engineering design teams. Each organizational function will have specific
responsibilities regarding the development of a new product. Figure 2.11 illustrates the how
the web of interconnected decisions between such functional teams. Authors like Balachan-
dra and Friar (1997); Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) argue that each functional team will make
product development decisions based on information within their area of expertise and will
often ignore considerations arising from the functional interdependencies between teams.
Figure 2.11: Clustering of Product Development Decisions by Traditional Functional Cat-
egories (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001).
Most project initiations are born from some type of marketing analysis which investigates
the various opportunities to pursue. However in many cases projects often get a boost from
technology programs already in progress within the organization.
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2.3.3 Market Segmentation
Most business strategies include some type of marketing strategy. There are many types
of marketing strategies that deal with market dominance, product differentiation, market
segmentation, innovation, growth, etc. Marketing strategies are derived from the marketing
plan which is created based on the overall business strategy. In many competitive situations,
the quality of a market strategy often determines who wins. Although marketing strategies
are not formulated in engineering conceptual design, processes like market segmentation,
described by Seepersad et al. (2002), are widely used to divide a global market into subset
groups with homogeneous characteristics and thus facilitate the design selection process.
Firms will segment markets based on important differences in customer needs or preferences
in order to gain a competitive advantage (Hill and Jones, 2004).
Market segmentation is also employed as a robust design concept according to Rothwell
and Gardiner (1988). They define it as a design “that has sufficient inherent design flexibility
or ’technological slack’ to enable it to evolve into a significant “design family” of variants.
Essentially, a robust design is one that can satisfy the evolving needs of a “set” of user
segments.” This is an important technique that is employed in the marketing department
but not necessarily considered by conceptual designers.
Marketing teams have a large variety of business tools that they employ to formulate
the appropriate strategy to target the customer. These tools however are rarely, if ever,
employed at the engineering conceptual level. Instead, many engineering departments will
have their own simplified version of a customer value tool or marketing tool to assess how
well the product will perform in the market. For this reason, these designers are reluctant
to carry out competitive market analyses on their technical designs because of the lack of
trustworthy information they have and data they produce. Preliminary designers therefore
have difficulty in identifying the impact of the competitive element from the market on their
technical design choices.
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2.3.4 S.W.O.T. Analysis
A common strategic planning approach best suited to help develop a competitive business
model is to identify a firm’s internal Strengths and Weaknesses and its external Opportuni-
ties and Threats (SWOT) (Humphrey, 1970). A firm’s internal strengths are those unique
skills or distinctive competencies that help build and sustain a competitive advantage. Like-
wise, there exists weaknesses within a firm that restrict it from achieving its objectives and
that may need improvement. A SWOT analysis will scan the external environment and
identify where the best opportunities exist based on specific firm objectives and resources.
The firm’s external operating environment will also likely contain threats that may prevent
the firm from achieving its superior performance.
One of the advantages of using SWOT at the beginning of any strategic planning ini-
tiative is that it provides a quick assessment of the external environment. Decision-makers
can determine how significant the threats are from technological or marketplace changes,
competitive positioning or other macroeconomic factors. For industries such as aerospace
where globalization is prevalent, analyzing the market environment will facilitate the deci-
sions that need to be made to determine if there is sufficient competitive advantage in the
global marketplace.
This analysis tool is useful for auditing the overall strategic position of a business and
its environment. If the the group of individuals involved in the analysis share homogeneous
characteristics this strategic planning tool can be rewarding. However, the technique may not
lend itself to large heterogeneous groups as it may be difficult to agree upon specific strengths
or threats and can limit the potential for compromise. It is a powerful brainstorming tool
with qualitative capabilities of assessing strategic factors but has no formal methodology that
can provide quantitative benchmarks that may help reduce any disagreements or confusion.
2.4 Project Selection Studies
There are various studies that have been performed in the area product development that
focus specifically on competitor behavior. Figure 2.12 illustrates a taxonomy of the review
of game options in selecting research and development projects. A review was conducted to
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determine which studies would be most beneficial in developing a decision-making frame-
work. Since this research investigates the selection of an engine project based on a variety
of different engine options, the study of a portfolio of projects makes most sense. Also, the
analysis of a one-stage game under competitive conditions is assumed as well. More on those
assumptions are available in Chapter 4.
A major contributor to this research was the study performed by Ali et al. (1993) which
presents an approach to selecting pioneering or incremental innovation strategies for product
development projects. Studies by Dasgupta and Maskin (1987); Bhattacharya and Mookher-
jee (1986); Henriksen and Traynor (1999) have also demonstrated various techniques in port-
folio selection . Others have analyzed R&D portfolios within an engineering environment
with the aid of decision and risk analysis. Findings show that most of the models in the
management literature does not incorporate the effect of competition on resource allocation.
2.5 Competitor Analysis
Firms make investment decisions for various strategic reasons. The difference in making
strategic investment decisions from other types of decisions is that firms must make them by
taking into account the reaction of other firms and its potential effect on its own value. When
an airframe manufacturer (customer) initiates the design process for a new product, engine
manufacturers must quickly decide how to respond to the emerging needs of the vehicle. The
time available to act varies according to the stage of the design process. The engine company
(vendor) must decide if the project is worthwhile to pursue and generally employs some type
of economic analysis based on return of investment, net present value or cost-benefit ratio.
New aircraft also have a higher potential for fierce competition since no company may have
a distinct advantage in producing the specialized engine needed. Decision makers deal with
these issues by evaluating these assessment metrics based on personal insights or expert
opinion usually in the absence of any in depth analytical assessment. Decisions are usually
based on the ability to meet a set of requirements that is provided to them by the customer,
while ensuring a reasonable return on investment. At this point the vendor will have to
decide whether to accept or push back on some of these requirements. In many cases, the
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vendor feels pressured to secure the contract due to competition and to offer assurances and
guarantees on the over-specified requirements that sometimes cannot be met simultaneously.
However, uncertainty exists in the design of the vehicle and engine as both progress through
the development. As a result, increased development costs or terminations of the contract
occur if initial guarantees are not met.
Engine manufacturers will typically compete for market share by means of complex ne-
gotiation. There are few established methods that can model this aspect of competition.
Most of the negotiation with customers deals with formulating financial incentive agree-
ments which are contracts that specify the details of the purchase and maintenance of the
engine. Engine companies will typically sell engines at an attractive price so long as the
customer commits to a long-term maintenance contract with them. A significant portion of
engine profit comes from post-production parts support and maintenance. Marketing credits
and concessions are common in the industry to attract customers and gain market share.
Throughout these negotiations the engine marketing department will focus on selling the
engine via financial incentives but not necessarily focus on the engine/aircraft advantages
over the competition.
The marketing teams will meet with the customer and layout a personalized study of
how their engine will meet the needs of the customer. An in depth risk analysis regarding
the economic performance of the engine is common. The marketing team will also usually
demonstrate how their engines can satisfy the operating cost requirements through a route
network analysis. These methods are beneficial for marketing teams to identify their ad-
vantages over the competition but what is important to remember here is that the majority
of this customer analysis occurs once the engine has been partially designed. Conceptual
engineers ought to take advantage of some of these methods early on in the design process to
better understand where they could potentially stand in a competitive market. Anticipation
of a competitor’s response is an essential part of developing a competitive strategy.
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2.5.1 First-Mover Advantage
The development of an entry strategy for a market is a key management decision that can
have a significant impact on the success of a project. The elements of this strategy will
determine the positioning of the product in the marketplace as well as its long-term success
or failure. There are many questionst that need to be addressed in order to forulate the
best strategy: should the firm be a pioneer, a fast follower or a later entrant? how should
the firm enter the market- internal development, acquisition or joint venture and with how
much R&D investment? Is there a sustainable competitive advantage to adopt?
In many industries firms tend to push a product into the market before it is ready and
still with many defects left to be addressed. This is most common in the computer software
industry. However, in aerospace design, engine manufacturers will often make performance
guarantees, like fuel consumption, to the airframe manufacturer in order to be selected
to launch that airframe. The reason for this haste into the market is because firms that
introduce their product first will usually have access to a larger potential customer base
because none of the customers will have purchased the product as yet.
There exists a distinctive market advantage to firms that are able to enter first. Although
this is the most common situation, if there are too many defects this strategy may backfire.
Several studies have shown that formulating a game with the ability to address this first-
mover advantage is beneficial to understanding the significance of this type of strategy on
return on investment (Schmalensee, 1982; Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Fershtman et al.,
1990; Ettlie, 1997). The lead time between a firm’s entry and a response by the follower
benefits the first-mover in two ways according to Kerin et al. (1992):
1. During the time when there is no competition, the [firstmover] is, by definition, a
monopolist, and may use this position to gain higher profits than would be possible in
a competitive marketplace and/or increase the size of the total market.
2. After the entry of the competitors, the [first-mover] has established market position
and leaming curve economies, which may allow it to retain a dominant market share
and higher margins than imitators.
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Three primary sources of first-mover advantages are described by (Lieberman and Mont-
gomery, 1987): 1) technological leadership, 2) preemption of assests, and 3) buyer switching
costs. Of interest to this research are the advantages associated with technological leader-
ship. The second and third sources are less applicable to aerospace systems. There are key
advantages in the form of a learning curve where production costs decrease with an increase
in output for early entrants. They also suggest that technological advantages in the form of
patent and R&D races are proportional to the R&D investments made by those firms. They
also discuss first-mover disadvantages, which are advantages to late entrants such as: 1) the
“free-rider” effect, taking advantage of R&D, buyer education, infrastructure, 2) resolution
of technological and market uncertainty, 3) technological discontinuities that provide “gate-
ways” for new entry, and 4) incumbent adaptability issues with the environment; difficulties
for the incumbent to respond to competitive threats.
Development of market-entry strategies is an activity that typically takes place by mar-
keting managers. However, these decisions are dependent on the technological progress and
capabilities of the firm. The effects of market entry-timing are important to engineers be-
cause it allows them to evaluate their project options against the competition for different
entry scenarios and therefore assist in the project down-selection. The proposed game struc-
ture in this research presented in Chapters 4 and 5 introduce these first-mover advantage
parameters to study various market scenarios.
2.5.2 Modeling Competition in Systems Engineering
The concept of competitive analysis was introduced in the previous chapter as an essential
activity to support strategy formulation in systems design. The analysis of competition is not
a straightforward procedure common to all competing entities. The process itself depends
on the type of competition occurring and on the type of parties competing. For instance, the
competitive analysis of a firm seeking to increase its share in a particular market will differ
from the analysis of a country seeking to beat an enemy in a war. Furthermore, the analysis
process may transcend many levels of strategy formulation. The firm seeking to gain market
share may be targeting a local market where strategy formulation is controlled by a small
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branch of the firm or even a specific department within that branch. Conversely, the firm
may perform a competitive analysis on a more global scale that targets a broader market(s)
and has a larger strategic impact on the firm. Similarly, a country in a war situation will
have local battle strategy formulations and a more global approach to winning the war. The
procedure of competitive analysis thus highly depends on many factors.
The review of existing competitive approaches is driven primarily by the factors or
assumptions associated with this research. A fundamental premise in this research is that
the proposed methodology is employed by conceptual design engineers that have control
over local design parameters. Therefore the competitive analysis is being performed at the
engineering conceptual level by manipulating system design parameters. Another significant
assumption is that metrics like customer satisfaction, net present value, market share, etc.
are introduced into the competitive analysis so that the competition and the analysis thereof
can be more accurately represented. It was affirmed previously that competitive analysis
performed in conceptual design lacked rigor and fidelity. These factors play an additional
role in the search for appropriate techniques to develop a competitive analytical framework.
The objective again is to enable technical design teams to carry out a competitive analy-
sis at the conceptual design stage and to observe how that may impact their design decisions.
The immediate solution would be to borrow the powerful tools used by the marketing depart-
ment and integrate them into the technical design decision-making process. In the aircraft
engine industry for example, there exists collaboration between the marketing department
and preliminary design engineering. However, this usually means that engine information or
market data is transferred but there is not very much joint analysis taking place. This is often
because many of the business tools are not well understood by engineers. Another approach
is to use the existing version of the customer value tool used by engineers in conjunction
with more advanced decision-making techniques that do not have the strategy development
benefits of business tools but that still allow for some more rigorous competitive analysis.
The Boeing-Airbus competition described earlier is an example of a game in the aerospace
industry. Competitive situations have driven decision-making in many different industries.
The satellite-based mobile phone industry launched by the Iridium project in the late eighties
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is an example of how the engineering team lost track of changing consumer patterns and
competing products which altered the original business plan and had a significant effect
in their market share. A reminder here is that the business case must be revisited and
continuously updated at every point in the design process. Hazelrigg (1996) describes other
examples of games frequently encountered in engineering practice are the following :
• Engineering system design in a competitive marketplace
• Contract and subcontract negotiation
• Setting a research and development policy in support of a product that is produced in
a competitive marketplace
• Proposal writing and bidding
• Purchasing engineering goods and services
• Setting standards for a class of products or a service
• Establishing cooperative agreements for the design and manufacture of an engineering
system
Although there are numerous competitive situations in commercial design problems, means
to analyze them are not as widespread. Porter (1998) claims that a central aspect of strategy
formulation is perceptive competitor analysis.
“The objective of competitor analysis is to develop a profile of the nature and
success of the likely strategy changes each competitor might make, each competi-
tor’s probable response to the range of feasible strategic moves other firms could
initiate, and each competitors’ probable reaction to the array of industry changes
and broader environmental shifts that might occur.”
One approach in competitive analysis is to use mathematical-based modeling of strategic
behavior (Aubin, 1979; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). These models remove some of the
subjectivity from the decision-making that occurs when analyzing competition. This type
of modeling however is found primarily in the economic, business and military applications.
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One of the most challenging aspects of competitive analysis is data collection. In order
to answer many of the questions posed earlier, there is a need for gathering intelligence data
on competitors and information about the competitive game. There are several sources
and means to obtain this information but it can often be expensive and time-consuming.
Furthermore, the compilation of such data for a sophisticated competitor analysis can also be
overwhelming if there are many assumptions and uncertainties about this data. A competitor
intelligence system proposed by Porter (1998) is outlined as a mechanism to organize such
data to insure that the process is efficient. The reader is referred to Appendix D.1 for further
information.
The evaluation of competition and the forecasting of future markets is inherently difficult
because of the lack of information needed to accurately assess them. Companies rely on a
variety of intelligence and forecasting techniques that may often display conflicting results.
The decisions to incorporate this information that is gathered into the conceptual design is
risky and difficult to justify. The models must also address the large number of assumptions
that have to be made and the associated multi-level uncertainty.
Model fidelity in these analyses presents a design challenge to decision-makers as it
can reduce the clarity between solutions. Reliance on empirical data in systems modeling
usually constricts the new designs to historical models. Technical component models are
instead derived from design fundamentals that includes physics-based logic. This has been
successful in predicting overall performance systems metrics within a very small margin.
The model fidelity in other less technical disciplines that analyze competition and market
characteristics however, is limited to basic modeling capabilities with significant modeling
uncertainty. Furthermore, existing modules function independently and when integrated
together, computational speed is decreased. The competitive analysis is currently carried
out by modeling similar engines with different technologies and evaluating them both in a
representative model of today’s market. Current modeling and simulation processes in sys-
tems design lack analytical capabilities to measure and quantify the uncertainty associated
with competitor’s strategy and market evolution. There is are no formal and systematic
ways of dealing with competition in these stages of the design process. This research will
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seek to refine current competitor logic so that its impact can be more transparent when
determining overall business return.
2.6 Summary and Benchmarking
The final section in this chapter is presents some of the top-level challenges that are foreseable
in this research as well as hurdles that must be overcome prior to developing a methodology.
A matrix of different techniques, methods, and tools is also presented to provide a sense of
the many ways in which to tackle the research problem. Specific benchmarking criteria are
also established to guide the formulation of the methodology.
2.6.1 Technical Challenges
Although competitive analysis is extensively performed by marketing teams the opposite
is true in engineering design. The limited capabilities that exist for market analysis in
conceptual analysis contain several drawbacks.The negotiations involving the customers and
top-level engineering managers is frequently characterized by subjective decision-making.
Oftentimes, political circumstance or motivation will drive these negotiations. This is also
the case with discussions between engine and airframe manufacturers. At the marketing
level, engine companies with significant market leverage will also use that as an advantage
to guide the negotiations with the customer. This is a difficult aspect of the competitive
problem to model due to the nature of the subject decision-making.
It is very challenging for design engineers to understand how their design choices will im-
pact the engine’s success in a market. Studies in the product development fields have shown
that the use of game theory has been beneficial to understanding these impacts. However, in
conceptual design of engineering these techniques are not well understood. It is very difficult
to answer many of the business problems analytically. However, the use of physics-based
models in conjunction with these project development studies provides a promising route to
formulating a project selection framework within the realms of engineering design.
Both marketing and engineering departments rely heavily on empirical data to represent
the economic and technical performance of the engine. Engineers will use past market
scenarios where they have data that shows how they performed in the market and extrapolate
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Table 2.2: Matrix of Alternatives of Methods and Processes for Literature Study
this data to simulate future scenarios. This limits them to forecast scenarios appropriately
with little or no bias.
The final observation made in reviewing the literature in industry is that there exists a
significant communication gap between those creating the business case with the engineering
teams that must ultimately develop the product. The engine preliminary design process
does not employ the in depth marketing analyses and therefore are unable to have a good
understanding of how technical design parameters impact the success of the engine in a
market. Simply modeling and analyzing the combined sources of requirements uncertainty
is a major challenge. To include the additional complexity of considering this uncertainty
in the context of the larger strategic business environment is even more difficult, and until
recently, was so complex as to be nearly intractable. Fortunately, there are a variety of
new ideas and techniques emerging in the fields of complexity science, game theory, and
probability theory that offer promising new approaches to solving these problems.
2.6.2 Benchmarking
A broad review of literature was performed under three primary areas: planning and project
down-selection, uncertainty analysis, and analysis of competition. Within each area various
methods, tools and processes were investigated, some of which were described in depth in this
chapter. Table 2.2 lists selected techniques and processes. Those highlighted in orange were
investigated in depth and provide most of the foundation for the support of the proposed
methodology. Those in green were investigated and are secondary approaches to solving a
specific problem.
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The selected methods are benchmarked against a set of criteria. A consumer reports
type of study is created to facilitate the further selection of techniques to formulate the
proposed method. It is also beneficial to qualitatively identify the strengths and weaknesses
of methods to better understand where they can be utilized. Based on the characteristics of
the problem defined previously, a series of criteria are elicited to qualitatively compare the
possible techniques based on their different attributes:
1. Problem Structure - Ability to structure and enumerate problem strategies
2. Parametric Capability - Provides a means to explore areas of the design space and
behaviors previously obscured by the complexity of the problem
3. Uncertainty Modeling - Facilitates the modeling of uncontrollable variables and in-
cludes forecasting capabilities
4. Supports Rational Decision-making - Provides a rigorous mathematical platform
5. Quantifiable Competitive Behavior - Analysis of competitive behaviors and trends
6. Facilitates Visualization - Promotes the visual identification of strategies to decision-
makers
7. Ease of Implementation - The method can be used on a simple engineering problem
These criteria are meant to provide guidance in the method search and benchmarking phase.
Specific techniques and methods were chosen from the Matrix of Alternatives and bench-
marked against each other to determine which ones would emerge as most beneficial for this
type of implementation problem. One of the challenges however, is to compare techniques
that are not necessarily comparable within the same domain. For example, the SWOT and
Five Forces model are methods widely used in business applications that have unique ways of
formulating competitive strategies. However, although they focus on competitive analysis,
they cannot be compared directly to techniques like game theory because of the vast differ-
ences in the contexts in which they would be applied. Table 2.3 benchmarks four strategic
planning methods against the criteria established previously. The emerging techniques that
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Table 2.3: Benchmarking of Strategic Planning Methods
will be of value to the development of the methodology are the QFD and SP2 process. The
QFD is targeted more than the SP2 based on the ease of implementation. The focus is not
on the resources allocation of technologies but instead on mapping the customer require-
ments with engineering characteristics to identify which engineering physical metrics emerge
as being must important to carry through the analysis process. Therefore, it is determined
that the QFD approach will be most beneficial to this type of problem.
Based on the techniques and methods investigated in this literature review it was de-
termined that they all had enabling capabilities with respect to this research. The bench-
marking in Table 2.4 indicates that game theory is a beneficial technique based on the
criteria specified and will be reviewed in depth in Chapter 3. Agent-based models and sys-
tem dynamics can handle competition but game theory is faster and more light weight in
terms of its implementation into practical application involving only two competing agents.
The strengths of agent-based and system dynamics models is that they can analyze non-
equilibrium and nonlinear problems better but they require several simulations to converge
on solution. Game theory has a mathematical foundation which provides a quick way of
computing simple equilibria. The purpose of this chapter was to highlight potentially useful
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Table 2.4: Benchmarking of Competitive Analysis Techniques
techniques that will enable the creation of a competitive analysis process for conceptual
design.
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Chapter III
GAME THEORETIC TECHNIQUES
3.1 Introduction to Game Theory
In 1944 mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern published
their research in book entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). This provided the foundations for the formal analysis of competitive
interactions in economics and business strategy though its scope diversified to fields in
political science, sociology, and evolutionary biology. In its very basic form, game theory is
a tool for understanding how decisions affect affect each player. Until the establishment of
formal game theories, economists believed that firms could ignore the effects of their behavior
on the actions of other firms. This assumption would work in a monopolistic environment
or when competition was perfect but in the majority of cases was misleading.
Game theory presents a logical and mathematically based means of approaching prob-
lems involving competitors and decision making. A game is a model of a competitive sit-
uation, and game theory is a set of mathematical methods for analyzing these models and
selecting optimal strategies. Even without complete knowledge of an opponent’s decisions
or resources, game theory is useful for enumerating the decisions available, and evaluating
these options, or “moves” in a game sense. When a competitor’s investment decisions are
contingent upon the other’s moves, a wait-and-see approach may not always be advisable
and therefore a more rigorous game theoretic approach is necessary. It is a helpful tool in
valuating strategic decisions because it includes a means of understanding or predicting the
way in which competitors will behave and further provides an equilibrium strategy with
values for those decisions.
Game theory thus could be the link between engineering decision making and business
strategy by describing engineering decisions as the allocation of resources, and business de-
cisions as the assessment of return in a game model. The game model itself can contain
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sophisticated company analysis codes and simplified descriptions of competitors. “Game
theory provides a method for understanding and perhaps guiding the optimization process.
As such it provides an important management tool for use in decentralized design” (Vincent,
1983). Game theory may involve the application of simple optimizations of combinato-
rial problems, potentially including the application of genetic algorithms that compete to
determine which emerges with the best solution.
To successfully create the decision-making framework proposed in this research, a general
methodology for engine selection needs to be formulated that will require the application of
advanced methods to find the best set of strategies possible.
“Game theory’s most valuable contribution has been to show that rationality is
effectively undefinable when competitive actors have unlimited computational
capabilities for outguessing each other, but that the problem does not arise as
acutely in a world, like the real world, of bounded rationality” (Simon, 1996).
There are two types of games that are most commonly used to model interactive behavior.
Hazelrigg (1996) describes them below.
“A cooperative game is any game in which players can make binding commit-
ments.”
“A noncooperative game is any game that is not a cooperative game, this is, a
game in which the players are not permitted to make binding commitments.”
Noncooperative games are good representations of the competitive engine market. In the
majority of cases, engine manufacturers produce most of the engine and assemble the engine.
However, there are a several cases, like the CFM56 joint venture between General Electric
and Snecma, and the Engine Alliance joint venture between General Electric and Pratt &
Whitney, where a cooperative game is played between to competing engine manufacturers.
In this case both parties make a binding agreement to cooperate by sharing technology and
creating a joint product. Of interest in this research is the concept of noncooperative games
which is indicative of the majority of cases in the market.
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There exists specific rules when constructing games. Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) assert
that “following the rules of game theory can help reduce a complex strategic problem into a
simple analytical structure consisting of four dimensions”.
1. The players
2. The actions available to them
3. The timing of these actions
4. The payoff structure of each possible outcome.
There are two basic ways to formulate games and they are the strategic and the extensive
forms. The next sections provide a taxonomy of games and equilibrium analyses.
3.2 A Taxonomy of Games
3.2.1 Strategic form
The strategic (or normal) form is a matrix representation of a simultaneous-move game. The
definition of a strategic-form game is in terms of its constituent parts: players, strategies and
preferences. The game is formulated in terms of a matrix where rows represent the strategies
available to one player and the columns represent the strategies to another player. Each box
(row/column combination) represents the payoffs to each player for every combination of
strategies. These games are typically solved using the Nash Equilibrium concept discussed
further in the next section. There are various ways to filter down the moves to determine
the ’best’ outcome.
The first approach to solving matrix games is through strategic dominance. Simply
stated, strategic dominance occurs when one strategy is better than another strategy for
one player, no matter how that players opponents may play. This is a first cut at elimi-
nating strategies. There are two types of strategies, strictly or weakly dominant/dominated
strategies. In mathematical terms, for any player i, a strategy s∗ ∈ Si weakly dominates
another strategy if s′ ∈ Si if
∀s−i ∈ S−i [ui (s∗, s−i) ≥ ui (s′, s−i)]
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With at least one strict inequality. The S−irepresents the product of all strategy sets
other than i’s. On the other hand, s* strictly dominates s’ if
∀s−i ∈ S−i [ui (s∗, s−i) > ui (s′, s−i)]
A rational player would never play a dominated strategy. As a result of this premise, it
is often possible to use dominance analysis to rule out some outcomes as possibilities when
the game is played by rational players. It is often the case in some games that this leads
to a unique prediction of the outcome when players are rational making this a dominance
solvable game. Another way to view this concept is the idea that a dominated strategy
is “never a best response” for that player, no matter his beliefs about the actions of his
opponents.
If there is no clear solution using strategic dominance, another process exists to filter out
strictly and weakly dominated strategies through a process known as Iterated Elimination
of Dominated Strategies (IEDS) (Tirole, 1991). Figure 3.1 illustrates a payoff matrix where
two players must choose simultaneously between their available choices of U,M, and D for
player 1 and L,M, and R for player 2. For each payoff pair the first number is the payoff
to player 1 and the second number after the comma is to player 2. At first glance, the
maximum payoff possible to player 1 is 9, if player 1 selects choice D. However, player 2’s
maximum payoff is 8 when selecting choice R. If both players choose to stay with those
choices, then player 1 will end up receiving a payoff of 2 and not 9. The choice of the best
strategy is often masked by the complexity of the payoff scenarios that can occur. For this
reason the process of IEDS facilitates the down-selection of choices in a rational manner.
The process of using IEDS begins by eliminating the dominated action M for player 2.
With a reduced payoff matrix, actions M and D are dominated by U so they are eliminated.
Finally player 2 does better by choosing action L than R (3 vs 2) so the equilibrium result
is [U,L].
3.2.2 Extensive form
The extensive form game is often viewed as a decision tree. The main difference between the
normal and extensive forms is the information that a player has regarding the actions taken
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Figure 3.1: Iterated Strict Dominance (Tirole, 1991)
previously made. Extensive form game structures specify the order in which players make
decisions. This is a valuable piece of information when formulating a strategy. At every
point in time a player has a spectrum of moves available. A complete game can then be
theoretically modeled from start to end. If the game model was extremely accurate, one could
simply evaluate every possible combination of moves to determine the best possible sequence
of decisions to guarantee victory. However, this is impossible due to large number of decision
branches. Also, it is impossible to have perfect knowledge about all game parameters.
An example of a decision tree is shown in Figure 3.2 where two players have to make
choices in quantity, q. Player 1 moves first with choices 3, 4 or 6 and player 2 then makes a
choice with the same options. The resulting payoffs are shown at the bottom of the Figure
where the first number is the payoff to player 1 and the second is the payoff to player 2. The
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Figure 3.2: Extensive Form Game (Tirole, 1991)
outcome of the game depends on the information known to player 2. An information set for a
player at a particular point in a game is the “set of decision nodes at which the player knows
she is at but cannot distinguish without additional information” (Hazelrigg, 1996). For the
game tree example in Figure 3.2, player 2’s information set contains all three possible nodes
which means that player 2 knows what choice in quantity player 1 has previously made.
The information set concept is useful when modeling real world examples because more
often than not firms cannot know a priori what decision had been made (or planned) by
their competitors. To solve complex game trees there exists intelligent search methods that
prune the tree branches to determine the equilibrium outcome of the game. The Alpha-beta
pruning algorithm by Baudet (1978) was one well-known technique to solving complex game
trees. Over the past decades there has been extensive work in this field to develop algorithms
that are easy to implement and are fast and efficient in computing the equilibrium.
The framework developed in this research lends itself to a game tree analysis. But
information-gathering capabilities are needed in order to create the specific information sets.
The focus therefore, is on solving simultaneous games instead in a normal form structure.
3.3 The Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how the game will be
played. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, of which the
Nash equilibrium (NE) is the most widely used.
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“The Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s strategy
is an optimal response to the other players’ strategies” (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991)
Furthermore, no player has an incentive to deviate from his or her chosen strategy after
considering an opponent’s choice. Overall, an individual can receive no incremental benefit
from changing actions, assuming other players remain constant in their strategies. There
may exist more than one Nash equilibrium in a game. This solution concept can be viewed
as a robust solution that minimizes the potential loss in payoff to each player.
A set of actions
(
aN1 , a
N
2
)
is a Nash equilibrium if the following conditions are met:
U1
(
aN1 , a
N
2
) ≥ U1 (a1, aN2 ) for all a1, and
U2
(
aN1 , a
N
2
) ≥ U2 (aN1 , a2) for all a2
A set of actions is therefore a Nash equilibrium if each player cannot do better for herself
by playing her Nash equilibrium actions given the other players play their Nash equilibrium
actions. This problem can be solved by maximizing the utility functions of both players:
max
a1
U1 (a1, a2) and max
a2
U2 (a1, a2)
where each player takes each other’s action as given. The optimization problem performs
a search in the action space and determines iteratively if the conditions for a Nash equilibrium
have been met. The process of iteratively eliminating strategies discussed in the previous
section is common approach to solve simple games but when the action space is too large
the solution must be carried out algebraically via differentiable equations in a system of two
equations in two unknowns,
(
aN1 , a
N
2
)
. A game solution can either result in a pure strategy
or a mixed strategy equilibrium solution (discussed in the next subsection). A pure strategy
is a deterministic description of exactly (100% certainty) what action the player will choose
in a game (assuming they play rationally).
3.3.1 Mixed Strategies
Mixed strategy Nash equilibria result when players choose to play a pure strategy stochasti-
cally according to fixed probability distribution. A player with a mixed strategy randomizes
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between pure strategies. Nash (1950) showed that, if players are allowed to choose among
their mixed strategies (players choose strategies randomly according to pre-assigned prob-
abilities), then every n-player finite game contains an equilibrium solution. This result is
very useful because it tells us that there is always an optimal outcome for each player in
every game.
3.3.2 Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium
In most complex games the outcome will result in more than one Nash equilibrium. One
of the major challenges in this field is to determine which of the NE’s to choose from. The
problem with selecting an NE among many is that if both players do not agree on the same
NE then the actions they choose are really not equilibrium actions at all which defeats the
purpose of computing an equilibrium solution in the first place. The concept of a Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium has been widely studied to identify which of the NE’s would be
optimal to select from.
Two important refinements of the Nash equilibrium were established by Harsanyi and
Selten to understand equilibrium solutions in games (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). The first
one relates to NE’s that are payoff dominant or Pareto superior to all other Nash equilibria
in that game. The second refers to NE’s that are risk dominant where players will generally
gravitate to a risk dominant strategy if they are more uncertain about the actions of other
players. To best understand how to differentiate between these two types of equilibria
the Stag-Hunt game example is shown in Figure 3.3. The game is also referred to as the
Figure 3.3: The Identification of Payoff and Risk-Dominant Equilibria in The Stag-Hunt
Game
coordination game. Two players go hunting and they must choose to either hunt a stag (a
deer) or hunt a hare. They each make a decision without knowing what they other chose.
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If a player chooses to hunt a stag it requires the cooperation of his partner in order to be
successful. A player can choose to hunt a hare by himself but it is also worth less than a
stag. The payoffs associated with the different options are shown in the left matrix of Figure
3.3. If a player 1 chooses to hunt a stag but its partner (player 2) chooses instead to hunt
a hare then player 1 receives 0 payoff and player 2 receives 4. Like the prisoner’s dilemma,
this game provides rationale as to why collective action might fail in the absence of credible
commitments.
This game has two Nash equilibria. One at [H,H] and the other at [G,G]. The [H,H]
is payoff dominant since it is the maximum the players can receive. However, there is the
potential to lose a great deal and end up with a zero payoff. Therefore, the risk averse
player would play the risk dominant NE at [G,G]. The formal description of these types
of equilibria is as follows: [H,H] payoff dominates [G,G] if A≥D, a≥d, and at least one of
the two is a strict inequality: A>D or a>d. Secondly, [G,G] risk dominates [H,H] if the
product of the deviation losses is highest for [G,G] so that (C-D)(c-d)≥(B-A)(b-a). These
are beneficial concepts that provide more clarity to equilibrium solutions.
3.4 Game Theory Software
There are several computer based decision software that use game theory to analyze complex
games. The Maple c© toolbox from MapleSoft c© is used extensively by the mathematics
community and can be implemented into the programming language platform MATLAB c©
to facilitate the modeling and of complex games. Another popular free game theory analysis
tool is Gambit, developed by McKelvey et al. (1991). Gambit is a library of game theory
software and tools for the construction and analysis of finite extensive and strategic games.
Figure 3.4 is generated using the Gambit software. The software uses several search algo-
rithms to compute the Nash equilibria. It can be used in either of two ways, as a graphical
user interface (GUI) or as an integrated function within an algorithm. The GUI provides
the user with options to iteratively eliminate solutions. Figure 3.5 illustrates the result of
reducing a game via the IEDS method.
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Figure 3.4: Normal-Form Game using the Gambit Software
Figure 3.5: Elimination of Strategies using the Gambit Software
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Chapter IV
FORMULATION OF A COMPETITIVE METHODOLOGY
The literature review in Chapter 2 outlined the pertinent processes and techniques that
address conceptual design, decision-making and competitive analysis. This review demon-
strated that there are several techniques that deal with decision-making in engineering but
few that focus on market competition in the conceptual phase of design. Chapter 3 in-
troduced game theoretic concepts and techniques that analyze competitive scenarios and
have the potential to assist decision-making in the conceptual and preliminary phases of
the design process. The current chapter proposes a methodology that borrows elements
from advanced design methods outlined in the literature review and combines them with
the competitive tools discussed in Chapter 3. The purpose of developing this methodology
is to address the “gaps” within the specific research areas identified in Chapter 1.
This chapter begins by formalizing the questions presented at the end of Chapter 2 and
proposing research hypotheses as guidance in the formulation of the research methodology.
Figure 4.1 provides a visual linkage between the observations made in Chapter 1, the research
questions and and the objectives in developing the methodology. The methodology will then
be implemented using a commercial engine selection proof-of-concept in Chapter 5.
4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Based on the literature survey and advanced design method identification it is evident that
there is an emerging problem in systems conceptual design. In the commercial industry
the success of products is driven predominately by market forces. Even for large scale
systems like aircraft or aircraft engines the impact of the market can be significant. As
societal demand and standards continue to increase, the design process of complex systems
must become more sophisticated. In response to the design problems highlighted in current
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Figure 4.1: Recapitulation of Observations, Research Questions and Objectives
design processes a series of research questions are established as a means to guide the ex-
perimentation of the research. The three research objectives outlined in the first chapter
narrowed the focus of the research into three overlapping areas (requirements and competi-
tion uncertainty, competitive analysis, project selection). They are now used as a means to
establish formal research questions and propose a series of hypotheses that follow from the
observations. These hypotheses will then be tested through a proposed process using the
commercial aircraft engine selection problem as a proof of concept.
Chapters 2 and 3 identified certain advancements in systems conceptual design, compet-
itive analysis and decision-making capabilities. However, these capabilities have not been
integrated simultaneously into an integrated framework in order for designers to visualize
the impact competitor moves might have on the success of their product. A significant
challenge in the aerospace design community is the ability to model the economic impact
of designs in a market. The first research area of interest focuses on better analyzing mar-
ket requirements uncertainty and how that uncertainty propagates into the decision process
in design. The idea is to incorporate decision variables that are indicative of the market
performance of designs as part of the technical design space. Engine design for instance,
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would not only consist of choosing the optimum settings of thrust, engine weight, fuel burn,
technologies, etc. but also how much market share that design achieves, what type of return
on investment it has etc. The first two research questions are posed in an effort to develop
this type of environment.
Research Question 1.1: How can the technical design space of complex sys-
tems be expanded to model the economic success of R&D programs with uncer-
tain market requirements?
Research Question 1.2: How are customer requirements mapped to generate
feasible designs and establish value?
These research questions address the first objective which is to create a means to expand the
technical design space to include competitor influence. They refer to the need for a thorough
analysis of the market competition at the technical level in conceptual design. The focus
here is to go beyond the capabilities of current simulation environments and investigate the
effects of factors not specific to the design but that still influence the final design selection.
For example, fluctuations in engine material or labor costs are likely to impact the cost of
maintenance and can alter the trade-offs made with other metrics like takeoff performance
or mission range.
The second question specifically seeks to find out how to incorporate market requirements
composed of different “customer profiles” and map them to other metrics in the design space.
These requirements can be derived from different market segments with characteristics such
as missions with high or low payload/range requirements or hot and high altitude take-off
performance requirements.
In order to answer these questions, a solution path can be guided by establishing a formal
hypothesis that can then be tested by applying it with a proof-of-concept. The advanced
design methods described in section 2.2 combined with the computational power and fidelity
of a modeling and simulation environment provide a solid foundation for the development
of a methodology that can address the first two research questions. This claim can be
formalized as the first hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1: The uncertainty of market requirements and competition can
be quantified within a single unified environment that synthesizes the business
case of customer requirements with the performance metrics of designs.
Since the focus of this research is on competitive analysis as it pertains to conceptual design
selection the second research area looks into analyzing competitive uncertainty in different
types of markets. It was observed that research and development programs that generate
commercial products are very sensitive to market forces. Current design methods in engi-
neering can benefit from this market knowledge if it considered early in design. This will help
mitigate the risk of uncertain market performance. Chapter 3 provided a broad investigation
into the field of game theory and techniques that can assist in analyzing uncertainty due to
competitive product positioning. The second set of research questions seek to discover ways
to incorporate these techniques into aerospace engineering.
Research Question 2.1: What competitive decision techniques enhance the
confidence in concept down-selection of existing design methods in aerospace
systems design?
Research Question 2.2: How can decision-makers quantitatively measure the
impact of a competitors product development strategy on the economic success
of their design?
As mentioned earlier in Chapters 1 and 2, competitive analysis in conceptual design has
relied on subjective and qualitative reasoning based on intangible criteria that is difficult
to model at the conceptual level. The goal here is to identify a means to quantitatively
represent the impact of a competitors’ move on a design strategy at the conceptual level.
In order to carry out a competitive analysis using the various advanced design techniques,
the design problem should be converted into an equivalent problem in terms of a game
structure. The challenge here is to maintain the same or similar conceptual design decision
criteria such as thrust, engine weight, fuel consumption (for engine design) and additionally
introduce market criteria like competitor payoff, market share, so on and so forth. A process
is needed to allow designers to combine these metrics without introducing unmanageable
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uncertainty or variability. This hypothesis states that is is possible to use game structures
to represent a competitive decision-making problem without removing the technical metrics
of the design problem.
Hypothesis 2: Through the use of game theoretic techniques decision-makers
can construct a systematic game-based methodology that enhances the design
down-selection confidence and mitigates the potential of financial risk.
Within the investigation of game theoretic techniques, a sub-goal will be to determine which
techniques are most efficient in identifying robust competitive solutions.
The third set of research questions are meant to help facilitate the design selection
process by investigating different product strategies. The structure of the research questions
and hypotheses make it so that they build on each other. Therefore, by implementing
the methodology proposed via Hypothesis 1 with the mechanisms to evaluate competitive
uncertainty in Hypothesis 2 we can study the project selection opportunities under the
effects of different competitive scenarios. The main effort here is to test how different firm
characteristics can influence the selection of a project and what effect one firm’s development
attributes has on another firms’ project selection strategy. For instance, one firm may be
more efficient at developing a modified product by leveraging technologies from an older
product and can therefore potentially gain from entering the market sooner. Conversely,
another firm may have an advantage in developing new products and although it may likely
not enter the market prior to the first firm, it can still potentially gain more market share
based on its new design performance. These are scenarios that are of interest and can be
posed through a third set of research questions.
Research Question 3.1: What are critical firm attributes that influence project
selection under competitive scenarios?
Research Question 3.2: What effect does the intensity of rivalry in commercial
aerospace systems have on project selection?
The review of R&D project selection in Chapter 2 provided an extensive taxonomy of selec-
tion studies in both the economics and management fields. These studies produced selection
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models that had firms selecting a single project versus a portfolio of projects where two or
more innovations were considered simultaneously. They also considered single stage selection
versus multi-stage selection where the latter allows the firm to reallocate resources to other
projects at the end of each stage. These models as described in Chapter 2 are beneficial to
the development of a project selection framework for aerospace design but do not have the
depth needed to analyze the complex uncertainties of aerospace systems. However, in these
models in conjunction with advanced probabilistic methods and a well-established modeling
and simulation environment can provide practical down-selection capabilities in the design
process. These thoughts are formalized into the third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Project development strategies can be formulated using proba-
bilistic techniques in conceptual design thus recommending robust market entry
opportunities and optimal project portfolio selection.
Finally, it is hypothesized that the well-established mathematical branch of game theory will
enable competitive modeling and provide a rational selection of strategies in systems design.
Each hypothesis is meant to build on the previous one. In order to test these hypotheses
a method must be developed that includes the techniques described. Presented below is an
overarching hypothesis which combines the three hypotheses to establish the main theme in
this dissertation:
Overarching Hypothesis: A game-based strategy exploration method that
employs game theoretic and probabilistic analysis techniques facilitates the sys-
tematic exploration and selection of architectures under uncertain competitive
scenarios.
This section is summarized below in Figure 4.2 where the research questions are mapped
together with the hypotheses.
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4.2 A Proposed Methodology for Competitive Design
The research questions and hypotheses in the previous section were established to guide the
development of a systematic process to analyze complex systems in a competitive environ-
ment. This process, which results from the synthesis of enabling techniques and methods
from Chapters 2 and 3, is proposed as a five-step methodology that addresses the need for
a structured approach to bridge the gaps identified in 2.6. It is then implemented through
a proof-of-concept based on a commercial engine selection problem in Chapter 5. This
methodology is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The methodology is first tested on a base-case
model and then fully implemented on the proof-of-concept in Chapter 5. Steps 2 and 3
are primarily associated with the generation of design alternatives and their evaluation in
terms of technical performance, customer value, etc. The focus in these two steps reside
in the synthesis of analysis codes to generate and evaluate these alternatives. Steps 4 and
5 are directly associated with analyzing the competition and strategically selecting R&D
projects. The approach taken by the author to build this methodology was to first create
a base-case model of steps 4 and 5 with notional projects to test the competitive analysis
method. Steps 2 and 3 are then added in the proof-of-concept study to provide more project
analysis resolution and flexibility in the design space. In this chapter, the base-case model
and its notional results are presented alongside the explanation of each step.
The sequence of steps in the methodology were formulated with the Integrated Product
and Process Development framework in mind (section 2.2.1). The purpose of each step is to
capture the goals of the three research areas described in the introduction and illustrated
in Figure 4.2. Throughout the description of each step in this section, the reader will be
referred back to the research questions and hypotheses.
4.2.1 Defining the Project Selection Problem (Step 1)
In most engineering conceptual design processes the first step involves defining the problem.
While this is often considered the first step in most design processes, in reality, the original
problem is constantly being defined and updated throughout the entire design process, from
82
F
ig
u
re
4.
3:
P
ro
po
se
d
F
iv
e-
St
ep
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
fo
r
A
na
ly
si
s
of
C
om
pe
ti
ti
ve
D
es
ig
ns
w
it
h
M
od
el
in
g
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
83
conceptual design to detail design and then through manufacturing and production. Many
design processes have a significant level of feedback that helps refine the problem and thus
more accurately match the final product with the problem requirements and expectations.
The idea of consistently verifying design accuracy throughout the process is beneficial when
product requirements are likely to deviate from the original definitions. Defining the problem
is usually the most critical step in the process and yet its importance is often overlooked
due in part because it requires the least amount of time out of all the steps in the process
to accomplish.
Defining the problem of an engineering endeavor can be carried out in many different
ways. Generally, this process begins with identifying the need for a product. Oftentimes, the
business development and marketing departments will make an assessment of the market
and their business objectives to determine what opportunities exist in order to be prof-
itable. Systems engineering also has a similar approach called the “pre-concept exploratory
research stage” (Fossnes and Forsberg, 2006) where performing a variety of research studies
often leads to the development of innovative ideas and technological capabilities which are
then the seeds to the initiation of a new project. More often than not a need is established
in response to a customer identifying a shortcoming in their existing system or capability
and request an upgrade or new solution. An airline for example, may want to expand their
services to take advantage of an emerging market that consists of a long distance, high ca-
pacity city-pair but realize that existing aircraft have a limited payload and range capability
and cannot satisfy that market requirement. Airlines are always seeking to minimize their
operating costs and there are frequent demands to manufacturers to produce fuel-efficient
aircraft with engines that are capable of meeting future noise and emissions standards while
still increasing payload capacity and range. Military systems have performance requirements
that are usually defined by their goals to fly faster, carry more ammunition, become less
detectable, etc. Although military systems have strict performance goals, the solution space
is more open-ended than their commercial counterparts mainly because of the tight regula-
tory requirements that commercial systems must satisfy. Both however, share increasingly
significant economic constraints that are of vital importance in the conceptual design phase.
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The selection of the project to pursue for design and development must be consistent with
the business goals outlined in the business case. The creation of a business plan to meet
the stakeholders’ needs usually takes place with upper-level management since they have
the capabilities and resources to convince the customer that their product can satisfy their
needs. Activities that involve market research and identification of profitable opportunities
in specific market segments are conducted during the development of the business case. The
problem of choosing a development project among a portfolio of projects consistent with the
business goals is analogous to the problem definition of most conceptual design processes
with some added prerequisites. A thorough analysis of these market opportunities and
scenarios must occur in conjunction with the system performance analysis so each design
can be evaluated based on, not only its technical merits, but its economic viability and
competitive potential.
In the next section, a description of the project roadmap is introduced. This is the
first task that describes how different R&D investment opportunities are analyzed based on
various market scenarios. The purpose here is to bound the competitive problem and avoid
getting lost in the complexities of market forces which extends beyond the scope of this
research.
4.2.1.1 Defining a Project Selection Roadmap
The methodology developed in this research begins with the specification of a project se-
lection roadmap. The purpose of this roadmap is to determine the applicable scope of the
methodology to R&D project selection problems. It is precisely at the very beginning of the
process where the key product and process characteristics must be identified to best trans-
late the customer requirements to the engineering characteristics. One of the advantages
of laying out a project selection roadmap is to bound the problem. It specifies the type
of market scenarios and investment opportunities that can be analyzed. This allows the
methodology to focus on specific examples and therefore provide a useful experimental pro-
cess. Since this research is motivated by the commercial aircraft engine selection problem,
this becomes the proof-of-concept for the methodology. The characteristics of this problem
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Figure 4.4: Game Structure Matrix of Alternatives (MoA)
are used in part to define the project selection roadmap.
The review of the project selection literature in section 2.4 provided a highlight of the
spectrum of work done in the economic and strategic management fields. That information
is used here to establish the third research focus area: Project Selection Strategies in a
Competitive Environment (Figure 4.2) and is also used to formulate the project selection
roadmap. There are many competitive situations that exist in many different types of
R&D investments. If one were to map all these together the result would a list of millions
of project selection roadmaps. Each roadmap would be derived by combining different
options of project alternatives, customer requirements, market attributes, and competition
attributes. A useful to technique to visualize and down-select an appropriate roadmap is
the Morphological analysis (developed by Zwicky (1948)) . This technique begins with the
creation of a Matrix of Alternatives (MoA).
Figure 4.4 illustrates a matrix of alternatives which displays the alternatives for the game
structure attributes. The highlighted alternatives are selected to form the game structure
for this proof-of-concept. There are two engine firms and each has a portfolio of projects to
choose from for research and development. Both firms have perfect information about the
game. Each knows exactly the payoffs available to the other. The game will be played in one
stage where both firms will only have one opportunity to make a project selection decision.
The first stage is referred to as the research and development stage whereas subsequent
stages involve commercialization of the product. Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) show how a
two-stage R&D game is constructed under demand uncertainty assuming a duopoly market
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structure. Each of the two competitors makes a decision to determine if and when to make
an R&D investment (1st stage) as well as decisions regarding follow-on commercialization
of the investment (2nd stage). They further state that the type of competition in each stage
will affect the equilibrium production and optimal investment strategy. The objective in
this research is to observe how competition affects R&D investment decisions since commer-
cialization of aircraft engines depends less on the design of the engine and more on the way
they are marketed. Multi-stage games introduce a larger challenge in constructing the game
as well as analyzing the equilibrium results.
Both firms select their project choice simultaneously and cannot know a priori what the
project the other has chosen. In a real competitive scenario between firms the game would
be sequential where firms choose their project based on the knowledge of having seen their
competitor’s choice. However, the analysis of game decision trees is more complex and is
beyond the scope of this research. The analysis is made based on pure strategies only. The
subject of mixed-strategies is introduced in this research but is not studied in the proof-of-
concept. The subject of equilibrium analysis is presented in step 5 of the methodology. The
purpose here is simply to establish the outline of the game to be played.
The rows of the matrix correspond to the different categories associated with competitive
project selection problems. Each column is an alternative solution option to each category.
The total number of possible combinations is calculated by multiplying the alternatives
together for each category. For example, the matrix in Figure 4.4, contains 243 possible
game structures that can be analyzed. Another important point to mention here is that the
level of complexity in the roadmap increases with certain alternative choices.
The morphological analysis is repeated three more times for the three remaining areas:
project alternatives, customer requirements and market attributes.The market scenario op-
tions are based on the requirements gathered from the market and customers. This task
involves generating different plausible competitive scenarios that effectively bound the un-
certainty of the project selection problem.
Prior to conducting those morphological analyses a QFD analysis is conducted on the
customer requirements. For the commercial aviation case, the customers are the airlines and
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Figure 4.5: The House of Quality for QFD
they seek to purchase (or lease) an airframe/engine combination for their fleet. The QFD
analysis begins by listing the customer requirements that have been gathered by the design
team into rows (see Figure 4.5). These are also referred to as the “voice of the customer”.
The engineering characteristics are then identified and listed in columns. These are metrics
that will be used to help satisfy the customer requirements. The relationship matrix in the
middle of the House of Quality specifies the degree of inter-relationship between the customer
requirements and the engineering characteristics. A nonlinear scale is used to determine the
weight of importance between the requirements and characteristics. The correlation ma-
trix or “roof” of the House of Quality identifies the degree of interdependence among the
engineering characteristics. A competitive assessment can be performed by benchmarking
each engineering characteristic of the product against other competitor’s similar products.
The result of the QFD process is a document loaded with information that is continuously
updated throughout the design process. It serves as a planning tool to determine which engi-
neering characteristics are most sensitive to the requirements and enables designers identify
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the appropriate processes needed to satisfy these requirements. The QFD is utilized in this
methodology in step one to identify the key customer requirements and characteristics of
the commercial aircraft/engine market. The details of the implementation will be discussed
in Chapter 5. The information from the QFD is used to populate the customer requirements
matrix of alternatives.
The market scenarios matrix of alternatives is created with the functional categories rep-
resenting player (manufacturing company) attributes. For example, one attribute can be the
relative efficiency of a player in completing a specific type of project compared to another
player. In the aerospace community, this is analogous to one manufacturing company having
a faster time-to-market for a specific type of aircraft than another manufacturing company.
The term efficiency here is defined solely in terms of the speed of a project’s development.
The main purpose of developing scenarios is to reflect a variety of potential future compet-
itive situations. In deciding between several projects to research and develop, a company
will want to evaluate each project against possible competitive circumstances that may arise.
Fahey and Randall (1997) and Ahmed et al. (2003) suggest generating a best and worst case
scenario as well as several likely scenarios that fall somewhere in between.
The third and final matrix of alternatives is created for the project alternatives. For
commercial aircraft engine development projects, example categories could be the type en-
gine, where possible alternatives are new or derivative engine architecture. These categories
would typically represent physical characteristics of the engine like cycle parameters, me-
chanical component designs, technology options, etc.
The final task in this first step is to integrate the game structure, the market scenarios,
the customer requirements, and the project alternatives into a project selection roadmap.
The information from each matrix is fed into the project selection problem throughout the
methodology as shown in Figure 4.6.
To recapitulate, a project selection problem must be fully described in order to proceed
with subsequent steps. This will facilitate the analysis of results. A summary of this step is
presented in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.6: Step 1: Integration of MoA’s into Project Selection Roadmap
Figure 4.7: Step 1 Summary of Activities
4.2.2 Generation of Design Candidates (Step 2)
4.2.2.1 Task 1: Map Customer Requirements
After having defined the problem and specified a project roadmap in step 1, the next step is
to develop a way of evaluating different alternative designs with the intention of eventually
selecting the best one. Prior to generating said designs for each project, it is necessary
to identify what metrics will be used to compare them against each other. These metrics
represent measures of value to the customer.
Customer requirements can be traced back to specific metrics like performance, time,
cost and quality. Performance is a measure of how well the design is meeting its operative
goals. The time dimension refers to any aspect of time associated with the design. For most
consumer products, the time-to-market metric has a significant impact on the overall value
of the design to the customer. Perhaps the most important deciding factor in customer
requirements is cost. The cost metric refers to any monetary aspect of the design. The
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concept of quality is more complex than other metrics since it is a characteristic that can
be defined in many ways but it is essentially related to how well the product satisfies the
customer’s criteria.
Beyond these four fundamental customer metrics there is the concept of value which is
a more inclusive measure of a customer’s desires. Value can be viewed as the worth of a
product and is sometimes computed by dividing a product’s quality by its cost. Throughout
this research, the term customer value expresses the total worth of a particular system or
design to a customer. Worth is a relative measure of how closely the design matches the
customer’s requirements. In many aerospace engineering systems, the benefit-to-cost ratio
is an common measure of customer value.
There are various managerial tools that assist decision-makers with analyzing customer
requirements. The Seven Management and Planning Tools, part of the Total Quality Man-
agement concept, is a set set of techniques that facilitate the brainstorming process of
decomposing vague concepts into manageable parts. The most commonly used in systems
engineering are the Affinity and Cause/Effect diagrams and the Interrelationship digraphs
(Leonard, 1999). The House of Quality is also a common graphical technique as part of the
Quality Function Deployment process (Matzler and Hinterhuber, 1998).
To summarize, the mapping of customer requirements is a top-down process that spec-
ifies what value metrics are necessary for each requirement, what attributes best describe
the value metrics and what design alternatives best match the attributes, metrics, require-
ments, so on and so forth. Figure 4.8 shows how this mapping fits in with the rest of the
methodology. In Chapter 5, each aspect of the requirements mapping will be described in
detail. There will also be an explicit description of the assumptions made in this mapping
process.
4.2.2.2 Task 2: Create Design Space
There are several ways to generate potential alternative designs or concepts. Each process
is unique to the problem they are attempting to generate solutions for. In many cases,
exploring ideas through brainstorming is a popular approach. These can take place within
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Figure 4.8: A Top-Down/Bottom-Up Mapping of Requirements
an integrated product design team (IPT) or individually. In aerospace engineering however,
design problems tend to be very complex to simply brainstorm potential solutions for. En-
gineers usually will suggest ideas that can be described qualitatively but also carry out a
conceptual decomposition of the problem to better formulate alternative solutions.
The first step is to decompose the problem into smaller parts or functions. Functional
decomposition can be described as translating the design problem in terms of a flow of energy,
material and information (Dieter, 2000). This is beneficial to the engineer in knowing what
purpose the design serves. This is analogous to the customer whats of the QFD. Design
concepts, or the hows, are then generated via numerous methods. Physical design parameters
for instance, like length and weight, and material properties can describe a product’s primary
attributes. These are characteristic functions of possible system. A Morphological analysis
helps to map all the functions into categories and suggest alternatives for each function.
Combining an alternative from each function is a way of formulating a potential concept.
As a result, a morphological matrix can define the alternative design space.
With the advent of fast computation capabilities and high fidelity analysis tools a physics-
based design simulation environment provides a means of generating concepts based on
the parameter boundaries established in the morphological analysis. Most companies have
developed modeling and simulation (M&S) environments in-house to perform design trades
and generate feasible concept alternatives. Particularly in aerospace engineering, the need
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for physics-based analysis tools is paramount to the development of feasible design solutions.
The ability to quantitatively assess alternatives with respect to a physical set of requirements
is critical in any decision-making process. This is most commonly achieved through an M&S
environment.
The modeling and simulation of aerospace design problems typically consists of a series
of disciplinary sizing and synthesis tools that, when combined together, are able to generate
a wide variety of design concepts. The linkage between these analysis tools and models
must be well defined in this step. Design parameters that will be varied in the simulation
process are also identified in this step. Fast and efficient computation capabilities have
expedited the process of generating a wide range of concepts with M&S environments. These
environments produce a parametric design space that can be used to analyze a wide range
of design configurations and quickly observe the quantitative impact of design changes on
the economic requirements of a system. They also provide a platform for supporting robust
design simulation and probabilistic analysis. These environments tend to be very specific to
the design problem being analyzed. A detailed explanation of the M&S environment used
in this research is presented in Chapter 5 for the proof-of-concept. Step 2 is summarized in
Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Step 2 Summary of Activities
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4.2.3 Evaluating Customer Requirements (Step 3)
In step 2, a modeling and simulation environment was created to generate feasible design
alternatives that are line with the market scenarios and customer requirements. The ob-
jective of step 3 is to evaluate these designs against the customer value metrics (criteria)
identified in step 2, create a method of assigning a value to each design, and rank them
based on how well they meet those criteria. In looking forward to step 4, assigning a value
to each design alternative helps categorize the designs based on market segments and cus-
tomer requirements. Since each project contains different alternative designs, it is beneficial
to know how these designs rank within each project and it also facilitates the down-selection
of both projects and designs in step 5.
4.2.3.1 Task 1: Multiple Criteria Design Valuation
Most complex systems design problems involve selecting alternative designs based on a finite
number of choices and performance criteria. The selection process can be carried out by
either selecting the most favorable design from the set of alternatives or ranking them based
on the criteria. There is a wide range of multi-attribute decision making (MADM) methods
that combine both qualitative and quantitative data together to assist the down-selection
of designs (Sen and Yang, 1998).
The customer value analysis in this methodology takes place within the modeling and
simulation environment. After generating alternative designs in step 2, each design is then
automatically fed into a customer value calculation model that takes each design through a
series of revenue and cost models to evaluate the design. Each design is then given a value
based on how well it performed for all the customer attributes and is ranked among the
other candidate designs. A finite set of representative attributes that are most important
to the customer are selected a priori to evaluate each design alternative. The final value,
in the form of an overall evaluation criterion (OEC), is a function of these attributes. This
function is shown in equation 4.1.
F (x) =
∑n
i=1wifi (x) (4.1)
Where f (x) is the of value of the criteria (attribute) for each alternative design and wi
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is the weight of that criteria. For each attribute, a normalized value of f (x) can also be
computed by specifying minimum and maximum values for the attribute and what target is
desirable (to minimize or maximize said attribute).
For the purposes of this research and the proof-of-concept application in Chapter 5 an
OEC is used as the customer value ranking and selection method. Employing an OEC as
a MADM method can often be over-simplistic and lead to sub-optimal results compared
to techniques like Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOP-
SIS) (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1990). The
main disadvantage occurs with the estimating the importance weights for each normalized
attribute. They are often estimated based on a consensus within a design team. For a
small number of customer attributes however, the OEC approach is beneficial. This type
of simple-weighted method facilitates the automation process of rapidly computing the cus-
tomer values for each design. It is also easy to implement in a wide-range of problems.
For real-world applications that involve more customer value attributes and also necessi-
tates better accuracy for customer value selection, the design engineer can replace the OEC
method and employ other types of MADM techniques. The M&S environment can be con-
sidered as a plug-and-play platform with the steps in the methodology remaining the same.
A full description of the OEC approach taken in this research is described in step 3 of the
proof-of-concept in Chapter 5. A summary of step 3 is illustrated in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Step 3 Summary of Activities
95
4.2.4 Project Evaluation (Step 4)
After having established a modeling and simulation environment to generate design alterna-
tives and a customer value model to evaluate and rank those alternatives, the methodology
now proceeds with a competitive analysis of these design alternatives. The reader is referred
back to Figure 4.6 which shows how a project roadmap was generated. The project roadmap
serves to guide the competitive process through a game structure and assist the competitive
calculations.
4.2.4.1 Project Structure
The literature review of the project selection problem in section 2.4 showed that there exists
a myriad of ways of selecting R&D projects. The purpose of that review was to carve out
and define the scope of this research by establishing criteria that was consistent with the
commercial aircraft engine selection problem.
Selecting a commercial aircraft engine for development can be viewed as an R&D project
selection problem. This aircraft engine industry is characterized by a handful of players,
usually two to three large engine manufacturers, that have to design, develop, and produce
gas turbine engines to compete in a global arena where there is uncertain development
and reward levels. The game-based model developed to characterize this project selection
problem builds on the work done by Loury (1979) and Ali et al. (1993). Their efforts provide
a working foundation for this research since they “model the new product development process
as the simultaneous consideration of different types of projects in a rivalrous market with
explicit representation of technical uncertainties associated with different projects and firms’
asymmetric efficiencies in completing projects” (Ali et al., 1993). Whereas their work uses
fixed rewards, the interest in this research is to investigate how variations in customer value
impact the selection process of aircraft engine development projects. Additionally, their
efforts assume project cost to be fixed while the proposed methodology in this research
utilizes a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis that calculates cost and revenue directly as
a function of project performance and customer requirements. An important assumption
made in those efforts as well as in this research is that once a firm undertakes a given product
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Figure 4.11: Hierarchic Project Mapping with Design Alternatives
development there is an irrevocable commitment of resources. This is consistent with the
aircraft and engine design philosophy which affirms that cost-committed at the outset of the
design increases as the development progresses.
Before continuing with the game structure development, an understanding of the linkage
between project types, design alternatives and design parameter choices is warranted. Keep-
ing the engine selection problem in mind, an engine manufacturing firm, one of two or three
players in the market, has a project portfolio of various types of development projects to
choose from that leads to a product (engine) for sale in the market. There exists two types of
projects; a new (innovative) project or a derivative (modified) project. Each project type en-
compasses a parametric design space with many possible design alternative solutions. These
design alternatives are constructed by selecting a combination of key design parameters. In
many cases, the selection of design parameters will be driven by enabling technologies. The
hierarchy of this project decomposition is illustrated in Figure 4.11.
It is important to note here that the project identification process, particularly the
development of the parametric design space for the design alternatives, takes place in con-
junction with the establishment of the modeling and simulation environment in step 2 of
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the methodology. The project decomposition is described here in step 4 because it is more
deeply interlinked with the game structure. At this point in the methodology, the design
alternatives have been created for each project type.
The market scenario matrix established in step 1 (section 4.2.1) is revisited in step 4 by
taking the previously specified scenarios and further expanding their attributes. Attribute
values are indicative of a player’s strengths and weaknesses in the ability to transform
development projects into realized products for market sale. How fast a player transforms
a project into product is the subject of the next section.
4.2.4.2 Project Uncertainty Modeling
In this research, two principle sources of uncertainty are assumed to be attributable to
development projects. In conceptual design, engineers often have to assess the impacts of
schedule uncertainty in their designs. This uncertainty corresponds to the likelihood of a
design satisfying the customer requirements and meeting any budgetary constraints by a
given date. The speed at which a design completes the conceptual design phase and begins
production is based on those two conditions in addition to whatever uncertainties may be
associated with integrating technologies.
There is however, a second source of uncertainty. Not knowing how competitors in the
market are going to react to the introduction of a product refers to the competition un-
certainty. In order to analyze the impact of this uncertainty on project selection, a game
theoretic treatment is required. The game theoretic process is a way of analyzing a com-
petitor’s project strategies as a function of the project choices made by another competitor.
This a unique way of finding a project solution that is potentially robust to uncertain market
scenarios when there is often limited information about the competition. The selection of a
robust project solution is the subject of step 5 in the methodology.
Schedule Uncertainty
The schedule uncertainty is modeled probabilistically by assuming independent log-normal
distributions that describes the successful completion of a project. The probability that a
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project undertaken by firm i is completed by time t is:
Pr (τiN ≤ t) = 12 + 12 × erf
[
ln(TiN )−µiN
σiN
√
2
]
(for a new project) (4.2)
and
Pr (τiD ≤ t) = 12 + 12 × erf
[
ln(TiD)−µiD
σiD
√
2
]
(for a derivative project) (4.3)
where µN(D)and σN(D)are the mean and standard deviation of either a new or derivative
project completion time’s natural logarithm. The parameter TiN(iD)is firm i ’s mean comple-
tion time for a new or derivative project. This value is a function of two important assump-
tions commonly made in similar studies involving development project selection (Loury,
1979; Ali et al., 1993; Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987).
1. It is assumed that the expected time to develop a product from a new type of project
would be greater than from a derivative type given a comparable allocation of resources
to each project. This is consistent with the notion that a new development project
typically has more inherent uncertainty in its development process compared to a
derivative project where, for instance, the learning curve may not be as steep.
2. Secondly, firms will likely have differing approaches to developing and completing
either a new or derivative project. This translates to a relative difference in the ratio of
completion times for each project type. For example, one firm may have an advantage
in transforming a derivative project into a final product compared to another firm.
Therefore, their derivative project completion time will be lower than the derivative
project completion time of the other firm. The completion times ratio between two
firms follows the following relationship:
EN =
T1N
T2N
and ED =
T1D
T2D
(4.4)
The enumeration of competitive scenarios in step 1 (section 4.2.1) is based on combinations
of ENand EDvalues. The goal of performing the competitive analysis by varying the ratio
of relative completion times is to represent instances where one firm has an advantage over
the other in developing a project. Since it is difficult for firms to know exactly how fast they
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can produce a product compared to their competition, it is useful to analyze a spectrum of
such competitive scenarios. Each scenario is then carried through the methodology and a
payoff is computed for each firm based on the scenario. Eventually, by mapping all these
scenarios with the project payoffs, the engineer will have a better understanding of which
project is most strategically desirable to select.
Another important assumption is made in the choice of a log-normal distribution in
representing the probability of a project being completed by a certain time. The log-normal
distribution is the probability distribution of a random variable whose logarithm is normally
distributed. These distributions are commonly used to model failure degradation processes
like corrosion, diffusion, migration, crack growth, etc. and other reliability analyses. In
large scale systems design projects, the development time-frame can also be characterized
log-normally. The completion date of the development of a new aircraft for instance, will
usually be set several years in advance. The probability that the aircraft is completed prior
to that date is much smaller than the likelihood of it being postponed beyond that date.
More often than not, large-scale systems design projects tend to overshoot their target date
because of unexpected technical setbacks, market obstacles or budgetary issues.
Competition Uncertainty
The firms compete simultaneously in the market. A firm will select a development project
with no knowledge of what project the other firm has decided to undertake. This uncertainty
is addressed by listing all possible game scenarios and evaluating each through a structured
game theoretic approach. When each firm has two choices available, the four possible game
cases are shown in Figure 4.12. Each case represents a payoff value to each firm. If firm 1
undertakes a derivative project and firm 2 selects a new project, the payoffs are determined
by computing case 3. Not knowing which project the competitor will undertake is the prin-
cipal contributor of uncertainty in project selection. This follows a conventional approach
by authors like Azevedo and Paxson (2007); Ali et al. (1993); Loury (1979), that evaluate
competitive market uncertainty in similar investigations .
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Figure 4.12: Four Competitive Game Scenarios
4.2.4.3 Game Payoff Calculations
Each game case shown in Figure 4.12 is a pair of payoff values, one for each firm. The payoff
matrix is constructed in two parts. The first part involves calculating the market share for
each game case and for each firm. This is done by evaluating the design alternatives with
the customer criteria. The second part consists of determining all possible payoff scenarios
that can arise from the game cases and the schedule uncertainty. The schedule uncertainty
calculation described earlier in this step estimates how long it takes a firm to successfully
complete a project given characteristic parameters, like average project completion times,
etc. This information then helps determine which firm enters the market first and which
one enters second. The market share matrix is then combined with these payoff scenarios
to populate the payoff matrix. The execution of these two parts are described here.
Part 1: Populating the market share matrix
The design alternatives generated in step 2 of the methodology were grouped into the
two types of projects, new and derivative. The assumptions made to distinguish a new
project from a derivative project are problem specific. For this reason, those assumptions
are described in detail for the engine selection problem in Chapter 5. In step 3, each design
alternative from each project was mapped against the customer criteria (from each market
segment) and ranked based on how well they performed against the criteria. This ranking
is now used to calculate the market share for each design alternative from both firms. This
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Figure 4.13: Market Share Matrix Development
process is shown in Figure 4.13.
Market demand determines which design alternatives are preferred by which customers.
The market demand is modeled by having a pool of customers, each representing a different
market segment. The customer criteria varies distinctly between market segments such that
it is difficult for one design alternative to satisfy each market segment.
The market share model utilized in this research builds on the well-established attraction
model by Bell et al. (1975). The design alternatives are evaluated based on the customer
criteria defined by specific market segments. Each firm, i, has a design alternative, DAij ,
where j is the design alternative number. An attraction value, a (DAij) exists for each de-
sign alternative and is a function of the degree to which it meets the customer’s criteria. An
aircraft’s attraction value for example, may be driven by its ability to meet fuel consump-
tion demands, payload and range capabilities, emissions and noise regulations, etc. (The
attraction value is computed in step 3 of the methodology). If a (DAij) is at or above the
required level desired by a customer k, then it is assumed that the quantity of the product
demanded by that customer, qk, will be allocated to that design alternative. It can be stated
then that
qk (DAij) = f (a (DAij)) for k = 1, 2, ..., n (4.5)
An important assumption in this model states that the market share, ms (DAij), of
a firm’s design alternative, is uniquely determined by the quantity sold to a customer.
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Therefore, this is formalized as
ms (DAij) = f (qk (DAij)) (4.6)
Furthermore, it can be said that
n∑
i=1
ms (DAij) = 1 (4.7)
where
0 ≤ ms (DAij) ≤ 1, i = 1, 2 (4.8)
for a duopoly market. If a market share is assigned to each design alternative based exclu-
sively on the quantity of design alternatives sold to each customer, then its market share is
given by:
ms (DAij) =
qk (DAij)∑n
k=1 qk
, for k = 1, 2, ..., n (4.9)
After computing a market share value for each firm’s design alternative, the market
share matrix is populated as shown in Figure 4.13. The market share matrix is then used
to compute the payoff values to each firm when they select a design alternative. The payoff
matrix will follow the project selection problem identified earlier in step 4 of the methodology.
A full description of this project structure is presented in part 2.
Part 2: Populating the payoff matrix
There are four possible game cases that, when evaluated stochastically using the schedule
uncertainty parameters, produce four market scenarios specifying which firm is the leader
and which one is the follower. The leading firm is considered the market pioneer and is
first to have successfully completed a project. The follower is the firm that introduces their
product into the market at some point after the pioneer. The time frame where there exists
only one product in the market is considered the monopoly period. When two products are
simultaneously available in the market it is considered the duopoly period.
The payoff to a firm depends primarily on the following factors: the type of project they
introduce into the market, whether they are a leader or a follower into that market and
the rewards available in each period. A first/second-mover advantage parameter is used to
103
study the advantages or disadvantages of being a leader in the market. This parameter also
provides a means to understand the rivalrous relationship between firms and the impact
that has on their payoffs. It is implemented in order to address RQ3.2 (Figure 4.2) which
seeks to understand how the degree of rivalry between competitors affects project selection.
This parameter is meant to encompass competitive factors such as price, which is driven by
the number of players in a market and the degree of substitutability between their products.
For example, in the duopoly period, firm 1 is the leader, firm 2 follows and each are in the
market with differentiated products (one has new, the other derivative). If the products are
highly substitutable then they may also induce price competition and so their payoffs are
penalized accordingly. This penalty is modeled by through the first/second-mover advantage
parameter. There is one parameter for products of similar type and one for differentiated
products. Each will be explained later on.
The rewards available in each period are determined by the demands in the new product
market and the derivative product market. These demands are only a function of the value
of the product to the customers in the market. As described previously in Part 1 of this step,
the values of a new and derivative product are computed in order to determine the market
share between firms. The market share specifies the amount of rewards, riNand riDfor a
new and derivative product for firm i in each period. The rewards for the engine selection
problem are the engine orders placed by the customers in the market. This will be discussed
in detail in Chapter 5.
A firm receives monopolistic payoffs if its product is the only one available in the market.
In the duopoly period, firms will receive payoffs depending on what products they have
introduced into the market. All these possible market scenarios are enumerated in table 4.1.
In table 4.1, the total payoff to a firm is shown by adding the rewards attained in period
1 with those earned in period 2. For example, if firm 1 completes a new project before firm
2 completes a new project, the payoff to firm 1 is the addition of monopolistic rewards, r1N ,
in the first period, with a fraction of the duopolistic rewards, αNLr1N , in the second period,
where αNLis the first/second-mover advantage parameter used to split the available rewards
for a new project. The follower entering with a new project will have rewards decreased by
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Table 4.1: Game Payoff Structure
αNF equal to 1− αNL. Furthermore, the rewards for a new project will be higher than the
rewards for a derivative project. For the engine selection problem, new engines will generally
be priced higher than derivative engines which in turn will typically generate higher rewards
for the manufacturer (either through direct sales or parts). This assumption is also echoed by
similar analyses of consumer goods industries where pioneering firms will generally acquire
a higher market share (Schmalensee, 1982; Robinson and Fornell, 1985). The use of separate
first-mover advantage parameters, one for a new project and one for a derivative project,
follows the assumption made by Ali et al. (1993) that a pioneering firm will have a relatively
larger advantage in a market when introducing a new product versus a derivative product,
i.e. αNL > αDL .
When both firms invest in different projects then the distribution of rewards is based
on the type of projects chosen, the order of market entry, and the degree of substitutability
between types of products. If for example, as shown in table 4.1, firm 1 is the leader
with a new product and firm 2 follows with a derivative product, then the distribution of
rewards in the duopoly period is based on the degree to which a new product will displace
a derivative product. This substitutability parameter varies between 0 and 1 and is given
by σNL, σDF , σDL, and σNF , depending on who is the leader/follower and what type of
product they introduce into the market. The concept of substitutability is significant in the
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Figure 4.14: Expected Payoff Game Structure
development of aerospace systems and technologies. New and derivative aerospace systems
differ mainly in the type of technologies used in those systems. Therefore, the degree to
which a new or derivative product displaces the other will likely be driven primarily by
the technologies infused within those systems. The value this parameter adopts can can be
dictated by system performance metrics that are significant to the customer. The evaluation
of this substitutability parameter will be made in Chapter 5 with the aircraft engine proof-
of-concept.
The new and derivative project completion times, τiNand τiDfor each firm i are evaluated
stochastically via log-normal distributions following equations 4.2 and 4.3. These parameters
are used to determine which firm is the leader and which is the follower for each game case
scenario identified in table 4.1. The expected payoff calculations are made based on the
model developed by Ali et al. (1993) which suggests that the expected payoff of a project
to a firm is the combined discounted flow of rewards in periods 1 and 2. Figure 4.14 shows
the payoff distribution structure to each firm when they select a design alternative from a
new or derivative project.
The conditional expected payoff formulation to firm 1 entering the market first with a
design alternative j from a new project given that firm 2 follows with a design alternative
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from a new project is given by:
p1N2N (DAj) = Pr (τ1m = t& τ2m = s)×
tˆ
s
rNe
−µudu +
∞ˆ
t
αNLrNe
−µudu −XN (4.10)
where:
• Pr (τ1m = t& τ2m = s) is the probability that firms 1 and 2 introduce their products
at time t and s, respectively. The product type, m, is derived from a new or derivative
project. Based on the assumption on schedule uncertainty (section 4.2.4.2), τ1 and τ2
are stochastic, so a firm may be a leader or a follower depending on the random date
of the completion of the projects.
• ´ ts rNe−µudu is the flow of rewards, rN , discounted by µ during the monopoly period.
• ´∞t αNLrNe−µudu is the flow of rewards, αNLrN , discounted by µ during the duopoly
period.
• XN is the development cost for a new type of project.
This payoff formulation is a straightforward approach to calculating conditional expected
payoffs given a time horizon. The methodology proposed in this research utilizes this ap-
proach as a foundation. In the selection of an engine architecture study in the next chapter,
the discounted flow of rewards computation is carried out via a discounted cash flow analysis
using appropriate financial models. In addition, the project development costs are integrated
into the cash flow analysis.
The remaining seven payoff formulations illustrated in Figure 4.14 are devised in a similar
fashion as equation 4.10. The payoffs are then compiled for each design alternative into a
payoff matrix. This matrix is a type of game design space that enables managers to make a
direct link between design alternatives and market opportunities.
The next step in the methodology is to explore the design space in such a way to choose
an optimal strategy for project selection. Step 4 of the methodology is summarized in Figure
4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Step 4 Summary of Activities
4.2.5 Strategy Development and Decision-Making (Step 5)
The final step of the methodology begins by taking the game payoff matrix generated in
step 4 and identifying the equilibrium solutions. These solutions represent robust choices of
strategy in competitive scenarios with the purpose of mitigating potential payoff risk due to
competitive market uncertainty. The equilibrium analysis uses concepts developed through
the vast game theoretic literature. The second and final part of step 5 is where the project
choice is made. The choice is primarily based on the equilibrium results. However, as will be
discussed in Chapter 5, each project may have multiple design alternatives available, each
with their own game equilibrium result.
4.2.5.1 Task 1: Identify Game Nash Equilibriums
Each payoff matrix is considered a game matrix for equilibrium1 calculation purposes. As
described in the literature review (Chapter 3) of game theoretic techniques, there are two
types of game structures, normal and extensive form games. The normal-form structure is
represented in the form of a matrix and differs from extensive-form games (game trees) in
that information regarding the sequence of moves by players is not available. Normal-form
games are easier to construct and evaluate which makes them more attractive when identi-
fying dominated strategies and Nash equilibria. It is important to note that the framework
proposed in this research lends it self to both normal and extensive-form game formulations.
1The equilibrium-finding method used in this research is based on the Nash equilibrium and therefore
the word equilibrium here will be used interchangeably with Nash equilibrium.
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However, the normal-form structure is the preferred approach to introduce the fundamental
concepts of game theory and equilibrium analysis without the required additional informa-
tion and computations needed for extensive games.
In this research, the author studies the competitive interaction between two players2.
Evaluating this interaction is achieved by carrying out an equilibrium analysis using the
techniques described in section 3.3. The selection of the best method for computing equilibria
depends on several criteria. The methods applicable to a game depend on the number of
equilibria to compute, the structure of the game (normal or extensive), and the rules of the
game. The rules of the game as described in Chapter 3 dictate how the game is to be played.
This information is critical to selecting the correct equilibrium solution-finding method. For
this reason, the first step of the methodology, which formulates the project roadmap, is
primarily concerned with explicitly outlining every element of the game to be analyzed.
A major driver in the selection of an equilibrium-finding method is the size of the game
matrix. The larger the game (in terms of number of actions available to each player) the
higher the probability of finding multiple equilibria. One of the major challenges with
larger games (beyond 4x4) is attempting to choose a single equilibrium among the multiple
solutions. By having a single point solution, game theorists would be able to predict what
would happen during the game with more certainty. Furthermore, this would help players
themselves in predicting what their opponents might do. Having multiple equilibria to
choose from in a game may suggest that these are not genuine equilibria since each player
may select a different equilibrium solution. This is a major hurdle to overcome in game
theory and the literature proposes various modifications of the Nash equilibrium concept.
Several attempts have been made to determine the “best” Nash equilibrium among a set of
equilibria (van Damme, 2002).
In the proposed methodology the Nash equilibria are computed by solving systems of
polynomial equations and inequalities. The method used to perform these computations is
called “gambit-enumpoly” and is executed via the Gambit c© software (See section 3.4). The
input file specifies the type of game to be analyzed, the size of the matrix, and the payoffs
2For the purposes of this research, a firm is considered a player in the game.
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Figure 4.16: Example of Game Inputs into the Gambit Algorithm
Figure 4.17: Linking the Analysis Codes with Gambit
for each player. An example of this input is shown in Figure 4.16.
The output file specifies the equilibrium strategy pair. If there exists mixed strategy
equilibria the output specifies the probabilities of the mixed strategies. One of the major
challenges encountered in this research was linking the game theory algorithm (Gambit) with
the analysis codes used to generate the design alternatives. The state of the art in equilibrium
analysis using computer algebra is currently limited to the Gambit software which provides
an extensive toolkit for analyzing games but is limited to discrete experiment analysis. The
output and input formats are not necessarily conducive to being automated which is a key
criteria when running probabilistic analyses with varying payoffs. This problem is rectified
by bypassing the graphical user interface of Gambit and directly “hard-coding” the gambit-
enumpoly algorithm with the other analysis codes. The MATLAB c© software is used as the
platform to devise the experiment algorithms for this research (see Figure 4.17). Further
details about the algorithm coding are provided in Chapter 5.
The project schedule uncertainty evaluation in step 4 (section 4.2.4.2) is essentially a
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sampling of input values from a probability distribution that change the payoffs of a game.
Since this uncertainty analysis is performed over many samples the equilibrium analysis is
therefore automated to perform the equilibrium computations for each payoff game. The
equilibria are then compiled to observe how the schedule uncertainty affects the equilibrium
outcome of competitive games. The next part of step 5 is where the decision-making takes
places. The projects and their design alternatives are evaluated based on the equilibrium
results (among others) and down-selected.
4.2.5.2 Task 2: Evaluate and Down-Select Project Strategies
The final part of step 5 re-introduces the research questions to observe how the proposed
methodology addresses them as well as suggests other beneficial findings. In particular,
Research Questions 3.1 and 3.2 are tasked with identifying the characteristics of a firm that
influence project selection in competitive markets. The engine selection problem in this
research is concerned with many types of decision criteria, ranging from technical metrics
to economic and market metrics. As a result, the dimensionality of the problem increases
rapidly and it becomes difficult for the decision-maker to make an engine selection. Fortu-
nately, there exists a host of different down-selection techniques, like Pareto analysis, that
facilitate the down-selection of designs. These techniques will be employed in Chapter 5.
It is not necessary to visualize every single output metric in order to make a decision. In
fact, most of the time there will be conflicts between metrics making it impossible to identify
a single optimal design. Ultimately, a compromise between metrics is required so that a
design satisfactorily meets the most important requirements. One approach to facilitating
the down-selection process is to evaluate each project and design alternative based on its
“competitiveness” in the market. This can be defined in many ways but in this research the
author has elected to define competitiveness in terms of expected payoff and risk (potential
financial loss). The down-selection decisions then primarily focus on these two metrics. Both
expected return and risk are based on the competitor’s position in the market. For example,
a new design project introduced into the market first can be financially rewarding initially
during the monopoly period but may be less attractive once the competition enters with a
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Table 4.2: Base-case Model Inputs
derivative project. It is possible therefore, based on the project completion times for the
projects from each competitor to determine their respective payoff and risk values. From a
firm’s perspective, the final selection of a design alternative is one which provides the most
value to the firm, is robust to changes in customer demand, and its return on investment is
sustainable across competitive scenarios.
4.2.6 Base-case Model
A base-case model is analyzed to provide insights into the sensitivities between the roadmap
inputs (market scenarios, design alternatives, requirements) and the game theoretic tool
outputs. The creation of a base-case model is essential to the overall research in order to
calibrate the competitive analysis tools. This will alleviate the analysis of results in the
proof-of-concept implementation in Chapter 5. The reader is referred to Figure 4.3 for an
outline of the general assumptions made in the formulation of the base-case model. These
assumptions will be reintroduced throughout the model setup.
The base-case model consists of two firms, each having two project options, that compete
in a notional market where the rewards and development costs are fixed. This assumption
shifts the focus from the impact of rewards/costs to the impact of the schedule (PCT)
uncertainty. The market demand suggests that the potential rewards for a new product
are higher than for a derivative product. Furthermore, the parameters for first and second
(leader/follower) advantages are also fixed to a value of 0.5. This implies that during the
duopoly period both firms receive 50% of the market rewards. This again helps to focus
entirely on the impact of PCT fluctuations. The objective is to observe how the optimal
project selection is driven by project completion times (PCT). The only independent vari-
ables in this case are the PCT’s. The parameter settings are presented in table 4.2. The
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Figure 4.18: Market Scenarios for Firm 1’s New and Derivative Project Completion Times
PCT’s are vary uniformally between 1 and 4 years. A uniform distribution is assumed first
to prevent the results from being skewed by the inputs. The base-case algorithm is run with
100 simulations for different PCT combinations to compute a payoff matrix for each market
simulation. Each matrix is then analyzed to identify Nash equilibria using the Gambit game
theoretic software as shown in Figure 4.17. The results are compiled to visualize how the
NE results vary with different PCT scenarios. Figure 4.18 illustrates the market scenario
results. The green and red points represent market scenarios where firm 1 should choose to
develop a new and derivative project, respectively. The market scenarios are separated by a
project “switch” line that suggests the PCT values where it would become optimal to switch
project strategies. The Nash equilibrium shows that firm 1 would be inclined to convert a
new project strategy to a derivative strategy if it estimates that the target PCT for new
project is going to continue to increase beyond a threshold timeframe while its estimated
PCT of a derivative project remains the same.
Another interesting result is to visualize how the payoffs for firms 1 and 2 change based
on the project strategy choosen by firm 1. Figure 4.19 shows the payoff impact to firm 2
when firm 1 switches between a derivative and new project. Both firms seek to maximize
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Figure 4.19: Market Payoff Scenarios for New Project Completion Times
their payoff for every game scenario. This “ideal” point would be positioned in the top right-
hand corner of Figure 4.19. A Pareto frontier exists such that a payoff loss for firm 1 is a
payoff gain for firm 2. The next base-case analysis consists of taking the same inputs from
table 4.2 and changing the uniform distribution of the PCT’s to a log-normal distribution.
A log-normal distribution provides a more accurate representation of the probability that a
project will be completed by a specified target date. The same base-case payoff algorithm
is used and the Nash equilibria are calculated for 1000 market scenario simulations. The
equilibrium results for a firm 1 and firm 2’s PCT’s are illustrated in Figure 4.20. The results
depict four different equilibria that are possible for any combination of PCT’s. From firm
1’s perspective, an equilibrium scenario in either [N,N] (blue) or [N,D] (green) indicates that
firm 1 should develop a new project. Similarly, an equilibrium result of either [D,N] (black)
or [D,D] (red) suggests that firm 1 choose a derivative project to develop. The market
scenarios plotted in this figure are a function of PCT’s for new projects. The purpose here
is to observe how the equilibrium trends as a function of uncertain new project completion
dates. An important observation that emerges from these results is the “switch” year, where
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Figure 4.20: Market Payoff Scenarios for Log-normal Project Completion Times
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Figure 4.21: Base-case Equilibrium Surrogate Model Profiler
firm 1 would need to assess the likelihood that its new project development timeframe will
go beyond ~2.25 years, in which case it should undertake a derivative project instead.
The next approach is to construct a surrogate model of the base-case payoff algorithm
combined with the Nash equilibrium calculation. In addition to further equilibrium verifica-
tion tests, surrogate models support decision-making on the fly. The equilibrium result can
be attained by dynamically changing anyone of the input variables to any value within a
specified range. This “game” design space is created through a design of experiments (DoE)
with inputs listed in table 4.2. Each experiment in the DoE is run through the payoff algo-
rithm and Nash computation. The model is created using the MATLAB c© software. There
are 1000 experiments in the DoE and each one constitutes a market payoff scenario. These
scenarios consist of combinations of values of PCT’s taken from a specified range, as shown
in table 4.2. The surrogate model is constructed through the training of a Neural Network
(NN) of 50 nodes. A NN is appropriate for highly non-linear functions, such as the Nash
equilibrium space. A result showing one scenario of four PCT combinations is presented in
Figure 4.21.
The surrogate model is used as a platform to verify the trends of the Nash equilibrium
result. Figure 4.21 shows firm 1 entering the market first with a new product but follows
firm 2 into the market with a derivative product. With these game settings the model
suggests that the optimal choice of project for firm 1 is new and for firm 2 is derivative:
[N,D]. These four PCT values are separately run through the payoff algorithm and Nash
function and the resulting equilibrium is [N,D], which is indicates that the surrogate model
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is consistent with the algorithm and Nash calculations. This result is also intuitive since a
firm will profit more by being a leader in the market so firms will tend to select projects
which they believe they can introduce into the market before the competition. Surrogate
models enable decision-makers to experiment with different project completion time settings
and observe how the optimal project choice varies.
The main base-case takeaway is to demonstrate through a notional game example the
ability to implement the payoff function and compute a payoff as a function of key R&D
project inputs. It provided a platform to test the Nash function and observe the equilibrium
trends. It also provided a basis for implementing and evaluating schedule uncertainty with
different time-to-market scenarios. This model also begins to answer the second research
questions which are presented here.
Research Question 2.1: What competitive decision techniques enhance the
confidence in concept down-selection of existing design methods in aerospace
systems design?
Research Question 2.2: How can decision-makers quantitatively measure the
impact of a competitors product development strategy on the economic success
of their design?
4.3 Chapter Summary
Chapter 4 introduced the methodology that is central to the development of the dissertation.
At the beginning of the chapter, the research questions were posed and hypotheses were
developed as means to guide the research process. Figure 4.22 illustrates the relationships
between the methodology and the research framework.
The goal of formulating a specific methodology is to address each hypothesis by running
the methodology through an experiment which will either prove or disprove each hypothesis.
In the next chapter, the game-based methodology is implemented through an aircraft engine
selection problem.
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Figure 4.22: Recapitulation of Mapping between Methodology, Research Questions and
Hypotheses
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Chapter V
CASE STUDY: SELECTION OF A COMMERCIAL
ENGINE ARCHITECTURE
The selection of a commercial engine architecture is the demonstration problem for the
proposed methodology outlined in Chapter 4. The intent in this chapter is primarily to
show that the method can be completed and applied to a current engineering problem.
The demonstration problem also serves as a testbed for answering the research questions
and evaluating the hypotheses established in section 4.1. It is important to keep in mind
that the results presented throughout this chapter are hypothetical, based on a series of
important assumptions that will be introduced where necessary.
The structure of the chapter is based on the steps of the methodology. The first section
begins with an introduction into the commercial engine selection problem. A significant
amount of effort is devoted to steps 2 and 3 which detail how the engine design alternatives
are generated and evaluated in terms of their technical and economic performance. At the
outset of this doctoral research, the focus was primarily on the development of a commercial
engine design environment where decision-makers could evaluate different engine alternatives
under various economic conditions. A broad modeling and simulation environment was
developed for this purpose. As the research progressed into the competitive market arena
this environment grew concurrently to assess the competitive effects of different market
scenarios.
5.1 Problem Introduction
Section 1.5 introduced some examples of competition in the aerospace market. The proposed
methodology is applied to the engine architecture selection problem of a 300 passenger
commercial jetliner with market competition.
The problem is inspired by Boeing’s development of the Boeing-777 in the late 1980s and
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Figure 5.1: Boeing 777LR with GE90-110 Engines (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2008)
early 1990s1. However, the engine selection problem in this research is not meant to exactly
imitate that design problem. The real B777 engine selection problem serves as a guidance
throughout the implementation. In particular, throughout the development of the M&S
environment and the creation of the engine design space, an attempt is made to conform to
the technical specifications of the B777 engines.
The B777 market was chosen as the proof-of-concept for this research for several reasons.
There is more flexibility from a sizing and synthesis standpoint when considering large
turbofan engines. The B777 aircraft was (and still is) outfitted with the largest commercial
turbofan in the world (Figure 5.1) . The engine analysis codes used in this research are
capable of generating a wider range of engine alternatives that can satisfy the performance
requirements of the B777 than if they were to generate alternative designs for smaller aircraft
categories. The competition between the three B777 engine manufacturers, General Electric,
Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney demonstrates how three different engine manufacturers
with varying engine architectures can compete on an airframe. Only very few airframes
exist in the market, like the B747 and B767, that are offered with a choice of engine from
1See section 2.1.1 for background on the B777 engine selection problem.
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Figure 5.2: Five-Step Methodology for Analysis of Competitive Designs
all three major engine manufacturers. Much of the decision to use the B777 as a case study
was dependent on the modeling and simulation capabilities of the technical framework in
this research. More on the modeling of B777 engines is presented in step 2 in this chapter.
An illustration of the methodology is reintroduced in Figure 5.2 to remind the reader of
the sequence of steps for the implementation process.
5.2 Step 1: Project Selection Problem Definition
The first step of the methodology can be regarded as the backbone of the implementation
process. The problem definition step determines the structure and direction the experiments
will take. It begins with Quality Function Deployment to identify the key requirements and
engineering characteristics. A matrix of alternatives then utilizes the QFD information to
develop project alternatives for the engine manufacturers.
5.2.1 Quality Function Deployment
The problem definition step starts by confirming the already established business case of
the design problem. In the case of the engine selection, this would consist of gathering all
the pertinent information from the different business units within the firm, like marketing,
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engineering, etc. and consolidating this information to develop the best strategy. The ap-
proach in step one of this methodology is to simulate the formulation of a business case
through a Quality Function Deployment (QFD) and analysis of alternatives. One of the
main advantages of a QFD analysis is to provide a planning route from the top-level prod-
uct requirements, through the part characteristics, through the process parameters, to the
component level and how everything will be manufactured. In this experiment, a QFD is
performed for a 300 pax aircraft (product) but focusing only on the engine characteristics.
It is important to note that the QFD would integrate all the suppliers to the airframe (like
the engine) together to plan a successful development approach. However, the assumption
in this experiment is that a QFD for the airframe has already been carried out.
The QFD is performed to translate the customer requirements of a notional 300 passenger
aircraft to the engineering characteristics of an engine manufacturer for that airframe. The
first step in the QFD analysis is to populate the customer requirements rows. The analysis
requires that these attributes be expressed as measurable design targets in the form of
engineering parameters. The “voice of the customer” can be categorized into four main areas:
performance requirements, regulatory requirements, operations and safety, and economics.
Figure 5.3 shows the house of quality for the proof-of-concept. Each category is divided
further to include specific design attributes such as range, number of passengers, risk, noise
production, emissions, maintainability, direct operating cost, etc. Each attribute is given
an importance value by the customer. These will help compute the relative and weighted
importance of the engineering characteristics later on.
The next step involves populating the engineering characteristics. These are design
parameters that the engineer has control over to address each customer attribute. For
this aircraft study there are categories like: performance, structures, costs, and propulsion.
Each has specific characteristics like: sea level thrust, engine weight, number of spools,
SFC, takeoff field length, Mach number, material selection, etc. In most design problems
the engineering characteristics are correlated with each other. This information is inserted
into the correlation matrix (roof of the house of quality). This involves looking at the
coupling between characteristics and specifying a degree of correlation. For example, the
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Figure 5.3: Engine House of Quality for 300 Pax Aircraft
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engine weight is strongly correlated with the number of compressor stages. This assessment
may indicate that a further trade study is necessary between these characteristics.
Once this information is added to the house of quality, the relationship matrix is then
populated. The relationship matrix will determine the degree to which the engineering
characteristics impact the customer needs. For example, the engine weight strongly impacts
the passenger payload of the aircraft. The scale of the correlation is generally nonlinear of
the form 9/3/1/0.
For each engineering characteristic there are specific target values which are listed at the
bottom of the house of quality. The organizational difficulty nonlinear scale provides a way
of identifying which engineering characteristic targets will be most difficult to achieve.
A technical competitive assessment is made which benchmarks the firm’s engine against
other competitors engines for each of the engineering characteristics on a scale of 1 to 5
(best). In the QFD analysis the competitive assessment is important as it is the the first
take on at addressing what the competitor is producing.
The weighted importance of each engineering characteristic is computed based on the
importance rating of each customer requirement. The scale of organizational difficulty is way
of showing how difficult it will be to achieve the target values under schedule uncertainty.
A nonlinear (9/3/1) difficulty scale is appropriate to separate those metrics that are higher
risk from those a lower risk. This scale will then impact the distribution of the relative
importance. The relative importance is the weighted importance, normalize on a scale from
1 to 100. The results of the QFD are used to populate the matrices of alternatives. This
distribution shows that sea-level static thrust, TSFC, design range, and several other metrics
have the most impact on the customer requirements. This study confirms that engine design
candidates must be created with these metrics in mind. Furthermore, the cycle parameters,
Fan Pressure Ratio (FPR), Overall Pressure Ratio (OPR), Turbine Inlet Temperature (T4),
High Pressure Compressor Ratio (HPCPR), and High Pressure Compressor Weighted In-
let Mass Flow Rate (HPCWc) have a direct impact on Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption
(TSFC).
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The final step is to calculate the product of the weighted importance and the organi-
zational difficulty to identify the relative weighting of engineering metrics with the highest
organizational difficulty. This is represented by the bar chart at the bottom of the House of
Quality. This result is added value in determining the difficulty of achieving the engineer-
ing targets. This bar chart represents the risk embedded in each engineering characteristic.
The risk is driven by factors such as low technological knowledge with respect to achieving
the engineering target, or by the schedule and costs associated with meeting those targets.
Although some engineering metrics like SLS thrust have an important impact with respect
to the customer requirements, the risk results indicate that TSFC is going to be a more
significant metric to consider, based on the difficulty associated with achieving its target.
The next step involves constructing the engine and customer matrices where the QFD
results will help identify which parameter values to select.
5.2.2 Matrix of Alternatives
Performing a QFD analysis first, before populating the matrices is beneficial because it
determines which customer requirements are more important and it helps to formulate al-
ternatives based on the results of the engineering characteristic impacts. The QFD’s relative
importance analysis also serves as a guide to select the optimal choice of scenarios from the
matrices. There are four matrices that are necessary to bound the scope of the proof-of-
concept.
The first step is to do a functional decomposition of the engine based on the engineer-
ing characteristics from the QFD. The matrix attributes in the rows are the engineering
characteristics in the QFD. The project alternatives are established based on a review of
existing engine designs from competing manufacturers as well as technological advances that
exist in industry. This matrix is illustrated in Table 5.1. The highlighted cells indicate a
chosen alternative for a specific engine attribute. The row is the called “presets”. These
represent notional engine alternatives and when selected are made up various combinations
of attributes. The bottom five attributes are engine cycle parameters that determine the
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Table 5.1: Project Matrix of Alternatives
Table 5.2: Customer Requirements Matrix of Alternatives
cycle of an engine design alternative. In the next step of the methodology a design of exper-
iments is constructed around these cycle parameters to generate feasible engine candidates.
The values of these parameters are presented here deterministically. In the design of exper-
iments, however, they will be allowed to vary based on a range determined from the values
highlighted in this matrix of alternatives.
The next matrix relates to the customer requirements. The QFD information is directly
implemented here again to populate the attributes on the left-hand side of the matrix in
Table 5.2. For the proof-of-concept, two markets are used to evaluate the engine designs
from each firm. The first market (A), represents a base range aircraft that would carry
a specific payload for a base design range. The second market (B), is an extended range
derivative of the first airframe. The customers in this proof-of-concept consist of different
airlines, with different preferences and fleet routes, that are going to commit to buy an
aircraft (either A or B) with a choice of engine from two available engine firms in order to
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Table 5.3: Game Structure Matrix of Alternatives
maximize their utility. The utility of an airline in this research is determined by the net
present value (NPV) of their investment in an aircraft/engine package. This utility analysis
is the subject of step 3 in the methodology. The matrix of alternatives for the customer
requirements consists of five predefined airline profiles. Five airline profiles is assumed to
provide a good distribution of differences between airlines currently operating worldwide.
Each profile specifies the preference of that airline with respect to the list of attributes
listed in the rows of Table 5.2. The customer value analysis (step 3) can be performed
with either one airline representing the entire market or ’n’ airlines. The approach taken
for this proof-of-concept experiment is to use the five airlines as representations of different
market segments in the global aviation marketplace. It’s important to note however, that
the very first experiment consisted of only one representative airline. The goal initially was
to focus less on what the market demanded on more on what the firms had to offer. As the
research progressed, more airline profiles were added to provide a healthier representation
of the market diversity. For an engine manufacturer, it is more rewarding to capture more
than one segment of the market with the same product.
At this point the focus shifts from the project alternatives and customer requirements
definition to defining the experimentation process of the methodology. The next matrix
of alternatives illustrates the various game structure possibilities that exist when analyzing
competition between players. Table 5.3 shows the different alternatives that are possible for
a variety of game attributes. The reader is referred to section 4.2.1.1 for a more detailed
description regarding the choices made for this particular game structure. Of interest in
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Table 5.4: Market Scenario Matrix of Alternatives
this research is the competition in innovation investment. As engineers we want see what
effect does time-to-market have on our selection of designs. Smit and Trigeorgis (2004)
provide a framework for simultaneous and sequential games under various scenarios of R&D
investment competition. These scenarios are used to help formulate the game framework
for this proof-of-concept. Again, the focus is on simultaneous investment decisions made by
firms that feel the competitive pressure to rush into an innovation.
The last matrix of alternatives describes the options available to study the different
market-entry timing scenarios. Table 5.4 shows the options available to describe a market
scenario. The information contained in a market scenario is specifies the range of a firm’s
project completion time frame. With this information it is possible to identify a leader and
follower in the market. The mean PCT’s for each firm and their respective projects are used
to build the log-normal distributions that represent the uncertainty in project development
duration. The sigmas for each project determine the spread of the log-normal distribution
from the mean target PCT. The alphas and sigmas for each project leader specifies how the
rewards are distributed in the monopoly and duopoly periods.
The results of step 1 establish the roadmap that the proof-of-concept will take. As shown
in Figure 4.6 of Chapter 4 the objective of this first step is to provide the groundwork for
the subsequent steps in the methodology. Since each step builds on the next it is crucial to
specify the structure of the entire methodology prior to generating results.
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5.3 Step 2: Generate Design Candidates
With a clear definition of the types of projects and design alternatives that are going to
be evaluated for competition, the focus shifts to generating these engine designs. The top-
down/bottom-up approach that was illustrated in Figure 4.8 (Chapter 4) determines the
mapping of the customer requirements and market segments to the engine design alter-
natives. There are five airlines profiles that are set up to represent five different market
segments for the 300 passenger aircraft market. The segmentation of the market is made
based on existing routes by airlines using the B777-200 and B777-200ER airframes. The
primary goal is to provide a distribution of airline profiles that captures a wide range of
operating characteristics. The airlines profiles are notional but were loosely based on op-
erating characteristics of existing airlines. At this point, the only information necessary to
generate the design alternatives are the main customer value metrics that determine what
engine outputs to track.
Each of the five airlines has different requirements in terms of aircraft utilization, takeoff
field length, expected engine orders, delivery dates, etc. These are value metrics that take
on different values based on the preferences of the airline. Although there are many more
metrics that are necessary to differentiate airline customers, these were selected from the
problem definition in step 1 as the those that would have the largest impact on the utility
of the airline. These metrics were also selected to help distinguish the impact of each engine
alternative from each other. It’s important to note that the design of an aircraft engine
has an important but limited impact (mainly through the performance of the aircraft and
maintenance) on the airlines’ utility whereas other financial and operations metrics are more
common when looking at airline requirements. However, the purpose of this research is to
identify how the engine design can directly impact the utility of an airline. A full description
of the airline profiles is provided and discussed in the customer value analysis in step 3. The
focus here to generate the engine design space.
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Figure 5.4: Engine Architecture Decision Path
5.3.1 Engine Design Space
The proof-of-concept studies two types of projects, new and derivative. The definition
of a research and development project in this study is based on how engineers define the
difference between a new and derivative engine architecture. Defining the basic architecture
of an engine is the first step that needs to be made. This stems from the fact that the
architecture is earliest decision and the most difficult to revisit in the future. To understand
the spectrum of options available, a flowchart of engine architectural decisions is illustrated
in Figure 5.4.
In this research, option C is considered a derivative project and option D a new project.
To guide the engine parametric environment these two different architectures were chosen
based on existing engines and their flow-paths are illustrated in Figure 5.5. Once the two
engine projects are chosen the next part of step 2 is to produce a large set of engine designs
for each project by means of varying design cycle parameters. A DoE is created for each
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Figure 5.5: Engine Flow-paths For a New and Derivative Architecture
Figure 5.6: Engine Design of Experiments Structure
engine project and for both markets (base range and extended range aircraft) as shown in
Figure 5.6.
Five cycle parameters were selected as design variables for the DoE. These are shown
in table 5.5. A central composite design (CCD) was generated using these design variables
and a total number of runs was 81 for each of the four DoE’s. The DOE is then run
through the Environmental Design Space (EDS) modeling and simulation environment which
contains a suite of analysis modules/tools that represent the different aspects of engine design
and aircraft mission analysis. Each module consists of an analysis method which is either
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Table 5.5: Design Variable Ranges for DoE
a physics-based analysis code or analysis method with an empirical database. The EDS
platform in Figure 5.7, was commissioned by the FAA office of environment and energy for
the purpose of having a simulation capability for investigating the interdependencies and
trade-offs associated with environmental policies and technology development goals (Georgia
Tech and MIT - PARTNER, 2007). The detailed modules comprising the EDS tool were
originally developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
include five modules which have been seamlessly integrated:
• Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) – calculates the engine thermody-
namic analysis
• Weight Analysis of Turbine Engines (WATE) – estimates component weights and
dimensions based on cycle parameters calculated in NPSS
• FLight OPtimization System (FLOPS) – calculates aircraft weights and performance
results based on mechanical model from WATE and cycle performance from NPSS
• Aircraft Noise Prediction Program (ANOPP) – predicts certification noise levels and
noise power distance curves, based on aircraft dimensions from FLOPS and engine
information from NPSS and WATE
The NPSS cycle analysis performs a multi-point design at sea-level static, takeoff, top-of-
climb, and an aero-design point (cruise). This cycle analysis is more accurate than designing
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Figure 5.7: Engine Environmental Design Space Environment (Georgia Tech and MIT -
PARTNER, 2007)
the engine for a single point in the mission. Off-design analysis points that span the mission
are also included. The analysis code generates various outputs from the cycle analysis
including TSFC and thrusts at takeoff and top-of-climb (SLS thrust is an input). The
WATE analysis code generates the weight outputs for each engine design. These include
all the weights for all the components of the engine. The total engine weight is important
when it comes to sizing the airframe for the mission. It will also be key in determining the
amount of aircraft payload available. The FLOPS analysis is perhaps the most important in
terms of mission potential as it computes the fuel burn for each engine based on a specified
mission input. It also estimates the Takeoff Field Length (TOFL) required for each engine.
The estimated TOFL of a sized aircraft/engine combination is typically a design constraint
in design. Since the runway length is fixed by the design of the airport designers must
incorporate this constraint into their sizing analysis. This metric may be more important to
some airlines than others based on the runways they operate from. The engine results from
the four experiments are compiled together and presented in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Step 2 Engine Design Alternatives Results
The relationship of engine weight and thrust are consistent with the what would be
expected as engine weight increases with thrust. The thrust is discretized into three levels
as specified in the input. The derivative architecture weighs less but also generates less
thrust. Another important verification is the trends between block fuel and TSFC. As
TSFC increases the mission fuel burn increases for both architectures. Market B (extended
range) has a larger block fuel and is more sensitive to TSFC than market A. The engines are
now transferred over the customer value analysis to evaluate them based on the preferences
of the airlines.
5.4 Step 3: Customer Value Analysis
The objective of this step is to estimate the value that each engine design will have in
the market. In engineering design it is very challenging to model the economics of an
airline. Maximizing return to the manufacturer is a difficult calculation in design. There
are unknown impact of sales incentives or geopolitics. For this reason, the engineering
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approach is to attempt to design the engine that maximizes the value to the potential
airline customer(s). Rational customers buy engines that provide the “best value” for their
business case. Airline customer value is a primary objective function for commercial engine
design and is a function of the customer’s operating conditions, like route structure and type
of aircraft used.
There exists tools like Aircraft Life-Cycle Cost Analysis (ALCCA) that effectively esti-
mate the manufacturing and production costs of aircraft and the operating costs for airlines.
Although these tools can be used to understand costs and estimate revenues, as stand-alone
tools they are limited in their capacity to effectively determine the value an engine/aircraft
combination has to the operating structure of an airline. This research depends signifi-
cantly on the ability to evaluate engines based on how well they match an airlines operating
conditions and their overall business case.
The traditional valuation approach is the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method which
projects investments and sales to predict the future cash flows of new product. It adjusts
the value of future cash flows with a discount rate to obtain the present value which is then
added over the time period to obtain the Net Present Value (NPV). The corresponding
formula for computing the NPV is:
NPV =
∑T
i=0
Ri−Ii
(1+r)i
(5.1)
where R is revenue, I is the investments or costs, r is the discount rate, T is the total
time that the product will be in receiving revenues or expending costs, and i is the year.
The discounted cash flow is a useful way of evaluating enginering projects in terms of their
economic value to a firm.
The NPV result will be determined mainly by the input parmeters r, R, and I. The
discount rate, will typically depend on the internal economic status of the firm and can be
impacted by the firm’s credit history. Since this impact is internal to the engine manufac-
turer, the fluctuations of the discount rate are beyond the scope of this research. A firm’s
revenues are directly linked to the market demand and the market share achieved by the
firm. Marketshare in turn, is directly a function of the customer value which depends on a
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products’ peformance characteristics, operational results and how significant the customer
values competing products. A firm will also have to make key investments, particularly in
the R&D phase where substantial sunk costs or common for complex aerospace systems.
These costs will fluctuate throughout the design, development and production phases as
engineers finalize the concept and/or add technologies. Production costs are also driven by
labor and production rates which can change independently and is not typically under the
control of the firm. For the purposes of valuating an aircraft engine, the key contributors
to the NPV are essencially, the producer’s discount rates, forecasted sales, and technology
selections. Furthermore, the impact of external factors like fuel prices, noise/emissions regu-
lations, maintenance rates, and airline preferences in fleet utilization also affect the customer
value.
Step 3 in the methodology provides a way of addressing the first two research questions
which seek to discover ways in which the technical design space can be evaluated concurrently
with customer requirements. These questions are presented below.
Research Question 1.1: How can the technical design space of complex sys-
tems be expanded to model the economic success of R&D programs with uncer-
tain market requirements?
Research Question 1.2: How are customer requirements mapped to generate
feasible designs and establish value?
The development of a customer value tool is essential to identifying what particular aspects
of a commercial engine affect the directly and indirectly the customer value. This tool is
described in the subsequent sections.
5.4.1 Customer Value Analysis Tool
An important contribution in this research is the creation of a tool that helps to better
predict and understand the value perceived by the airline and the engine manufacturer
that is capable of accounting for external factors. The tool is an Excel-based modeling
and simulation environment that uses state of the art cash flow analyses to compute the
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Figure 5.9: Customer Value (Financial) Modeling Environment
economics of the airline. The economics are initially calibrated using data from a various
airlines operating the B777-200 and B777-222ER ((Air France-KLM, 2008; The Emirates
Group, 2002-2003). The data, based from the airlines annual reports specifies the operating
costs per trip for a given city pair route. Although the model is roughly calibrated to
some airlines, the focus of this research is in the competitive analysis results. The economic
analysis tool provides a means to compute value and can be updated as necessary. The
model is composed of a total of 11 worksheets. Three of them are inputs, four contain
computations, three are assumptions, and one contains all the results. A schematic of how
the different modules are interconnected is presented in Figure 5.9.
Airline Profiles Module
The airline inputs sheet contains information about the five airline customers in the mar-
ket. A particular aircraft will typically have a variety of missions requirements throughout
its life with an airline. These missions are often not similar in range and payload. For
instance, airlines often operate the Boeing 777-200ER over a variety of different missions
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Table 5.6: Airline Profile Ranges
and payloads, ranging from 1000 nm to 6000 nm and with payloads of 40,000 to 120000 lbs.
Any combination thereof is feasible, provided that fuel volume and takeoff weight limits are
met. Mission mixes potentially have a large impact on engine design since they are expected
to perform optimally during every mission scenario. Further, airlines do not fly each mission
equally every year. A vector of aircraft utilization for each mission is presented in table 5.6
both market A and B, for each airline. These values are on a scale of 0 to 100 where 100
indicates that that range is representative of common city-pair routes for that airline.
Five airline profiles are created based on the ranges from table 5.6 and are used to
represent different demand segments in the market. To better visualize how the utilization
vector varies with each airline profile, the payload/range diagrams are illustrated in Figure
5.10 for both the base-range airframe and the extended range airframe. The difference
between airlines 1 and 5 is in the way they utilize the airframe for their routes. Airline 1 has
the most frequency of trips (per year) with ranges below 2000 nautical miles. Whereas airline
5 bulk of operations are towards the 6000 nautical miles range and above. The purpose of
having two available airframes to choose from enables the airlines to optimize their use of
the airframes capabilities. Airline 1 is likely to prefer an engine that matches well with
the market A airframe and airline 5 will likely select market B. The choice of airframe and
engine that suits the airline will translate to more efficient operating costs for the airline.
In return this airframe/engine combination will be more attractive to the airline and have
a higher value.
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Figure 5.10: Payload-Range Diagrams with Utilization Frequency for Airlines 1 and 5
Airframe Data Module
The airframe data specifies the characteristics of the airframes used for markets A and
B. Some of the essential data required for the analysis program include the aircraft empty
weight, its maximum zero fuel weight, maximum takeoff weight, and maximum fuel capacity.
Most of this information will remain fixed since the focus of this study is not to define the
shape of the aircraft but to install the engines that provide the maximum value to the
customer for different customer route preferences. Some of the values, such as block fuel for
the design mission, will vary based on the engine design. Figure 5.11 presents a snapshot of
the user interface for this module.
Engine Data Module
A list of all the engines resides in this sheet. All the engine results from the each of the
four DoE’s is listed in this sheet. This sheet also computes some preliminary results such as
engine manufacturing cost and a first guess on engine price based on historical data. The
engine price regression analysis is discussed at the end of this step.
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Figure 5.11: Airframe Description for Markets A and B
Airline Revenue Module
The Airline Revenue Module (ARM) utilizes the DCF method to obtain the NPV of flying
the aircraft/engine combination using the utilization distribution previously defined over a
period of twenty years. For this calculation, it is assumed that the aircraft is leveraged at
one hundred percent, with an interest rate of 6.5% and a term of 15 years. During this
period, the airline assumes a ticket price inflation of 3.21% versus a cost inflation of 3.25%.
Passenger revenue is obtained by multiplying the $/rpm already defined in the airline profile
module by the trip mileage, and the number of passengers flying in the airplane in one year.
Cargo revenue uses a different metric, the cost per pound of cargo per mile. A separate
study was performed evaluating comparable prices of cargo transport services on a per-pound
basis. The result indicated that as the range of the mission increases, the cost per-pound
per mile decreases. However, it was found that for very short distances it was impossible to
justify high prices, since for short distances transportation alternatives for cargo are widely
available. After regressing the data to create a model of the cargo prices using an exponential
function, an adjustment was made to prevent cargo prices to rise so significantly for short
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Figure 5.12: Revenue Cargo Prices
routes. Figure 5.12 illustrates the real data based on the Excess Baggage Company (2007)
and the curve fit that corrects for the error in short distances labeled Fit Curve.
Total Aircraft Related Operating Cost Module
The Total Aircraft Related Operating Cost (TAROC) is a module that based on the
ALCCA cost analysis and converted into and Excel spreadsheet. It calculates the total
operating cost per mission and per year with inputs like utilization introduced previously.
It includes a graphical interface of the utilization distribution of the twelve airline missions
which enables the user to manipulate the profile style of airline they wish to model. In this
research study, the utilization distributions per mission for the five airlines are input directly
into the appropriate cells. These utilization levels are all normalized with respect to each
other to avoid confusion among different values. In this way if all utilizations are set to the
same value, regardless of the actual value, the amount of total time available in a year will
be equally distributed to all missions. This would cause shorter missions to fly more often
than long missions, but the total amount of time allocated to each mission would be the
same. The mission mix of two example airlines are illustrated in Figure 5.10.
Payload/Range Module
One of the main benefits of this customer value tool is the flexibility of swapping engine
designs to compute the benefits and costs to the airline. The payload/range module allows
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Figure 5.13: Mission Mix Sample and Payload-Range Envelope
the user to visualize the impact of an engine design on the mission and economic perfor-
mance. The engine will impact the several criteria, including block fuel, cargo revenue, and
maintenance cost. The flight envelope sheet enables the visualization of the impact of an
engine design on the capabilities of the airplane as a whole. For instance, a light engine
will impact the amount of payload available for cargo due to a reduction on total empty
weight. As a result, the potential revenue produced by cargo will increase. A similar effect is
observed if an engine has a lower block fuel requirement for a specific mission. An iterative
calculation takes place with up to one hundred cycles to converge on a solution of required
block fuel for each of the missions. The envelope, illustrated by the colored lines in Figure
5.13, changes dynamically with different engines. The top constraint is the maximum zero
fuel weight. This limit is set by the maximum stress that the wings can support due to
bending moment if all the weight is accumulated in the fuselage and there is no fuel on the
wings. This line does not change with different engines, but it sets the maximum amount of
cargo weight available after the fuel and passengers are included. The red line illustrates the
maximum takeoff gross weight of the aircraft. This limit is set by the airframe manufacturer
and therefore does not change with different engines. However, the position of this line will
migrate with different engines. As a new engine becomes more efficient, it is possible to load
more payload and less fuel, increasing the range of the airplane. It’s slope is downward due
to the tradeoff between fuel and cargo. The intersection between the maximum zero fuel
weight constraint and the maximum takeoff gross weight is achieved by loading the airplane
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Figure 5.14: Mission Mix Inputs for Block fuel Regression
to its maximum capacity in terms of passengers and payload, and then increasing the fuel
level available until MTOGW is reached.
Longer range missions will require a trade-off between fuel and payload to ensure that
the MTOGW constraint is not violated. Eventually, once the fuel capacity is reached, the
only way to fly farther routes is to decrease the passenger or cargo payload and make the
airplane lighter. This is case is shown by the blue line in Figure 5.13. However, the airlines
analyzed in this research do not fly missions in the extreme range of the flight envelope.
The script that runs the customer value model uses Excel solver functions to iterate on
block fuel calculations until a balance between fuel required and fuel available is achieved for
each mission. In addition, every time that a new engine design is selected for this module,
the flight envelope and payload load of each of the missions adjusts to ensure they stay
within the constraints using the load factors specified by the airline inputs.
As a final note, the mission mix flexibility (different airline payload/range profiles) of this
module is possible because of the inclusion of a surrogate model for block fuel. Block-fuel
is regressed against the engine design variables as well as values of range and payload that
bound the payload-range design space as shown in Figure 5.14 . Each point shown is run
through the FLOPS module in the EDS environment to calculate the block-fuel required for
that payload range combination.
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5.4.2 Computing Project Value
The customer value tool provides the engineer with the economic results for each engine
design for the five airline customers outlined previously. The final part of step 3 is to assign
every engine design a value based on the importance that each airline gives to specific metrics
of interest. As described in section 5.4, there are several possible methods that are capable
of ranking the engines based on the importance of certain criteria to the airline. Since the
focus of this research is primarily on the competitive analysis, a weight-based OEC was used
to evaluate each engine alternative against specified airline criteria.
The first step was to down-select specific criteria that would be useful to distinguish
engines in terms of the their economic and technical performance. At the same time the
goal was to focus on criteria that would be significant to the business case of the airline.
In the latter case, a revenue/cost approach was taken and a discounted cash flow with net
present value became the representative criteria to use for the economics. On the revenue
side, it is possible to track how the different engine weights and block fuel requirements affect
the passenger and cargo payload potential and thus impact the revenue potential. On the
cost side, the engine price was computed by regressing existing engine price data from similar
engines in production today as a function of thrust, TSFC, fan diameter, and engine weight.
An important factor to airlines is the maintenance cost and this is calculated based on
the ALCCA maintenance module. Maintenance cost per hour (MCPH) is computed based
on several engine characteristics, like maximum turbine inlet temperature (T4), material
selections, etc.
The three criteria chosen to compute value are: airline NPV, MCPH, takeoff field length.
These three metrics were chosen at the outset of the investigations and a sensitivity analysis
was performed to determine which of the three had more leverage on customer value. Takeoff
field length was selected as a criteria because all five airline profiles were assumed to operate
from different airport locations and thus different runway lengths. However, both NPV and
MCPH had a larger impact on the value results. The MCPH calculation was separated
from the cash flow analysis in order to visualize the impact of NPV and MCPH separately.
All three criteria were used initially with an OEC where all the airlines had equal weights
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Figure 5.15: Combined Engine and Customer NPV Pareto Filtered Results
(preferences) for each criteria. The ranking of engines varied mostly with NPV. Therefore,
MCPH was rolled back into the NPV calculation and NPV was chosen as the only contributor
to customer value. This action was taken primarily to simplify the analysis of the competitive
results in steps 4 and 5. But it’s important to note that several studies were made with
varying airline criteria preferences. Finally, this area can be revisited in the future to include
other significant airline criteria.
The result of step 3 is a ranking of all the engines for both new and derivative projects
based on their customer value. This ranking will be used to compete the engines in the
market with the other firm. A market share value will be assigned to each firm based on
how well their engines perform against each other. To subject of computing the market
share and the subsequent payoffs to each firm is the subject of step 4.
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5.5 Step 4: Evaluate Projects
The proof-of-concept now proceeds with a competitive analysis of the projects and their
engine alternatives. The first step is to compute the market shares for each firm based on
the customer value analysis in the previous step. The result will be a market share matrix
that will then be used to compute each firm’s payoff for each project and engine alternative.
These payoffs are a function of several criteria, particularly including the market scenarios
outlined in the project roadmap of step 1. These market scenarios determine which firm is
the leader and follower into the market. A payoff matrix is generated and is carried over to
step 5 of the methodology for the competitive analysis and down-selection of the engines.
The reader is referred back to section 5.5 and Figure 4.11 as a reminder to the hierarchic
structure of projects and design alternatives.
5.5.1 Market share Calculations
The market share matrix, defined in section 4.2.4.3, is populated through an algorithm that
competes a firm’s engine design against another firm’s engine based on the engine value to the
airlines. There are 81 engine alternatives for each of the four project/market combinations:
new-market A, new-market B, derivative-market A, and derivative-market B. The algorithm
first filters the engines within each project by selecting the best engine (max value) among
the three thrust levels. This is consistent with how an engine manufacturer would design
an engine for a particular airframe. They would determine which of the three thrust levels
is best for a specific airframe and only offer that thrust level to the market. Figure 5.16
presents the algorithm for computing market share.
This thrust filter reduces the amount of engines from 81 to the top 27 engines. The 27
engines of market A are competed against market B’s engines and the the 7 best engines of
each market are selected. The point here is not to remove a market option completely since
there may be some airlines that prefer one market over the other. The same approach is
taken for the next project type and the entire process is repeated for firm 2. An important
note to make here is the assumption in this research that the game between these two firms
is symmetric. Therefore, for the purposes of this proof-of-concept, the 28 engines selected
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Figure 5.16: Algorithm to Compute Market Share
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Figure 5.17: Market-share Matrix
for firm 1 are the exact same engines selected for firm 2. The resulting market share matrix,
as expected, will show a 50% share to each firm along the diagonal of the matrix.
The market share itself is computed based on the number of engine orders won by each
firm. A reminder here is that market share is only based on the customer value via engines
sold. The resulting 28 by 28 matrix is reduced one last time to a 4 by 4 matrix, shown in
Figure 5.17, by selecting the top ranked engine for each project-market option. The numbers
beside each project-market option identify each engine from the list of 81 engines in the DoE.
The colors in the cells engine ID cells reflect the thrust level for that engine. The benefit
of tracking the engine ID through the entire process is observed at the end where it will be
possible to connect the choice of architecture with specific engine cycle parameter settings.
There are several reasons for reducing the matrix down to a 4 by 4. After analyzing the
28 engine options (7 for each project-market) in the matrix through the entire methodology
for various airline preference variations, the equilibrium results in step 5 showed that in
95% of these airline preferences the top ranked engine for each of the four options was the
same. The computation of the Nash equilibrium of a 28 by 28 matrix game takes about
15 times longer than for smaller matrices. For the purposes of this research, the objective
is to down-select engines in an intelligent manner and maximize the transparency of the
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decisions made in down-selecting those engines. Therefore, since the proposed framework
is capable of tracking these down-selections, it is possible in the future to analyze any size
matrix when faster computation capabilities become available. The second part of this step
is to compute the payoffs to each firm for every project-market option they have.
5.5.2 Project Payoff Calculations
The project payoff calculations are made with two primary inputs, the project completion
time for each firm as well as the market share data determined by the customer value in step
3. An important assumption prior to completing the payoff analysis is to make sure that
all the potential engine designs are technically feasible. This verification process is made in
step 2.
The engine manufacturer payoff calculation is made via a financial tool developed by the
author using the ALCCA analysis framework to assess the revenues and costs associated
with developing an engine. As stated earlier, it is impossible and impractical to assess
the accuracy of this model since neither the model nor the data it produces are publicly
available. The value added to the design process relies in the fact that the behavior of
this model is similar to that of real life models, since they are all driven by the basic laws
of finance. Also, the fact that this model is not calibrated against any set of real data
or other revenue model does not impede the engine comparison process from an economic
perspective. This is because any estimation error embedded in this model would affect all
designs in an equal manner since the amounts by which the financial solutions differ from
reality would be roughly the same for all estimations.
The engine payoff model employs a discounted cash flow model similar to the one devel-
oped for the airline. The main difference is that whereas the airline model uses passenger
and cargo revenue and operating costs to obtain a NPV, the engine manufacturer model
has two different sources of revenue. The first source of revenue comes from the sales of the
engine itself. The engine sales are determined directly from the market share matrix. In the
recent years the business model of engine manufacturers has shifted from being sales-centric
to more customer service-oriented. Engine manufacturers attempted to become profitable
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Figure 5.18: Payoff Matrix for One Market Scenario
by selling high quality engines with high upfront costs. As a result in today’s market en-
gine prices have dropped relative to historical prices, and the business focus has shifted to
providing strong maintenance contracts to ensure a stable source of revenue over the years
and reduce, in this way, market fluctuations produced by weak sales periods. The second
source of revenue of the ERM is therefore produced by maintenance contracts. Some of the
assumptions of the maintenance model include:
• A maintenance contract period of ten years after the engine is delivered
• An additional 10% of demand is produced for spare engines
• The normal production rate of engines per year is about 250
• Maintenance overhead is approximately 200%
• Maintenance cost per hour is approximately 10% of the actual cost paid by the airline
The structure of the payoff is based on equation 4.10 for each project of each firm. The
financial tool described previously is formulated based on this equation and the payoffs are
computed as described in section 4.2.4.3 in Chapter 4. The result is a payoff matrix as
shown in Figure 5.18
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Figure 5.19: Firm Payoff Simulation Algorithm
Since there is uncertainty surrounding the completion of engine R&D programs, a sim-
ulation of PCT’s is warranted to address the schedule uncertainty. The simulation of payoff
matrices is performed for different samples of PCT’s and the algorithm is shown in Figure
5.19. These are referred to as different market scenarios. For each market scenario a project
completion time is sampled from the log-normal distributions for each firm and for each of
their project types. These distributions can be constructed to simulate the knowledge and
expertise a firm has when it develops a new or derivative engine. When GE and PW were
determining which engine architecture to develop for the Boeing 777 program in the late
eighties they had to base their decision primarily on the existing technologies and engine
cores they had available. The purpose of having a distribution of project completion time
that is different for each firm is to model the differences in the way each firm develops par-
ticular engine projects and reflect that through a target project completion time. Figure
5.20 illustrates the proposed project completion time distributions for each firm and their
two architecture types. The choice of a log-normal distribution is made to reflect the fact
that engine manufacturers will typically have a target date for the completion of their engine
development. This target date is represented by the mean of the distribution. In most cases
however, that target date cannot be confirmed with certainty and there is a higher likelihood
that the date migrates to the right of the distribution than to the left. In other words, if
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Figure 5.20: PDF’s of Project Completion Times for Payoff Simulations
firms cannot meet their target date, the result is that is probably going to get pushed back
rather than pushed forward. This is evident in the development of several current R&D
aerospace projects like the Boeing 787 and Airbus A350-XWB.
After having generated all the payoff matrices for all the 1000 market scenarios the next
step is to down-select an engine that is strategically positioned to maximize the return to the
manufacturer. This down-selection will be enabled by a competitive equilibrium analysis.
5.6 Step 5: Strategy Valuation and Down-Selection
The payoff matrix generated in step 4 is an important result in this research. It specifies the
return on investment (in terms of NPV) for the engine manufacturer based on the engine
project they decide to undertake for development. Before making any engine selection
it is important to revisit the problem definition in step 1 to restate the goals and key
characteristics of the proof-of-concept. The QFD analysis highlighted the key technical
targets for the engines in terms of cycle parameters. It also provided a sense of what the
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schedule requirement would have to be for the completion of a engine for the 300 passenger
aircraft. Those results bounded the direction of the proof-of-concept and therefore the
resulting engine options available with their associated payoffs are a product of the “rules”
specified in the problem definition.
An engine selection decision must be made with respect to many influential factors.
There are two primary factors studied throughout this implementation problem, the market-
entry uncertainty of engine projects and uncertain competitor behavior. They each impact
the payoff a firm will receive. The first part of step focuses on evaluating uncertain com-
petitor behavior and identifying strategies to selection an engine the competition in mind.
5.6.1 Computing the Nash Equilibrium
The game structure matrix of alternatives in step 1 specified the rules of the game for
the proof-of-concept. The reason for specifying the way in which the game is played is
to select the correct game theoretic technique that will compute the game equilibria. The
game structure for equilibrium-calculation purposes is defined as a normal form game where
two players select engine projects simultaneously. In section 4.2.5.1 of the methodology
formulation, the process for computing the game equilibria was described. The reader is
also referred back to Chapter 3 for a broad review of useful game theory techniques for
these types of applications.
The Nash equilibrium calculation specifies what the optimal solution of the game will be
for both firms. By relying on the equilibrium result, firms will be guaranteed to not do worse
than if they were to select a different engine strategy. This assumption holds only when both
players can conclude rationally, that this result is optimum for them. However, the subject
of irrational decision-making, albeit beyond the scope of this research, is introduced in the
next subsection which introduces the element of risk in selecting engines.
The equilibrium of the payoff matrix generated in step 4 (Figure 5.18) for a discrete (fixed
PCT’s) market scenario, with the following assumptions is shown in Figure 5.21. This payoff
matrix is based on the market share matrix calculated in step 4 and the following discrete
project completion times and first/second mover advantage parameters:
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Figure 5.21: Payoff Matrix with Nash Equilibrium Solution
• PCT firm 1 new engine project (T1N): 2.5 years
• PCT firm 2 new engine project (T2N): 4 years
• PCT firm 1 derivative engine project (T1D): 3.5 years
• PCT firm 2 derivative engine project (T2D): 2 years
• When both firms develop new engines, leader receives (αNL): 50% of duopoly rewards
(equal advantage)
• When both firms develop derivative engines, leader receives (αDL): 50% of duopoly
rewards (equal advantage)
• When both firms develop different engine architectures, new leader receives (σNL):
50% of duopoly rewards (equal advantage)
• When both firms develop different engine architectures, derivative leader receives
(σDL): 50% of duopoly rewards (equal advantage)
These assumptions are the market scenario parameters that determine how the payoff (re-
wards) for each period (monopoly and duopoly) are distributed among the two firms. In this
very first result, the objective is to start from an equal distribution of rewards to observe the
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impact of PCT’s only. Introducing different values for the first/second mover advantage pa-
rameters would skew the results and it would become difficult at first glance to differentiate
the effects of PCT’s on the Nash equilibrium (NE) result.
The NE result in Figure 5.21 implies that both firms should develop a derivative engine
for a market A (base-range) airframe. Firm 1 would receive a payoff of 29 and firm 2 would
receive a payoff of 213. The main reason why firm 2 receives a higher payoff is because it
enters the market first as a leader and enjoys monopolistic rewards for the first two years
(T1D = 4, T2D = 2) before firm 1 enters in year 4. It is important to note however, that
all the payoffs are a function of both market timing as well as market share (function of
customer value). The NE result is more of a recommendation to firms. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for a decision-maker to look at the payoff matrix and determine an optimum
choice of engine. The advantage of having the NE mechanism is to recommend a solution
when there are two many options to down-select from. Although the NE solution is not
payoff-dominant for either player (both players could do better payoff-wise but with more
to lose), it is an optimal solution that maximizes the return on investment, no matter what
engine the opposing firm decides to develop. Playing the NE strategy can be viewed as a
risk-averse approach where each firm can do no worse if they maintain that strategy.
5.6.2 Firm PCT Simulations
The next step is to evaluate the results of different market scenario simulations. Here
we introduce the notion that there is uncertainty in the PCT of each project. A single
payoff matrix with a fixed PCT alone is not enough to make a robust engine selection.
PCT simulations provide decision-makers with a broad spectrum of potential situations of
different completion times between projects so that they can make a more informed strategic
decision as to which engine architecture to develop.
The results are generated based on the firm payoff simulation algorithm described in
Figure 5.19. For each firm there are four possible engine choices: New in Market A, New
in Market B, Derivative in Market A, and Derivative in Market B. The results in this
dissertation are presented from firm 1’s point of view. So for example, if the equilibrium
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Figure 5.22: Firm 1 Strategy Selection as a Function of Equilibrium Location
point is located in any of the cases 1, 2, 3 or 4 shown in Figure 5.22, then the choice to firm
1 is the same, namely, new engine in market A. Likewise, if the equilibrium is located within
cases 5, 6, 7 or 8, the resulting choice for firm 1 is a new engine in market B. A similar
approach could be taken from Firm 2’s perspective where cases 1, 5, 9, and 13 all correspond
to Firm 2 choosing a new engine in market A. This approach facilitates the visualization of
equilibria by only considering one firm at a time.
The market scenario results from the payoff algorithm are illustrated in Figure 5.23. The
multi-variate plot shows firm 1 and 2’s new project completion times as a function of the
Nash equilibrium location in the payoff matrix. The numbers on the matrix location axis
correspond to the game cases in shown in Figure 5.22. Based on the assumed PCT log-
normal distribution assigned to firm 2’s projects, it is possible to deduce from the market
scenarios which engine strategy firm should undertake. If firm 1 can estimate that it can
develop and introduce a new project within 4 years or less then it should commit to a
new project. However, if it believes that its new project will take 4 years or longer to
develop, it should switch and undertake a derivative project instead. Furthermore, if firm
1 stays with a new project strategy, it should focus entirely on market A. If however, firm
1 pursues a derivative project, it should focus primarily on market B. It interesting to note
that when a new engine strategy is optimal, targeting market A is more profitable and when
a derivative engine is optimal, market B is more profitable. These results are not entirely
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Figure 5.23: Multi-variate Plot of PCT’s for Firm 1 and 2 Illustrating Optimal Project
Selection
intuitive since one might expect a new engine architecture to satisfy longer range (market B)
aircraft missions because of its higher thrust potential. However, its important to note that
these results are not simply based on the technical performance of each engine. The payoffs
are driven also by the airline economics and how well each engine/airframe satisfies the
airline requirements. In these results, a derivative engine, albeit with less thrust potential,
is optimal for airlines that operate in long-range missions. In some cases, firms do not intend
to capture diverse segments of the market but instead focus on targeting specific airlines.
This information would then be fed back into this analysis so that more weight is given to
those specific airlines that operate in either base-range or long-range missions.
A look at the variability of the PCT distribution for new project reveals a dispersion
of market scenarios along the PCT axis. The same payoff algorithm is run three separate
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times for different values of sigma new, the standard deviation parameter of the log-normal
distribution. Figure 5.24 shows the inputs for that study. The resulting market scenarios
Figure 5.24: Increasing the Standard Deviation of the PCT Distribution of a New Project
are shown in Figure 5.25. The top grouping corresponds to a PCT distribution with a sigma
value of 0.05, the middle set corresponds to a sigma of 0.15 and the bottom set corresponds
to a sigma value of 0.25. These results show that changing the variability parameter of the
PCT distribution only impacts the dispersion of the market scenarios and not the project
“switch line”. It is worthwhile to note that the shape of the log-normal distribution has a
direct link to the dispersion of the market scenario results. The primary interest however,
is the project selection decision line that exists between project types..
A more complex result is illustrated in the multi-variate plot in Figure 5.26. It illustrates
the PCT inputs sampled from the log-normal distributions of Figure 5.20. However in this
case, the market scenario inputs for first and second mover advantages are no longer discrete.
A uniform distribution is given to αNL, αDL, σNL, and σDL. The distribution varies from
0 to 1. This is done to provide a understanding of the impact of these parameters from a
scenario where the leader in the market receives 0% of the rewards in the duopoly period
to where the leader receives 100% of the rewards. The case where the leader receives 0%
would simulate a situation where the follower enters the market with a revolutionary engine
(technologically more advanced) which would virtually displace its competitor. This would
158
Figure 5.25: Market Scenarios for Three Sigma Values of a New Project PCT Distribution
most likely occur when they are both offering the same type of engine for the same airframe.
It is no longer possible to distinguish a clear “switch line” from a new project to a derivative
project. For example, in the lower left-hand box of the plot, if firm 1 can estimate that it
can complete a new project within 4 years, it is not completely clear if it should commit to a
new project because there are some scenarios in which a derivative project may be optimal.
There is a region where both new and derivative scenarios overlap. This is where the effects
of the first/second mover advantages take effect.
The use of a first and second mover advantage parameter is a useful parameter to envision
what-if scenarios in the market. Until this point in the analysis of results these parameters
have been fixed such that there are no penalties in the duopoly period regardless of who
entered first or second. The reality in commercial aviation is that there exists an advantage
(or disadvantage) with respect to the timing of a firm’s market entry. The potential rewards
of becoming the launch engine for a new aircraft are very large because of the benefits
of capturing early customers. Airframe manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus however,
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Figure 5.26: PCT Inputs with NE Results of Market Scenario Simulations
would rather have two engines offered on their airframe. This will induce more competition
between the airframers since customers will have a larger variety of aircraft performance
to choose from to suit their operating structure. Before committing with an engine to
the airframer, manufacturers need to determine whether they can successfully develop a
particular engine type within their expected project completion time frame. If the market
rewards a manufacturer in the duopoly period for having entered the market first with either
a new or derivative engine then this is the type of knowledge that would help select the most
appropriate type of engine to develop.
5.6.3 Market Timing Results
The next set of results pertain to the impact of having an advantage in the duopoly period
when entering the market with a specific engine type. The experiment structure created
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in this research lends itself to a huge number of possible scenarios to examine. The ad-
vantages of using visualization and data manipulation software like JMP provides decision-
makers with a tool to dynamically change these first/second mover advantage parameters
and quickly observe the impact on engine selection.
The concept of a first or second mover advantage can be viewed as measure of market
risk. A firm may be more inclined to enter the market as a leader if there are more benefits
than risks when entering first. For example, market leaders will have access to a larger
customer base and potentially higher market-share. If however, the technological hurdles
are too large or the uncertainty of the market is too great, then entering first can be more
risky and firms would have to re-evaluate it’s market-timing. The results so far have shown
how the uncertainty in project development results in different market-entry scenarios and
thus an optimal project choice for each scenario. A further investigation is necessary to
model the effects of market risk that are not under the control of the firm. Two cases are
presented that demonstrate how these advantage parameters would influence the selection
of a particular type of engine.
The first case asks the following question:
• What happens when both engine manufacturers undertake a new engine program but
one is the leader and the launch engine for the proposed airframe?
The approach to investigate this problem begins by making some key assumptions. First,
in order to observe the impact of the first-mover advantage (αNL) the other advantage
parameters (αDL,σNL, and σDL) are set 0.5. This means that in the duopoly period both
firms receive a 50% share of the rewards. In Figure 5.27 the plot illustrates how a change in
αNL will affect the equilibrium solution of engine selection. The parameter αNL determines
how much of the duopoly rewards the manufacturer will receive when offering a new engine
into the market. This curve was constructed by training a neural network of 1000 market
scenarios. The approximation error is negligible and the model provides a good estimation
of the trend that occurs with these advantage parameters. This is verified by carrying out
independent market scenario cases by manually changing the parameters and using the Nash
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Figure 5.27: Firm 1’s Engine Architecture Selection as a Function of Alpha_NL
equilibrium software to evaluate the outcome.
Figure 5.27 has αNL starting out at 0.5. When all parameters are set to 0.5 the resulting
equilibrium suggests that firm 1 should design a derivative engine for market A. An increase
αNL from 0.5 to about 0.65 implies that firm 1 should switch from designing a derivative
engine to a new engine. For example, knowing that firm 2 will propose a new engine design,
firm 1 should switch to a new engine design if there is an advantage in entering the market
first.
The next case asks the following question:
• What happens when one engine manufacturer enters the market as a leader but also
knows its rival will follow with a derivative engine?
The situation described here suggests that both firms are planning on entering the market
with different engine architectures with firm 1 leading with a new engine and firm 2 following
with a derivative. Figure 5.28 illustrates how an increase in σDL from 0.15 to 1 implies that
firm 1 should switch from a new engine to a derivative strategy. This means that as the
advantage increases for a firm to lead with a derivative engine (when both firms propose
differentiated engine types) the firm with a new engine design should switch to a derivative
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Figure 5.28: Firm 1’s Engine Architecture Selection as a Function of Sigma_DL
engine. In this case it is too risky for firm 1 to stay as a leader with a new engine strategy
and instead should switch to a derivative design.
The equilibrium results also suggest that firms prefer to invest in differentiated engine
strategies when one firm is more efficient in developing a project and therefore will exploit
its efficiency to enter the market with that project. Studies by Ali et al.Ali et al. (1993) have
demonstrated too that late entrants with access to game changing technologies may have an
advantage in developing new project types whereas an incumbent firm would remain with
its derivative product as it relies on its experience in the market.
Another finding reveals that when the project completion times between differentiated
projects are very staggered (as they are in Figure 5.20) then firms will tend to pursue a
differentiated project strategy where they have most advantage in.
Another interesting discovery with the equilibrium results is that as the variability of the
project completion times increase for a new project, the equilibrium result tends towards a
derivative design. The implication here is that there is potentially more to lose (but also
more to gain) in going with a new project than a derivative project.
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5.6.4 Risk Analysis under Irrational Competition
After performing an equilibrium analysis on the different market scenarios, various engine
selection solutions emerged. However, those results were founded based on several important
assumptions. The most important one being that equilibrium solutions are most beneficial
when both firms are playing the game rationally. The next analysis does not include an
equilibrium calculation but instead uses the concept of risk to determine the best engine
choice.
In order to identify how risky a particular engine program might be it is important to
understand the definition of risk in the context of this research. In traditional terms, risk is
a measure of the likelihood and magnitude of impact of a given event or scenario. In the case
of designing aircraft engines, the risk associated with a particular engine could be defined as
how much (magnitude) that engine costs to develop or how much the manufacturer stands
to lose versus the likelihood that that engine does not satisfy the customer. For example, it
would be very risky for a firm to invest in a brand new engine design (typically very costly)
knowing that there are many airlines that actually prefer a derivative engine instead.
In the financial field and more specifically according to Modern Portfolio Theory, the risk
of a portfolio of investments is measured based on the standard deviation or the volatility
of the investments. The model assumes that investors are risk averse and will prefer to
invest in the asset with least risk for the same expected return as shown in Figure 5.29. A
similar approach is taken in this research which seeks to identify the risk associated with
each engine project in order to map a Pareto frontier.
The payoff matrix from Figure 5.18 is used to evaluate the risk of each engine project
for firm 1. Figure 5.30 illustrates the payoffs of firm 1 and firm 2. The ideal solution in
terms of payoff for each firm would be situated in the top right-hand corner. Maximizing
the payoff to firm 1 implies that firm 2 receives a smaller payoff.
The risk of each engine investment is determined by computing the absolute difference
in payoff that firm 1 can receive for each engine strategy regardless of what the competition
does. In other words, it’s the potential loss due to the uncertainty of what strategy the
competition might take. Figure 5.31 illustrates the plot of payoff versus risk for firm 1 for
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Figure 5.29: Risk versus Return for a Project Portfolio
Figure 5.30: Firm 1’s Engine Strategies for Fixed Market Scenario
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Figure 5.31: Firm 1’s Engine Strategy Risk Profile
the four engine strategies.
The results indicate that a new engine for either market A or B is less risky than pursuing
a derivative engine design for markets A or B. However, as a result the former engine
strategies also will potentially generate less payoff to firm 1.
5.6.5 Decision Factors in R&D Strategy Formulation
The construction of an R&D investment model showed that under rivalry, firms are assumed
to maximize their expected rewards under conditions of schedule and market uncertainty.
The management literature has shown that firms traditionally make project investment
decisions based on potential revenues and development costs via a net present value or
return on investment approach. One of the main challenges of this research was to show
how managerial decisions must also be made based on the impact of competitors’ technical
capabilities and how that will influence the choice of project.
It was shown that the project development costs and revenues are key factors in selecting
a project to develop as one might expect. However, other considerations were introduced to
solidify the optimal project selection. These factors are:
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• The relative efficiency between firms in developing a specific type of project (firm
characteristic)
• The uncertainty of introducing a project by a given target date (project characteristic)
• The effect of project substitutability in the market (market characteristic)
The assumption of a simultaneous-move game is important in this research but not critical
to the key observations made about project selection in general. A sequential approach
to project selection would add more flexibility to the firm by introducing a key piece of
information, namely the type of project the competitor decided to undertake first. However,
the goal in this research was to simulate the initial decision-making that takes place when a
manufacturer must commit to the airframe manufacturer with an engine and performance
guarantees.
5.7 Discussion of Implementation Results
Throughout each step in the methodology several results were obtained and then transferred
to the next step. This section is meant to provide traceability of results from step 1 through
step 5.
The methodology begins with a problem definition step that will guide the experimen-
tation process for the subsequent steps. In a QFD analysis the customer requirements of
a 300 pax aircraft market are mapped to engineering characteristics from a representative
firm to identify which engineering metrics had the largest relative impact on the customer
requirements. It was determined that specific engine cycle parameters: thrust, OPR, FPR,
etc. had the most significant impact on the requirements that were of high importance to
a customer utilizing this type of aircraft. These engineering characteristics and their tar-
get values are then transferred to the engine matrix of alternatives to provide guidance in
selecting specific values for the creation of an engine design space. Similarly, the customer
requirements with the highest level of importance were used to define the pool of airline
customer preferences in the customer matrix of alternatives. The QFD results provided the
necessary information to populate those two matrices. Both the game matrix and market
167
scenario matrix were designed to provide a broad range of experiment simulations for steps
4 and 5.
In step 2 the generation of engine design alternatives establishes design space to carry
out an initial down-selection of engines based on mission feasibility. In step 3 each design
is evaluated in the customer value model. There are five airline profiles that were created
from the customer requirements matrix of alternatives. Each engine design was evaluated
against all five airlines and was given a value based on how well it met the preferences of
the airlines. The airlines have a specific number of engine orders which, in combination with
the engine value, are used to compute the marketshare for each engine.
The game structure and market scenario matrices of alternatives from step 1 are used to
establish market scenarios for a two-firm normal-form game. The scenarios specify, through
project completion time distributions, the order in which firms will enter the market with a
given type of engine project.
In step 4, the market scenarios and marketshare matrices are combined to compute the
payoffs for each firm. The result is a 4 by 4 game payoff matrix. This process is repeated
1000 times by sampling different project completion times from each firms’ PCT log-normal
distributions.
These scenarios are then evaluated in step 5 where the Nash equilibrium is the objective
function that determines the optimal choice of engine project for each firm. The choice of
engine architecture is examined in terms of its design parameter choices from step 2. This
entire loop is illustrated in Figure 5.32.
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Chapter VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
The results of Chapter 5 demonstrated how to distinguish engine design concepts from each
other based on their competitive value. The result of those experiments was not meant to
recommend a specific engine project type to develop. The experiments and results were
instead designed as a proof-of-concept to highlight the relationships between engine design
and market value. In the end, the results provided a way of visualizing different engine
development strategies in an uncertain market environment.
The primary benefit of performing a competitive analysis in conceptual design is to
maximize the value in making the right choice of strategy early in the design process. As
a consequence, the firm is better positioned for any changes that may arise in the market.
The methodology developed in this research adds structure and rationality to the decision-
making process. The game theoretic approach also provides a structured way of enumerating
options and evaluating them in a quantitative manner. Finally, the global result is being
able to drive design decision-making with customer value and business return early in a
product’s life-cycle.
In section 1.8 of the introduction, three specific objectives were established to bound the
scope of the research problem. The first objective was: Expand the engineering technical
design space to evaluate the market performance of large-scale aerospace systems. Several
studies identified from the literature review showed how the design process of consumer
products has included a variety of market and competitive analyses. In the aerospace systems
design, particularly in commercial aviation, the conceptual design process often lacks the
fundamentals of how the business case, previously established, is interlinked with design
decisions. A design framework was proposed in this research to bridge some of the gaps that
exist in design decision-making. Specific market concepts, like competitor positioning and
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customer changes, were examined in an integrated environment with key technical design
metrics to study the interrelationships.
The second objective was: Introduce mechanisms that quantitatively model competitive
scenarios and their impact on the resource allocation for a portfolio of engine architectures.
This objective dealt with two factors, quantitative competitor modeling and financial in-
vestment decisions. The first task was to investigate competitive modeling techniques that
primarily provided a means of quantitatively benchmarking competitive behavior. This was
achieved via techniques within the field of game theory. The second task was to develop a
way of evaluating design concepts financially such that decisions could be made on resource
allocation. The two tasks provided a link between the competitor’s moves (behavior) and
the consequential impact on the investment decisions.
The final objective focused on the design selection process: Establish a framework for
down-selecting engine strategies that accounts for uncertain development periods and that
benchmarks potential design performance against the competition. The concept of market-
timing or schedule uncertainty was introduced into the decision mix since there was evidence
in the literature that the impact of entering a market as a leader or follower will make a
difference on the competitor’s choice of product strategy. The framework alluded to in the
third objective refers to the game structure in step 5 of the methodology that employs the
Nash equilibrium solution as a recommendation of optimal design strategies. This equilib-
rium approach explores the game design space by evaluating every possible combination of
a strategies between players and identifying solutions that may once have been obscured by
the complexity of the game.
The methodology developed in this research provided a systematic approach to formu-
lating an engine design strategy for different “what-if” scenarios in a competitive market.
The process by which this strategy would be created is summarized in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Formulating a Competitive Engine Strategy
6.2 Revisitation of Research Questions and Hypotheses
The first research questions were directed towards establishing a framework within the con-
ceptual design of aerospace systems that would include include uncertain market require-
ments and how these would be mapped to generate feasible designs.
Research Question 1.1: How can the technical design space of complex sys-
tems be expanded to model the economic success of R&D programs with uncer-
tain market requirements?
Research Question 1.2: How are customer requirements mapped to generate
feasible designs and establish value
The first objective and the first question are addressed by the modeling and simulation
environment created in step 2 for the engine design space and the firms’ payoff functions
developed in step 4 which provide an evaluation of the return on investment of R&D projects
for fluctuating values of customer requirements. The second question was answered in step 2
with the creation of a customer value model that allows the user to directly map engine design
parameters (like FPR,OPR,T4) with customer value metrics (like utilization, payload/range
preferences). The customer profiles were established based on different segments in the
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market, with high or low payload/range requirements or hot and high altitude take-off
performance requirements. The proposed methodology provided the direction for answering
the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The uncertainty of market requirements and competition can
be quantified within a single unified environment that synthesizes the business
case of customer requirements with the performance metrics of designs.
Steps 1 through 3 of the methodology established a way to introduce segmented market
requirements and linked them to the generation of engine designs. By employing some game
theory techniques that have been proven in a wide-range of fields, a competitive analysis was
performed in steps 4 and 5. This assisted in the analysis of uncertainty due to competitive
product positioning.
The second research area focused on analyzing competitive uncertainty in different types
of markets. It was observed that research and development programs that generate com-
mercial products are very sensitive to market forces. In order to carry out a competitive
analysis using the various advanced design techniques, the design problem was converted
into a game structure. The second set of research questions were aimed at investigating
techniques that could model design problems in a competitive manner.
Research Question 2.1: What competitive decision techniques enhance the
confidence in concept down-selection of existing design methods in aerospace
systems design?
Research Question 2.2: How can decision-makers quantitatively measure the
impact of a competitors product development strategy on the economic success
of their design?
The challenge here was to maintain the same or similar conceptual design decision criteria
such as thrust, engine weight, fuel consumption (for engine design) and additionally intro-
duce market criteria like competitor payoff, market share, so on and so forth. Chapter 3
provided a broad investigation into the field of game theory and techniques that provided
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the background necessary to perform these game scenarios. The goal here is to identify a
means to quantitatively represent the impact of a competitors’ move on a design strategy
at the conceptual level. It was determined through the second hypothesis, recalled below,
that the utilization of normal form matrix games are representative of competitive situations
that provide a platform for making strategic decisions.
Hypothesis 2: Through the use of game theoretic techniques decision-makers
can construct a systematic game-based methodology that enhances the design
down-selection confidence and mitigates the potential of financial risk.
The third set of research questions and the third focus area were meant to help facilitate the
design selection process by investigating different product strategies. The answer to these
questions arise throughout the results step 5 in the methodology. The questions below were
meant to guide the results analysis process.
Research Question 3.1: What are critical firm attributes that influence project
selection under competitive scenarios?
Research Question 3.2: What effect does the intensity of rivalry in commercial
aerospace systems have on project selection?
The project completion times for each of the firms’ projects were critical in determining the
payoff values to the firms for different market scenarios.
The structure of the research questions and hypotheses make it so that they build on
each other. Therefore, by implementing the methodology via Hypothesis 1 with the mech-
anisms to evaluate competitive uncertainty in Hypothesis 2 a study of the project selection
opportunities under the effects of different competitive scenarios was performed. The game
structure in conjunction with advanced probabilistic methods and a well-established model-
ing and simulation environment provided practical down-selection capabilities in the design
process. This was previously formalized into the third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Project development strategies can be formulated using proba-
bilistic techniques in conceptual design thus recommending robust market entry
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opportunities and optimal project portfolio selection.
The main effort here tested how different firm characteristics influence the selection of a
project and what effect one firm’s development attributes has on another firms’ project
selection strategy. A “best response” formulation was made for a firm given the actions its
competitor undertook.
6.3 Contributions and Lessons Learned
The key contribution of this research is the proposed methodology- a game-based decision
support method for systems competitive design. This methodology provided a systematic
way of quantifying the competitive effects and observing their impacts on the value of
different design concepts. The methodology was applied to a commercial engine selection
problem for a large passenger aircraft in a highly competitive market.
A second contribution is the formulation of a customer value model that was capable of
valuating each design concept in terms of its economic benefit to a customer. In the proof-
of-concept experiment, each engine design was evaluated based on its joint performance
with an airframe for a given mission mix by an airline customer. The simulation model is
capable of handling a wide range of potential airline customer profiles. This is useful to
engine manufacturers that want to observe how their engine design might perform under
different mission payload/range and utilization scenarios. Several key surrogate models were
constructed to provide the flexibility of modeling a broad engine design space.
The third contribution was the inclusion of competitive design techniques directly into
the engineering design process. Specifically, the concept of game matrices to evaluate design
options under competition and the notion of a mathematical formulation (in the form of a
Nash equilibrium) to identify optimal game solutions. These techniques provide engineers
with a rational and quick way of visualizing the impact of their design choices on their
potential return on investment.
There are also several lessons that were extracted throughout the investigations in this
research. The use of a standard discounted cash flow technique cannot fully analyze the
strategic impact of investment decisions on a firm’s future path. It does provide a way
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of forecasting the economic performance over a set time period but it cannot account for
rapid technological changes and the intensity of competition that is more dynamic in nature.
The inclusion of flexibility options to account for unpredictable events in the future can be
addressed by options theory (discussed in the next section).
The modeling of competitive situations via a simultaneous-move game formulation does
not account for decisions that can be made over an extended period of time. This is a major
drawback when formulating strategies for R&D development since decisions are seldom made
simultaneously by firms. The game matrix could be replaced by a decision tree that would
better model the sequential nature of competitive decision-making. This is discussed further
in the next section.
6.4 Recommendations for Future Work
The efforts of this research should continue in different ways. Several paths can be taken
based on the outcomes observed with the proposed methodology. These can range from
refining the existing framework with higher fidelity analyses to introducing additional levels
of complexity to the strategic decision-making problem.
Enhancing the Modeling of Schedule Uncertainty
One of the most significant areas of research in aerospace design is the impact of tech-
nologies on a systems’ performance. Understanding how technologies will impact both the
technical performance and economic viability of a system can bring a great deal of knowledge
to the conceptual design process. However, this knowledge can be enhanced by understand-
ing how technologies from different firms compete. This enables decision-makers to formulate
the best technology strategy when embarking on a new project.
Every technology has a technology readiness level or TRL that is an indication of the
level of maturity based on the stage it is at in its development process. These levels could
be mapped with the schedule uncertainty to have a more refined estimation of a project’s
completion date.
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Improving the Accuracy of the M&S Environment
There are several refinements that can be made to the engine M&S environment and
the customer value models. The use of the EDS platform was beneficial in this research
as it provided the experiments with a realistic design space of potential engine candidates.
However, several components of the EDS environment were “switched off” in order to reduce
the complexity of outputs. In particular, the ANOPP feature, which evaluates the engine
noise, was not used. The QFD analysis in step 1 identyfied noise and emissions as being key
players in choice of engine design. Therefore, these metrics would be beneficial to include in
future assessments of engine designs. The customer value models could likewise be improved
by gathering more economic data that could more accurately model the cash flows of both
existing airlines and engine manufacturers. This of course has been one the major hurdles
in this research.
The use of a normal-form matrix as a game structure in steps 4 and 5 could be replaced
with an extensive-form structure to evaluate the sequential timing of strategic decisions. The
concept of mixed strategies was introduced briefly throughout the research to demonstrate
its value in suggesting more realistic Nash equilbria. In multistage games the notions of
threats and commitments are important to model as well.
Evaluating Flexible Strategies
Competitive analysis alone cannot provide all the insights necessary at the strategic level.
It is important for both managers and engineers to think in terms of adaptive strategies that
may help address questions like: what is the value of growth opportunities and when does it
make sense to maintain a “wait and see” approach? Is a joint research venture or strategic
alliance more valuable in the long term? These are precisely the questions that need to be
asked that will help determine a firm’s competitive success but are made in the absence of
structured and quantitative analyses. Valuation methods like Real Options have emerged as
a way utilizing financial options pricing mechanisms to quantify the strategic adaptability
options, like expanding into new growth markets. The combination of Real Options and
game theory has provided a means to analyze the effect of uncertainty on the value of an
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Figure 6.2: Example of an Option Game (Smit and Trigeorgis (2004))
investment opportunity. Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) describe how a “wait and see” strategy
would play out in Figure 6.2. Two firms have an investment opportunity in a market with a
total value of 4$ billion. The value of the “wait and see” option under demand uncertainty
is 2$ billion which results in a total market net worth of 6$ billion. The right-hand side of
Figure 6.2 depicts a game matrix with payoffs to firms A and B for two options, wait and
invest. There are four possible scenarios where they either: (i) both wait and equally share
the profits of $6B, resulting in a (3,3) payoff, (ii/iii) one firm preempts the other and invests,
receiving the existing market value of $4B while the other receives $0, (iv) or both invest
immediately (simultaneously) and share the market value resulting in a payoff of (2,2). The
game results in a Nash equilibrium outcome where both firms invest and receive a payoff
of $2B each. This is example is similar to the prisoners dilemma where both firms would
be better off by coordinating their strategies and exercise the option of waiting until the
market value increases to $6B.
Competitive strategies can therefore be analzyed using both option valuation methods
with game theoretic principles. The strategic value can be obtained through a holistic
framework that introduces an expanded NPV criterion to capture the strategic commitmetn
value of competitive interactions.
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Product Management and Information Technology Areas
Further studies in the areas of product life-cycle management (PLM), supply-chain man-
agement (SCM), and enterprise resource planning (ERP) could benefit the upfront analysis
of selecting R&D projects. The goal is to further integrate the business practices with the
engineering processes to improve product quality, reduce time-to-market and become more
efficient at manufacturing products. Elements within those practices could lend themselves
to a competitive framework like the one proposed in this research.
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Appendix A
MARKET SCENARIO RESULTS
A.1 Engine Manufacturer CashFlows
In the market scenario simulations in step 4 of the methodology variations in first and second
mover advanatages were examined to identify how the payoff for each firm would change
based on these external market factors. In this section some results are presented for scenario
simulations of cashflows for different values of first-mover advantage for a leading firm with
a new project. Figure A.1 illustrates two cashflow plots. The top one is a simulation of of
the different Alpha_NL values. The effect on the cash flow takes place after the monopoly
period since it is at this point where both firm would split the market rewards. The bottom
plot in the figure illustrates the cumulative cashflow as well as the individual future cashflows
at each year in the production period. The red stems represent the cashflows in the duopoly
period.
A.2 Global Multivariate Snapshots
The multivariate plot in Figure A.2 illustrates the main engine technical metrics: SLS_Thrust,
TSFC at the Aero-Design Point, TOFL, BlockFuel (design), and engine weight. In addition
to these metrics the results for the Net Present Value of Airlines 1 through 5 are also pre-
sented. The results are categorized into four groups representing the four different engine
options available to each engine manufacturer: New engine in market A (blue), New engine
in market B (green), Derivative engine in Market A (black), and Derivative engine in market
B (red).
The multivariate results in Figure A.3 show the 1000 market simulations of different
project completion times (PCT’s) for the four different engine projects (listed in the previous
paragraph). The input metrics for PCT and the first/second mover advantage metrics are
presented in addition to the payoff outputs for each possible combination of project. The last
180
Figure A.1: Leading Engine Manufacturing Firm Cashflows for Different Alpha Scenarios
metric is the equilibrium type which signifies the Nash equilibrium result for each market
simulation.
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Figure A.2: Multivariate Plot of the Engine and Customer Value Metrics from Steps 2
and 3
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Figure A.3: Multivariate Plot Illustrating the Market Scenarios and Equilibrium Results
from Steps 4 and 5
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Appendix B
SURROGATE MODELING TECHNIQUES
The use of surrogate modeling techniques has become more and more evident in many
engineering design problems. This is particularly the case in the aerospace industry where
engineers use complex analysis codes for large-scale systems. These codes are beneficial
since they provide decision-makers with the necessary data and information to make key
observations about the behaviors of a system that are often too complicated for a human to
do by hand. Oftentimes however, in conceptual design, the problems are poorly defined and
there is incomplete information. When this is the case engineers can run the analysis codes
multiple times under varying conditions to provide a healthy design space to examine. The
necessary computer power to run these codes at all the key conditions is quite substantial,
even for modern computers and simple design concepts. The purpose of surrogate models
is to create a “model of model”, or a metamodel of the analysis code. This new model
approximates the behavior of the real analysis code. Several surrgoate modeling techniques
exist but this research employed both response surface methodology and neural networks.
These are described in the next two sections.
B.1 Response Surface Methodology
Response surface techniques are based on creating empirical models to approximate a sys-
tem’s behavior. Their explanatory power is limited by the scope of the data used to create
the model. The most common response surface equation is a linear, second order polynomial
equation based on a Taylor series approximation. An example is shown in equation B.1.
R = bo +
∑n
i=1 bixi +
∑n
i=1 biix
2
i +
∑n−1
i=1
∑n
j=i+1 bijxixj + ε (B.1)
The parameters in the equation are: R is the response, bo is the response intercept, bi is
the coefficient for the first order terms, bii is the coefficient for the second order terms, bij
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is the coefficient for the cross terms, and xi and xij are the independent variables and ε is
the error term. The coefficients bi, bj , and bij are typically calculated with a least squares
fit. The response is estimated for different combination of xi variable in the model. The
optimal combinations of design variables is created by using three level DoEs but they can
also be created using more levels of resolution. Response surface equations are not capable
of modeling non-linear behaviors in systems or discrete responses. For this reason the help
of Neural Networks is becoming more and more widespread in modeling aerospace systems.
B.2 Neural Networks
Neural Networks are a popular surrogate modeling technique based on the biological func-
tions of the brain. The process works by mapping a set of input variables to a set of responses
through a set of filters, called hidden layers as illustrated in Figure B.1 as described by John-
son and Schutte (2006). The first layer is the input layer and it contains the model inputs.
The output layer contains the responses and the layers in between are called the hidden
layers.
Figure B.1: Neural Network Conceptual Diagram
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Appendix C
BASE-CASE PAYOFF RESULTS
The PCT values are shown in Figure C.1. The figure is divided into the 4 game cases.
Each dot represents one game scenario (1000 total). The game scenario highlighted in red
represents a combination of 4 PCT’s, [τ1N , τ2N , τ1D, τ2D]. The model computes the payoffs
for each scenario and calculates the Nash equilibrium for that scenario. There are four
pure Nash equilibria possibilities. A scenario where both firms choose new in equilibrium
is highlighted in blue. Firm1 should choose new and firm 2 should choose derivative when
scenarios are green, derivative and new when scenarios are black, and both firms should
choose a derivative project when the game scenario is red. These equilibria results indicate
that projects that tend to be introduced into the market fast are preferable since they will
likely yield higher payoffs. The determination of the equilibria however, is driven by who
is leader and who is the follower. So the relative introduction of projects into the market
between firms has a more significant impact on the payoff than the speed at which an
individual project is completed.
The second test case in the base-case model adds four more independent variables:
[αNL, αDL, σNL, σDL]. These are the first/second-mover advantage parameters that alter
the payoffs of each firm to observe how the project choice changes when a firm is a leader
or a follower in the market. In a verification experiment, σNL and σDL are set to 0.5 so the
focus shifts to just looking at scenarios where firms enter the market with similar products,
i.e. [N,N] or [D,D], with advantages, αNL and αDL. Figure C.2 is a plot of the game sce-
narios for the second base-case test. The red points represent game scenarios where both
players should enter the market with a new product and the blue points are those where
firms should enter with a derivative product. The results show how an increase in the first-
mover advantage in the market for either project type beyond 0.6 will suggest that each
firm choose the project with higher leader advantage to develop. For example, in the lower
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Figure C.1: Base-case Game Scenarios with Nash Equilibria
Figure C.2: Base-case test 2 [N,N] and [D,D] Equilibria for different Alphas
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right-hand quadrant there exists a large market advantage for leaders of derivative products
but a disadvantage for leaders of new products. It is assumed both firms enter the market
with similar products so in this case they would enter with derivative products.
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Appendix D
SUPPORTING LITERATURE
D.1 Five Forces Model and Best Response Correspondence
Porter developed a competitive analysis framework consisting of five main factors that deter-
mine the attractiveness of a market. He then provides an approach for competitor analysis
by first creating a competitor intelligence system. “The knowledge of each competitor’s
probable moves and capacity to respond to change can be summed up, and competitors can
be seen as interacting with each other on a simulated basis” (Porter, 1998). The goal of the
intelligent system is to collect data about the competition, compile it and formulate strategy
accordingly. A variety of recommendations on how to proceed at each step is given.
Figure D.1: The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy (Porter, 1998)
The Best Response Correspondence (BRC) is a technique in game theory that produces
a strategy which describes the most favorable outcome for a player. This technique has been
applied to design problems for different optimization problems. Figure D.2 is an example
process of how to create a BRC. The exact equations of the best response correspondence
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Figure D.2: Best Response Correspondence Approach (Hacker, 1999)
are difficult to obtain for highly nonlinear problems. It is often difficult to develop a closed
form equation for one or more variables as functions of other variables. Therefore, the BRC
of players is typcially found using approximation techniques or surrogate models such as
response surfaces or neural networks.
D.2 Boeing 777 Aircraft Engine Market Trends
The following charts illustrate the Boeing 777 engine sales for each individual aircraft deriva-
tive. The sales are based on year in which deliveries were made to the airlines.
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Figure D.3: Boeing 777-200 Engine Sales (Deliveries) (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2008)
Figure D.4: Boeing 777-200ER Engine Sales (Deliveries) (Boeing Commercial Airplanes,
2008)
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Figure D.5: Boeing 777-300 Engine Sales (Deliveries) (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2008)
Figure D.6: Boeing 777-300ER Engine Sales (Deliveries) (Boeing Commercial Airplanes,
2008)
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Figure D.7: Boeing 777-200LR Engine Sales (Deliveries) (Boeing Commercial Airplanes,
2008)
D.3 Customer Value Modeling
A customer value graphical user interface was created for an engine selection study to down-
select engine designs based on payload/range preferences for customers.
Figure D.9: Payoff Matrix and Nash Equilibrium Modeling Tool (Excel)
193
Figure D.8: Customer Value Interface Model (Matlab)
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